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1. Macro-prudential policy versus asset price bubbles 
in monetary union member states –  
The case of Spain 
Małgorzata Karaś 
 
The paper considers the ability of macro-prudential instruments – top-down regulations 
applied on the financial system as a whole, aimed at slowing credit growth and decreasing 
systemic risk – to flatten a growing asset price bubble in a country not having independent 
monetary policy. This is problem is analyzed from the perspective of Spain – a eurozone 
member state, for which the common monetary policy turned out to be expansionary, and 
which introduced a macro-prudential tool, dynamic provisioning, in the previous decade. 
The paper analyses the factors that influenced the em rgence of the bubble of the Spanish 
real estate market in the previous decade. It takes into account demand and supply factors, 
as well as discusses the ECB’s monetary policy in the context of Spain. Finally, it provides 
an overview of dynamic provisioning, the Spanish macro-prudential tool. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic provisioning, macroprudential tools, monetary union 
1. Introduction 
Towards the end of the first decade of the XXI century, Spain, just like many coun-
tries around the world went through a severe financial crisis, preceded by a bubble 
on the real estate market and turmoil on the credit market. The nominal interest rates 
on new mortgage loans reached as low levels as 3-4% in the years 2003-5, which 
represented a radical decline from about 15% in early 1990, while the average ma-
turity of mortgage loans in Spain increased from 10 to 28 years between 1990 and 
2007 (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008, Garriga 2010). The property prices multiplied by 
over 2 from the mid-1990s to 2004 and by 3 in the period 1995-2007. These multi-
pliers for the whole euro area altogether are significantly lower: 1.5 and 1.8, respec-
tively – the increase in property prices in Spain was significantly higher than, for 
example, in the United States.1 In fact, the cumulative growth of house prices in 
                                                   
 
1 As Garriga (2010) puts it, the housing boom in Spain makes the boom in the United States appear 
small.  
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Spain was among the highest in the OECD (Garriga 2010, Salmon 2010). As re-
search shows (Fernandez-Kranz–Hon 2006, Caruana 2005), property prices‘ in-
crease in Spain was far beyond the long-term equilibrium, which makes it fulfil the 
criteria for a bubble (Kim–Suh 1993, Gallin 2003). 
Figure 1. House prices in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the euro area, 1995=1002 
 
Source: ECB, UK National Statistics 
 
Looking at the severance of the bubble in Spain, it seems necessary to pose a 
question: what specific factors on the supply, demand, and policy side might have 
contributed to the situation? 
2. Monetary policy 
The European Monetary Union has always consisted of separate, independent states, 
with a different level of development. According to numerous studies from the late 
90’s. (Flaig–Wollmersgaeuser 2007), mobility of labour in the countries about to 
form the Eurozone was low, real wages – rigid downward, shocks – distributed 
asymmetrically among countries, inflation – varied3, to a level not explainable by 
                                                   
 
2 1995 was chosen as the starting date of the chart because reference to house prices in 1995 is the most 
common in literature. 
3 For those reasons, EMU creation was a controversial concept from the economics’ perspective since 
its beginnings. As argued by many, for example Charles Wyplosz (2006), it was led by the political 
need, rather than well grounded in economic research. The whole process of eurozone creation, traced 
back by Bień (1988) as far back as to the Treaty of Rome signed i  1957, rested on Germany’s 
willingness to give up the Deutsche Mark (Wyplosz 2006) and, consequently, was strongly influenced 
by particular political interests at each stage (Bień 1998). On one hand, it can be argued that that the 
optimal currency area theory was not entirely operation l at the time of eurozone creation, and varied 
creation criteria were favoured by different researche s (e.g. mobility of capital and labour emphasized 
by Mundell (1961), strong trade within OCA favoured by McKinnon (1963), diversification of the 
region’s economy emphasized by Kenen (1969). However, as argued by Wyplosz (2006), economic 
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the Balassa-Samuelson effect.4 These reasons posed significant risks to the introduc-
tion of a single monetary policy regime: as suggested by Balcerowicz (2012) it 
could turn out to be inadequate to a country’s fundamentals, either periodically 
(“temporal aspect“, important for countries with business cycles imperfectly syn-
chronized with the “average“ business cycle of the euro zone to which the European 
Central Bank’s rate correspond5) or structurally (“structural aspect“, in countries 
with a different natural interest rate level6). There is broad empirical research which 
focuses on differences between the ECB’s monetary policy and optimal monetary 
policy from the perspective of respective countries. 
One of econometric analyses of inadequacy of the European Central Bank’s 
monetary policy to the needs of euro zone countries is presented in a paper by Flaig 
and Wollmersgaeuser (2007). As a measure of divergence tendencies in the euro 
zone they used the stress (Clarida et al. 1998) – difference between the Eurozone’s 
short-term interest rate and the interest rate that would be adopted by each country if 
it followed the “optimal monetary policy“, approximated by its central bank’s policy 
in the pre-euro era. They found that in the case of Germany the stress indicator re-
mained close to zero during the whole period (which implies that the ECB continued 
the policy of the German Bundesbank for the whole euro area7). At the same time, 
for most euro zone countries interest rates were too low in the period of 1999-2005 
by 1-2 percentage points. The ECB monetary policy was especially expansionary for 
Greece, Spain, Italy, France, and Ireland before 2003 (Figure 2). 
                                                                                                
 
logic was clearly given lower priority than political reasons in this process, as the basic criteria of OCA 
creation that most researches agree upon, such as strong mobility of production factors and same 
inflation and output growth rates (Bień 1998, p. 164.), were not fulfilled.   
4 Significant differences in inflation among EU countries could only partially be explained by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), that is the process of real convergence of 
lower income countries within the currency area (signif cant productivity growth in the tradable sector 
of these countries translating into higher real wages in both tradable and non-tradable sectors and 
consequent higher inflation). Recent empirical evidence suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
does not suffice as an explanation of persistent inflation in the EMU (Rogers 2007). 
5 There was no wide consensus regarding whether national business cycles would become more 
synchronized after the union creation (intensification of international trade could synchronize economic 
activities, so optimality of a currency area could emerge after a monetary union launch in countries that 
did not form one ex ante; Frankel–Rose 1998) or less synchronized due to higher specialization in the 
union and impact of sector specific shocks (Krugman 1993). 
6 Wicksell’s (1936) concept of an interest rate compatible with output being at its potential and 
stationary growth. 
7 It is worth to note that this fact can be partly justified by Germany’s contribution to the euro area’s 
economy: Germany’s GDP has ranged between 28% and 33% of euro area’s GDP (calculations based 
on Eurostat’s data). 
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Figure 2. Country-specific stress for Eurozone member countries, 1999-2005 
 
Source: Flaig and Wollmersgaeuser (2007) 
 
A similar analysis devoted exclusively to Spain was performed by Arghyrou 
and Gadea (2008, Figure 3). They modelled Spanish monetary policy before the eu-
ro-accession (1980-1998), then forecasted the interest rates which the Bank of Spain 
would have set after 1999 if it had been independent, and finally used the differ-
ences between the forecast and actual ECB rates as a measure of compatibility be-
tween the single monetary policy regime and fundamentals of the Spanish economy. 
They found that after 1999 the Bank of Spain would have set nominal interest rates 
twice as high as those set by the European Central Bank. 
Arghyrou (2008) published a similar analysis devoted o Greece and found 
that the ECB’s monetary policy also seemed too loose (and “incompatible with the 
Greek economic conditions”). Hayo and Hofmann’s (2006) research suggests that 
German interest rates would have been similar to those of the ECB under a hypo-
thetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. 
Similar conclusions to those mentioned above can be drawn from a compari-
son of the ECB monetary policy with the level of interest rates suggested for each 
euro-zone country by the Taylor rule. Caruana (2005) analysed the period of 2004-
2005 and found that the ECB’s monetary policy was then expansionary for Spain 
and Greece (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3. Comparison between nominal interest rate set by the ECB and three 





Note: If it had remained autonomous and continued its policy from the period 1980-
1998. Two variants: panel (a) not taking into account credibility gains caused by 
euro zone accession (b) with those included in the model 
Source: Arghyrou and Gadea (2008) 
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Figure 4. Deviations of interest rates in the Eurozone from the Taylor rule in 2004-
2005. Weights of 1.5 (inflation's deviation from target) and 0.5 (output gap), natural 
interest rate of 2%, inflation target of 2%, inflation index excluding energy and 
unprocessed foods 
 
Source: Caruana (2005) 
 
Clearly, therefore, Spain seems to be an example of inc mpatibility between 
the single monetary policy regime and a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals: 
from Spain’s perspective, the ECB’s monetary policy was expansionary. As argued 
in Karaś (2013) and demonstrated by a number of empirical analyses (e.g. 
Jarociński–Smets 2008, Taylor 2010, Ahrend et al. 2008), loose monetary policy can 
contribute to the emergence of an asset price bubble, for example a bubble on a real 
estate market. 
3. Demand factors on the Spanish property market 
The factors that drove the demand on the Spanish real estate market in the previous 
decade can be broadly classified according to two dimensions: the first division sep-
arates fundamental demand factors from those related to the ease of financing hous-
ing, while the second one separates policy from non-policy factors. 
Purely demand, non-policy factors include demography, immigration, and 
culture. Spain is a high owner-occupation, low private rental country: only about 
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13% houses in Spain are privately rented8 (Maclennan 2000). It experienced a giant 
inflow of immigrants in the last decade: the significant increase in population (over 
15% of growth between 2000 and 2011) was largely due to immigration. The net 
migration in Spain in the period 2002-2007 amounted to 87-102% of total popula-
tion growth each year, with Eastern Europe, Latin America and North Africa being 
the most important contributors (Garriga 2010). The s are of the foreign-born popu-
lation in Spain was as of 2011 as high as 14%. The significant growth in population 
certainly increased demand on the property market, but also affected the supply side 
(see later). 





It is worth noting that the inflow of immigrants toSpain was not only driven 
by the general economic growth of this country, which made it attractive for job-
seekers from abroad. An important factor was also the growth of popularity of holi-
day houses – due to the Mediterranean climate – especially among foreigners, such 
as retired citizens of the UK and Northern Europe. It can be argued that this way – 
due to the less favourable climate of the United Kingdom – this country contributed 
to the Spanish real estate boom (Muellbauer 2007). Holiday homes were also popu-
lar among Spanish citizens, simultaneously because of the atmosphere of prosperity 
in Spain (Garriga 2010) and a wish to compensate for high density apartment living 
in cities (Salmon 2010). 
 
                                                   
 
8 According to Maclennan et al. (2000), those countries owe it to their social democratic heritage. 
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Two more issues related to demography are worth noting. Firstly, Spain – un-
like many other countries, e.g. Britain – experienced a baby boom in the 70’s. (Fig-
ure 7, Caruana 2005, Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008), and that generation grew up and 
started to move out of their parents‘ homes in the last decade. Secondly, Spanish 
families’ are known for their traditional preference for home ownership (Caruana 
2005). 
Based on the analysis above it seems that pure demand factors driving the 
boom, such as demography and immigration, were relativ y strong in Spain. 
The second group of factors, purely demand policy-related factors, include 
fiscal policy related to housing. Intuitively, countries where tax treatment favours 
owner-occupied housing over tenant-occupied (for example tax credits from which, 
naturally, only house owners can benefit) seem to have a larger proportion of citi-
zens in owner-occupied housing (Garriga 2010).9 An example if such a country 
                                                   
 
9 Such policy’s fairness is disputable, as renters usually are the young and poor households. This is why 
Beynet et al. (2011) suggest replacing subsidizing ownership with targeted cash-transfers as a housing 
support for low-income households, especially that en demographic characteristics of the household 
could be taken into account. 
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clearly is Spain, which offered its inhabitants taxcredits available for 15% of amor-
tization and interest payments on mortgage debt, suject to an annual maximum. By 
strengthening the incentives of owning property, such a policy seems to have con-
tributed to the boom on the Spanish market: a model by Lopez-Garcia (2004) pre-
dicts home prices lower by between 11% and 21%10 had housing subsidies, implicit 
in the personal income tax, eliminated. 
The increased popularity of owning real estate among households would not 
have created the boom without an adequate response from the banking sector. This 
is why the next issues driving the boom on the realestate market relate to the easy 
access to financing which Spanish society enjoyed in the previous decade. 




The first group are policy-related factors related to the ease of receiving cred-
it. The first factor here is the low central banks‘ interest rate, which has already been 
mentioned previously. The EMU accession increased th  credibility of Spain and 
other peripheral economies, brought a consequent fall in the country risk premia 
(spreads between government bond yields of euro area countries narrowed to very 
low levels; Bini Smaghi 2011) and a sharp decline of real interest rates, which re-
mained below 0 most of the time between 1999 and 2007 (Figures 8 and 9). 
                                                   
 
10 Those numbers come from the version of the model with exogenous land prices. If land prices had 
also been estimated by the model, the difference would have been higher. 
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Figure 8. Policy rates set by the ECB in the period 1999-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat 




The general confidence in the future deepening of the EU single market, as 
well as in structural reforms to be adopted in peripheral countries, brought the ex-
pectation that their competitiveness and GDP growth should increase. This belief 
was shared by the financial markets, companies, and households. Financial markets 
were eager to lend to corporates and companies were eag r to borrow, both groups 
Macro-prudential policy versus asset price bubbles in monetary union member states… 
 
23 
expecting high ROI. Households were interested in both increased consumption and 
housing loans, aiming for an increase in their living standards and believing in the 
appreciation of houses in the future (McQuinn–O’Reilly 2007). Those mechanisms 
led to a general boom in the Spanish economy. At the same time, the increased cred-
ibility of Spain and low short-term interest rates made it easy for banks to obtain fi-
nancing on wholesale money markets. 




Another factor are the developments of the market of credit instruments them-
selves. In Spain, no significant number of subprime loans was advanced (Salmon, 
2010), and securitization was relatively limited there. The main reason for that was 
the conservative regulation of banks – ever since 2004, asset-backed securities trans-
ferred to SPV de facto still remained on their owners‘ balance sheets as only the 
consolidated balance sheets were assessed by supervi ors. However, the vast majori-
ty (over 80%) of Spanish homeowners used adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to 
finance the purchase of a house11, which made it easier to transfer the interest rate
risk on customers (Figure 11). 
                                                   
 
11 98% according to Garcia-Herrero and de Lis (2008). 
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Figure 11. Mortgage product interest variability 
 
Source: Lea (2010) 
 
A factor affecting the boom which differentiates Spain from a number of dif-
ferent countries is the fact, that – having noticed the lending boom – the Bank of 
Spain introduced in 2000 the dynamic provisioning system which in practice penal-
ized credit growth and could today be called a macro-prudential tool. It was adopted 
despite strong criticism from the Spanish banks whodescribed it as worsening their 
position against foreign competitors (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). The two objec-
tives of dynamic provisions were (Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010): 
- to slow down the credit growth by increasing the cost (in terms of provision-
ing effort) of granting new loans; 
- to protect Spanish banks from future losses which are a natural consequence 
of the relaxation of lending standards during a boom. 
 
The provisioning system after 2000 was to be based on three types of provi-
sions: specific and generic (both existed before) and statistical (the new component). 
The first kind depended on current bad loans, the second was equal to 1% of the 
credit stock, and the third depended on credit growth and was designed to offset 
specific provisions (pro-cyclical since there are few non-performing loans during a 
boom; Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). 
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In the new provisioning system, bank assets were classified according to risk 
categories and assigned parameters, with a standard (with parameters ranking from 
0% for public sector debt to 1.5% for credit card lending and current account over-
drafts) or internally-developed method (subject to supervisory evaluation). Statisti-
cal provisions were then charged on a quarterly basis. They could be either positive 
or negative, depending on credit growth (with a positive coefficient) and contempo-
rary bad loans (with a negative coefficient). Accumulated statistical provisions gen-
erated a fund, with an upper limit of 3 times the ad quate coefficient times the expo-
sure (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). 
What is interesting to note is that the dynamic provisi ning system was 
changed in 2004 – for a couple of reasons. The first one was the criticism from 
standard-setters of international accounting rules. They argued statistic provision 
was against the “fair value” principles of International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards and allowed profit smoothing along the cycle, masking the real situation of the 
banks. The second one was the significant increase of the sum of statistical provi-
sions as the boom continued. Total provisions reachd 2.5% of credit (with specific 
provisions reaching only 0.5% of credit), and the coverage of provisions over bad 
debt reached nearly 500% (Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). Those numbers 
were widely considered as too high, especially by the banks which again argued that 
the statistical provisions posed a disadvantage against competitors from abroad 
(Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008, Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). 
The Bank of Spain responded to these arguments by merging statistic provi-
sions with the generic provisions. The new generic p ovisions were counted using 
the following formula: 
 
generic provision = α ∆ credit + β credit – specific provision 
 
where α and β values are presented in the Table 2. The upper limit of the Fund 
of the new generic provisions was reduced to between 0.33 and 1.25 times α times 
the exposure (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). 
After the reform (especially as a consequence of the change of the upper limit 
of provisions) the ratio of provisions to credit decr ased, from 2.5% in 2004 to 2.2% 
in 2007. 
It is interesting to note that after the introduction of dynamic provisioning in 
2000 the growth of credit stabilized around 15%, and then slightly decreased, which 
might have been – at least to a certain extent – due to both the provisions and the 
burst of the dot-com bubble. However, after 2004 – which coincided with the 
change in the provisioning system – credit accelerated sharply and reached rates of 
growth above 25% in 2006 (Figure 12). 
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Table 2. Coefficients applied to dynamic provisioning after the reform in 2004  
Type of risk α β 
No apparent risk 0% 0% 
Low risk 0.6% 0.11% 
Low-medium risk 1.5% 0.44% 
Medium risk 1.8% 0.65% 
Medium-high risk 2% 1.1% 
High risk 2.5% 1.64% 
Source: Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero (2010) 
Figure 12. GDP growth (in light grey) and credit growth (in dark grey) in Spain, 
1991-2009 
Source: Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero (2010) 
4. Supply’s reaction on the Spanish property market 
A couple of factors which drove the supply side of the real estate market in Spain 
should be noted. 
The first one was the liberalization of constructible land in 1998 and 2003, 
which resulted in a 28% increase in the availability of land for construction (Garriga 
2010). As before, land which was not zoned for housing could be bought at a fairly 
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low price. After the liberalization, this land could be easily transformed into con-
structible land via an administrative process. Already filing the application for the 
transformation pushed the land prices forward, let alone successful application. This 
is why it became popular to buy land, apply, and resell it at a substantial profit or 
develop real estate. This legal opportunity drove land prices12, and generated profits 
for land owners, local authorities13, and corrupted individuals involved in the ap-
proval process (Salmon 2010). 
The second was the big reservoir of relatively low-cost labour, being both the 
unemployed (as the level of unemployment in Spain never fell below 8% of the ac-
tive population; Salmon 2010) and the immigrants, that could be employed by this 
sector (Garriga 2010). As a result, employment in the construction industry rose 
from 1.2 million in 1996 (9.2% of the labour force) to 2.7 million (13.3% of the la-
bour force) in 2007. Consequently in 2007 there were almost as many people em-
ployed in construction alone (excluding related activities) as there were in the whole 
industrial sector (Salmon 2010). 
It should be emphasized, however, that clearly the Spanish housing boom was 
demand-driven. Despite the strong reaction on the supply’s side, the real estate pric-
es had grown explosively. As a result of increased supply of the two essential pro-
duction factors, housing supply in Spain was able to grow very fast. 
                                                   
 
12 It might seem that counterintuitive that a liberaliz tion led to a price increase. However, let us 
consider the following example: 
There is a small country with 1000 km2 of empty land, 500 km2 constructible and 500 km2 non-
constructible. Constructible land is of higher value because it provides its owner with possibilities of 
making a high profit, for example via developing a block of flats and selling it. Let us, therefore, 
assume a price of km2 of constructible land to be as high as 1000 monetary units, while a km2 of non-
constructible land is worth 200 monetary units. Then the law becomes liberalized and it is possible to 
transfer non-constructible land into constructible via an administrative process. Some people decide to 
buy non-constructible land and apply for a change of its properties. In the first round, 100 km2 is 
transferred. There is now 600 km2 of constructible land and 400 km2 of non-constructible land 
available. The price of the initial 500 km2 of constructible land decreases. The price of the left 400 km2 
of non-constructible land increases. The price of the 100 km2 jumps from 200 units per km2 to slightly 
less than 1000 units per km2. As the two markets (of constructible and non-constructible land) slowly 
become one, the prices of the first type decrease and of the second type increase until they reach a new 
equilibrium. 
13 Their sources of income include taxes on property and property development – Property Tax, Tax on 
Buildings and Building Works, Tax on Increased Urban Land Value. Those together nearly reached 
50% of their adjusted income (reduced by transfers and money markets) in 2005. 
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5. Bust in Spain 
Slowdown on the Spanish real estate market started t the beginning of 2007 and in-
tensified after the burst of the asset bubble in the United States in the summer of the 
same year. Garcia-Herrero and de Lis (2008) mention two important channels of 
contagion from the US to the rest of the world: 
- funding liquidity dry-up and the closure of the wholesale money markets; 
- direct exposure to subprime losses (negligible in the case of Spain, where 
subprime credits were not granted on a large scale and banks had not looked 
for investment opportunities abroad). 
 
As a consequence, in February 2007, the number of new house mortgages 
granted in Spain was down by nearly 4%, in May – by 6%, and in October – by 
12%, compared to the previous year. The pace of decline accelerated in 2008, with a 
29% drop in May 2008 compared to May 2006, and a 42% decline in October 2008 
compared to October 2006. In January 2009, the sum of ortgages granted fell by 
58% from the equivalent number in January 2007 – and then stabilized (Salmon 
2010, Figure 13). 
Figure 13. Number of new urban house mortgages granted, Spain, 2007-2010 
 
Source: Salmon (2010) 
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As a consequence of the liquidity crisis, decrease in l nding, fall in the value 
of the banks’ assets (both real estate and equity holdings), and increased level of bad 
debts, the central bank had to intervene to support banks. 
In Spain cajas (“credit institutions with foundational origins and social objec-
tives” with public representation in their governing bodies; Catalán–Moretti 2006) 
made up a half of the banking system. As the crisis hit, the Bank of Spain had to 
support two of them: it provided Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha with tem-
porary liquidity support in early 2009 and took into administration the Córdoba 
based ‘CajaSur’ in mid-2010. On the other hand, the soundest bank in the EU ac-
cording to stress tests organized by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS, now the European Banking Authority) in July 2010 was the Spanish Banca 
March (CEBS 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
The bubble which appeared on the Spanish real estate m rket in the early 2000s was 
influenced by a number of factors on the demand (demography, immigration, cultur-
al factors, fiscal policy related to housing, credit market structure and regulations), 
supply (land regulations, immigration), and monetary policy side. In further research 
the relative strength of each of the factors should be evaluated in detail. In particular, 
in the light of discussion on macro-prudential tools introduction in developed econ-
omies (in the case of the EU introduced in 2014 by the Capital Requirements Di-
rective IV) it is worth verifying how the dynamic provisioning introduction and re-
form influenced the market. 
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2. Inflation targeting worldwide and in Hungary –  
A miracle or a disaster? 
Ádám Kerényi  
 
Inflation Targeting (IT) is one of the operational frameworks for monetary policy aimed at 
attaining price stability. Goodhart’s (2009) law states that any observed statistical regularity 
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. Central banks 
behave accordingly to their monetary regime, which all have policy goals. In recent decades, 
there has been widespread interest in shifting from a discretion-based to a rules-based 
monetary policy frameworks. The inflation targeting regime has a wide pro and critical 
professional literature. We all know, that inflation is a serious disease, but the role of the 
anti-inflatory policy is questioned by several economists, who advise that the monetary 
policies might focus on unemployment rate or the increase of GDP. The questions raised in 
my paper that: Is IT an exclusive monetary regime? Is IT the most successful equipment to 
reach price stability? Are the central banks the one and only responsible actors regarding 
the inflation rate? I am focusing in the second part of my paper to the Hungarian monetary 
policy regimes. Does price stability should be the ultimate goal for a monetary framework in 
Hungary? I think this paper is actual, because in Hungary there has been inflation targeting 
monetary framework since 2001 due to what I suppose the international financial crisis hit 
the country more severe than it should.  
 
Keywords: inflation, monetary policy, central bankig  
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been widespread interest in shifting from a discretion-
based to a rules-based monetary policy frameworks world ide (see Benati-Goodhart 
2008).  
The inflation targeting (IT) regime was introduced to eliminate the inflation 
bias, very soon many countries have adopted that regime, meanwhile in Hungary 
János Kornai (1983) listed seven different main diseases1 which attacks the wealth 
                                                   
 
1Inflation, unemployment, shortage, high level of external indebtedness, growth problems, inequality, 
bureaucratism. 
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of national economies. Among these diseases there ar  m ny trade-offs. In order to 
reduce the symptoms and complications of one disease, or even be successful in 
treating it, we are responsible for increase one oth r disease. There is no panacea. 
That is almost impossible to be full healthy, the non-healthy condition remains. Al-
most everyone agrees on that the inflation can be harmful2 to the society3, let me re-
fer to that expressions: inflation is the tax of the poor’s. The main reasons for the in-
flation are the imbalances between the actual supply and demand. “Inflation harms 
the economy via two interrelated channels. The level of inflation, on the one hand, 
and inflation uncertainty, i.e. erratic changes in prices, on the other, may induce 
costs, thereby reducing social welfare (Kiss–Krekó 2004, p. 7.)”. If we analyze the 
global inflation between 1990 and 2013 (Table 1) we might think that the golden era 
of decreasing and reaching a constant low inflation has been arrived. In the econom-
ic history that is a unique process when the inflation went down so fast. Neverthe-
less this is only a precondition of sustainable price stability, because long-term price 
stability depends less and less on domestic monetary policy.  
Table 1. Inflation, average consumer prices 
Geo – time 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
World 17,9% 15,3% 27,7% 14,4% 4,6% 3,8% 3,6% 3,8% 
Advanced economies 13,7% 5,4% 5,1% 2,6% 2,3% 2,3% 1,5% 1,4% 
Euro area  n/a n/a n/a 2,4% 2,2% 2,2% 1,6% 1,5% 
Major advanced economies (G7) 12,4% 3,8% 4,7% 2,2% 2,2% 2,4% 1,4% 1,3% 
European Union 12,6% 6,1% 27,5% 5,0% 3,1% 2,3% 2,0% 1,7% 
Emerging market and develop-
ing economies n/a n/a 98,7% 39,0% 8,6% 5,9% 5,9% 6,2% 
Central and eastern Europe 27,5% 17,7% 140,4% 9,2% 29,3% 5,9% 5,3% 4,1% 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013 
downloaded: 2014-03-09 
 
One of the Maastricht criteria states that the inflation rate is an annual refer-
ence period shall not exceed the greater of 1.5% of the average of the three Member 
States with the lowest inflation rate index. In comparison, if we look at how differ-
ent inflation rates over the last eleven years from within the European Monetary Un-
ion (Table 2), we can see that the difference betwen the countries with the lowest 
                                                   
 
2But there are evidence only for its harm to the economy when the inflation is unexpected, double digit 
or higher. 
3Every inflation is basically antisocial (Inotai 2011, p. 361.). 
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and the highest inflation rate is always higher than the 2,2%, resulting in a dramatic 
divergences in a decade. 
Table 2. Inflation in the Euro area from 2002 to 2013 
Geo - time 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Belgium 1,6 1,5 1,9 2,5 2,3 1,8 4,5 0,0 2,3 3,4 2,6 1,2 
Germany 1,4 1,0 1,8 1,9 1,8 2,3 2,8 0,2 1,2 2,5 2,1 1,6 
Estonia 
         
5,1 4,2 3,2 
Ireland 4,7 4,0 2,3 2,2 2,7 2,9 3,1 -1,7 -1,6 1,2 1,9 0,5 
Greece 3,9 3,4 3,0 3,5 3,3 3,0 4,2 1,3 4,7 3,1 1,0 -0,9 
Spain 3,6 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,6 2,8 4,1 -0,2 2,0 3,1 2,4 1,5 
France 1,9 2,2 2,3 1,9 1,9 1,6 3,2 0,1 1,7 2,3 2,2 1,0 
Italy 2,6 2,8 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,0 3,5 0,8 1,6 2,9 3,3 1,3 
Cyprus 
      
4,4 0,2 2,6 3,5 3,1 0,4 
Luxembourg 2,1 2,5 3,2 3,8 3,0 2,7 4,1 0,0 2,8 3,7 2,9 1,7 
Malta 
      
4,7 1,8 2,0 2,5 3,2 1,0 
Netherlands 3,9 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,6 2,2 1,0 0,9 2,5 2,8 2,6 
Austria 1,7 1,3 2,0 2,1 1,7 2,2 3,2 0,4 1,7 3,6 2,6 2,1 
Portugal 3,7 3,3 2,5 2,1 3,0 2,4 2,7 -0,9 1,4 3,6 2,8 0,4 
Slovenia 
     
3,8 5,5 0,9 2,1 2,1 2,8 1,9 
Slovakia 
       
0,9 0,7 4,1 3,7 1,5 
United King 1,3 1,4 1,3 2,1 2,3 2,3 3,6 2,2 3,3 4,5 2,8 2,6 
Iceland 5,3 1,4 2,3 1,4 4,6 3,6 12,8 16,3 7,5 4,2 6,0 4,1 
Min 1,3 1,0 1,3 1,4 1,7 1,6 2,2 -1,7 -16 1,2 1,0 -0,9 
Max 5,3 4,0 3,2 3,8 4,6 3,8 12,8 16,3 7,5 5,1 6,0 4,1 
Difference 4,0 3,0 1,9 2,4 2,9 2,2 10,6 18,0 9,1 3,9 5,0 5,0 
Source: Eurostat  
2. Different goals, methods, frameworks 
Over much of the 20th century macroeconomic stabilizat on was pursued through 
active discretionary monetary with a fixed exchange rat  regime. 
Disappointed with the excessive focus of economists in controlling business 
cycles, while neglecting the efficiency and growth, Milton Friedman (1948) was the 
 Ádám Kerényi 
 
36
first to articulate a coherent framework of monetary nd fiscal rules. Stated in its 
simplest form, his proposal called for a stable money supply calibrated only to ac-
commodate actual government budget deficits or surpluses generated by a cyclical-
ly-balanced budget, which would of course allow for the operation of automatic sta-
bilizers. Inspired by this proposal, rules-based macroeconomic policy frameworks 
have evolved in multiple ways to capture real-world needs and complexities of dif-
fering economic environments. In essence, a rules-based framework is commitment 
technology. Under such a framework, the fiscal or mnetary authority is bound to 
pursue a predictable policy course, within certain numerical and qualitative con-
straints on a well-defined performance target, such as inflation, public debt, or 
budget balance. As commitment technology, the framework encompasses policy 
rules and procedures that link decision-making to the specified target. The linkages 
include institutional requirements and technical requirements. For instance, in the 
monetary area, inflation targeting is predicated on an effective transmission mecha-
nism between the base interest rate and the inflation rate, possibly specified within a 
coherent macroeconomic model, which underlies inflation forecasts. In the fiscal ar-
ea, policy rules must be supported by an orderly and transparent budget process. The 
latter provide the basis for reliable and unbiased hort- to medium-term fiscal fore-
casts, as well as for long-term scenarios to ascertain public debt sustainability. A key 
element of the framework is a well-defined policy reaction function. The precise 
specification of the interest rate function (simply stated, as a function of the devia-
tion of expected inflation from the target rate and of the output gap) used for infla-
tion targeting is country-specific, yet within a broad pattern across countries (Kopits 
2014). 
When voters have three or more distinct alternatives K nneth Arrow’s para-
dox4 states that no rank order voting system can convert th  ranked preferences of 
individuals into a community-wide ranking while also meeting a specific set of crite-
ria. Political decisions, if they are principled, rest on value judgments. Politicians 
and citizens participating in the political process must choose a position in the con-
flict between such ultimate values. Inflation is a monetary syndrome so that is logic 
we can hope for its curing from a monetary regime.  
A major argument for establishing a rules-based framework is to anchor ex-
pectations of economic agents and financial markets as regards policy goals and pol-
icymaking. Regarding monetary policy the expectations are to be anchored to price 
stability. Anchoring inflation expectations tends to reduce uncertainty and to en-
courage investment, saving and work effort decisions t  be taken from a longer term 
                                                   
 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem. 
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rather than a short-term perspective, so the reduction of uncertainty tends to lower 
the discount rate. The ensuing decisions contribute to higher economic growth. In-
troduction of a rules-based framework can be particularly useful for signaling a par-
adigm shift in a country where macroeconomic policy management has experienced 
erosion in credibility. If accompanied by much-needd structural reforms (rationaliz-
ing government employment, targeting subsidies and pensions, eliminating tax dis-
tortions, etc.), such policy signaling can initiate  virtuous economic cycle by induc-
ing a decline in the sovereign risk premium, followed by a boost in economic activi-
ty, and culminating in an increased growth path (Kopits 2014). 
The following monetary regimes exist (Table 3): 
- Monetary targeting; 
- Exchange rate targeting; 
- Real exchange rate targeting; 
- Inflation targeting; 
- Hybrid; 
- No strategy-strategy. 
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Source: Habermeier et al. (2009, p. 57.)  
 
In some respects, the European Union represents a special case of a monetary 
union with a highly decentralized system of subnational governments. 
Although good practices have evolved in shaping rules-based frameworks, 
there is no universal standard applicable worldwide. In fact, it is hard to find two 
countries that have the same framework, even in terms of design, but especially in 
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practice. Whereas there is some convergence toward a standard template in the de-
sign and implementation of an inflation targeting re ime (Kopits 2014). 
3. Inflation Targeting worldwide 
It is now widely accepted that the primary role of monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability. An operating definition of price stability that is now broadly accepted 
has been offered by Alan Greenspan “Price stability obtains when economic agents 
no longer take account of the prospective change in the general price level in their 
economic decision making” (2009). This is often thought to correspond to an an ual 
rate of inflation in the low single digits. Inflation targeting is one of the operational 
frameworks for monetary policy aimed at attaining price stability. In contrast to al-
ternative strategies, notably money or exchange rate targeting, which seek to achieve 
low and stable inflation through targeting intermediate variables – for example, the 
growth rate of money aggregates or the level of the exchange rate of an “anchor” 
currency – Inflation Targeting involves targeting iflation directly. The literature of-
fers several different definitions of inflation targeting. In practice, however, inflation 
targeting has two main characteristics that distinguish it from other monetary policy 
strategies: 
1. The central bank is mandated, and commits to, a unique numerical target 
in the form of a level or a range for annual inflation. A single target for in-
flation emphasizes the fact that price stabilization is the primary focus of 
the strategy, and the numeric specification provides a guide to what the au-
thorities intend as price stability. 
2. The inflation forecast over some horizon is the de facto intermediate target 
of policy. For this reason inflation targeting is sometimes referred to as 
“ inflation forecast targeting”. Since inflation is partially predetermined in 
the short term because of existing price and wage contracts and/or indexa-
tion to past inflation, monetary policy can only influence expected future 
inflation. By altering monetary conditions in response to new information, 
central banks influence expected inflation and bring it in line over time 
with the inflation target, which eventually leads actual inflation to the tar-
get (IMF 2005, pp. 161-162.). 
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Table 4. Inflation target worldwide 
Country Inflation targeting adoption date 
New Zealand 1990 
Canada 1991 
United Kingdom 1992 
Australia 1993 
Sweden 1993 























Source: Sarwat (2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm 
 
Mishkin says that there are 5 major characteristics of this monetary regime, 
which are the follows: “Inflation targeting is a recent monetary policy strategy that 
encompasses five main elements: 1) the public announcement of medium-term nu-
merical targets for inflation; 2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals re subordinated; 3) an in-
formation inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary aggre-
gates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; 4) 
increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy hrough communication with 
the public and the markets about the plans, objectiv s, and decisions of the monetary 
authorities; and 5) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its infla-
tion objectives. Inflation targeting requires that a decision be made on what price 
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stability means in practice. Alan Greenspan has provided a widely-cited definition of 
price stability as a rate of inflation that is sufficiently low that households and busi-
nesses do not have to take it into account in making everyday decisions. This defini-
tion of price stability is a reasonable one and operationally, any inflation number be-
tween zero and 3% seems to meet this criterion (Mishkin 2001, p. 2.)”.  
Inflation Targeting has become an increasingly popular monetary policy strat-
egy, with many countries now inflation targeters. After New Zealand had introduced 
Inflation Targeting were 27 other countries that adopted it, fixing the consumer price 
index as their monetary policy goal (Table 4). The government outsources the deci-
sion-making to an independent central bank which in tur  is accountable to the gov-
ernment, the legislature, and the public. Performance under the inflation target is 
continuously monitored and communicated by the central bank (including through 
quarterly inflation reports); also, deviations from the inflation target must be ex-
plained (Kopits 2014). 
3.1. What to do with IT in good times? 
It is well documented that, by and large, performance under rules-based monetary 
frameworks has been favorable. Inflation targeting, whether explicit or implicit, 
conducted by independent central banks, has contributed significantly to an almost 
uninterrupted record of low inflation in more than three dozen countries around the 
world. Arguably, this record was helped significantly by tailwinds during the Great 
Moderation. Integration of the Asian workforce into the world labor market and IT-
based productivity gains in industrial countries have been major drivers, which al-
lowed a rather loose monetary stance (and complacency) in some countries. The ex-
perience has been particularly beneficial in emerging market economies, where in-
flation targeting has served as a useful disinflation device from double-digit rates 
Most of the inflation targeters had poor initial conditions prior to the adapta-
tion of Inflation Targeting regime (see Table 5). Table 5 represents a cross-country – 
in Emerging and Industrial countries – analysis (data source International Monetary 
Fund 2005, p. 178.).  
However, in recent years, inflation targeting regimes in many of these coun-
tries have been under pressure from strong capital inflows associated with extraordi-
nary liquidity expansion in the advanced economies (Kopits 2014). 
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Table 5. Initial conditions prior to adopting Inflation Targeting  









Emerging Countries    
Philippines 25% 29% 50% 13% 
Israel 42% 22% 29% 48% 
Czech Republic 33% 23% 60% 26% 
Peru 8% 25% 83% 27% 
Hungary 25% 50% 15% 53% 
Korea 42% 44% 32% 29% 
Brazil 25% 54% 56% 26% 
Chile 25% 43% 67% 28% 
Thailand 8% 57% 57% 44% 
Poland 25% 42% 65% 35% 
Colombia 25% 41% 63% 39% 
South Africa 33% 64% 64% 53% 
Mexico 58% 41% 68% 48% 
Industrial Countries    
New-Zeeland 67% 43% 14% 28% 
Iceland 58% 43% 33% 39% 
Australia 67% 56% 57% 52% 
Norway 58% 56% 64% 55% 
Canada 100% 41% 48% 53% 
United Kingdom 92% 62% 44% 53% 
Sweden 92% 55% 66% 41% 
Switzerland 58% 68% 77% 56% 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2005, p. 178.) 
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3.2. What to do with IT in the times of financial crises? 
„Today inflation targeting is been put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail” 
(Stiglitz 2008). The governors of different central b nks of major advanced econo-
mies decided to reach certain overarching goals, which are the follows: (1) lower 
unemployment to a 6.5 % rate in the United States, (2) to save the euro in the Euro-
pean Union, and (3) to end deflation in Japan. Faced with zero-bound interest rates, 
central banks adopted “forward guidance,” as a form f rule, in the implementation 
of quantitative easing programs (Woodford 2012). 
In the European Union, the one-size-fits-all monetary policy in the euro area 
has been less than successful and the Stability and Growth Pact has failed upon im-
plementation (Kopits 2014). 
The other critics of IT Inflation targeting in transition economies has been a 
more challenging task than in developed economies (Daianu–Lungu 2005, Freed-
man–Ötker-Robe 2009, Rose 2007, Walsh 2009a, 2009b). As experience with IT in 
transition economies shows, the central banks in these countries often missed infla-
tion targets by a sensible amount.5 „The country experiences support the earlier ar-
guments that countries do not have to satisfy a long ist of preconditions at the outset 
to implement the IT framework successfully. Among the sample countries, only one 
(Canada) was well-positioned to move to a full-fledg  IT regime at the time that it 
adopted the policy framework. In others, while some of the so-called preconditions 
were met, a number of them were missing and were established gradually over time 
after the adoption of IT (Freedman–Ötker-Robe 2009, p. 6.)”, see also on Table 6.  
After a brief period following the transition, all Visegrád countries (V4) opted 
for an inflation targeting regime, later Romania also introduced IT. In Table 7 we 
can state that out of 32 trials only 14 times (with green color) were reached the tar-
get in Czech Republic and in Poland between 1998 and 2013.  
 
                                                   
 
5 Also criticize IT the following economists: Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley 
Mohamed El-Erian, PIMCO Arminio Fraga, Gavea Investimentos, Takatoshi Ito, University of Tokyo, 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Bruegel, Eswar Prasad, Cornell University and Brookings Institution, Raghuram 
Rajan, University of Chicago, Maria Ramos, Absa Group Ltd., Carmen Reinhart, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Hélène Rey, London Business School, Dani Rodrik, Harvard University, 
Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University, Hyun Song Shin, Princeton University, Andrés Velasco, 
Columbia University, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, University of Mainz, Yongding Yu, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences 
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Table 6. Main Elements of Successful Inflation Targeting Implementation 
Conditions  Countries satisfying 
Price stability as the primary 
goal of monetary policy  
Romania and Turkey 
Price stability main objective 
with other goals  
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic; Hungary, Israel and Poland (with 
exchange rate bands) 
Goal independence or agree-
ment with the government on 
inflation target path 
Israel (government set the target); Canada, Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, and Turkey (joint between government and CB); Chile, and Po-
land (CB) 
Absence of fiscal dominance 
(gov. access to CB credit lim-
ited/ prohibited) 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, 
and Turkey 
Central bank instrument inde-
pendence 
Canada (de facto) Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, 
Romania, and Turkey 
Well-understood transmission 
mechanism 
Relatively good in Canada (though with gaps); Basic at outset, with 
continuing efforts in: Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Po-
land, Romania, and Turkey 
Reasonable degree of control 
over short-term interest rates 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, and Turkey. Hungary, Israel, and 
Poland (though reasonable, it was complicated somewhat by simul-
taneous pursuit of the ER target) 
Reasonably well-developed fi-
nancial markets 
Canada and Chile (well-developed) Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel 
(relatively well-developed), Turkey, Poland, and Romania (less well-
developed) 
Reasonably stable financial sys-
tem 
Canada, Chile, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, and Turkey 
Modeling/forecasting capacity 
Canada (well-developed). In the remaining countries--little at the 
start, developed and improved over time. 
Mechanisms of accountability  
Canada (no formal accountability mechanism at the outset, but need 
to explain monetary policy to public; formal mechanisms established 
over time); Turkey (through requirement to inform the public about 
CB operations and monetary policy and when targets were not met at 
the designated time). 
Source: Freedman–Ötker-Robe (2009, p. 6.) 
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Table 7. Inflation Targeting Systems in Czech Republic and in Poland between 1998 
and 2013 
Czech Republic Poland 
Target Actual Target Actual 
1998 5,5-6,5% 10,70% N/A 11,80% 
1999 4-5% 2,10% 6,4-7,8% 7,30% 
2000 3,5-5,5% 3,80% 5,4-6,8% 10,10% 
2001 2-4% 4,68% 6-8% 5,50% 
2002 2,75-4,75% 1,88% 4-6% 1,90% 
2003 2,5-4,5% 0,11% 2-4% 0,80% 
2004 2-4% 2,78% 1,5-3,5% 3,49% 
2005 2-4% 1,84% 1,5-3,5% 2,13% 
2006 2-4% 2,54% 1,5-3,5% 1,03% 
2007 2-4% 2,86% 1,5-3,5% 2,49% 
2008 2-4% 6,34% 1,5-3,5% 4,22% 
2009 2-4% 1,03% 1,5-3,5% 3,45% 
2010 2-4% 1,46% 1,5-3,5% 2,58% 
2011 2-4% 1,93% 1,5-3,5% 4,27% 
2012 2-4% 3,29% 1,5-3,5% 3,70% 
2013 2-4% 1,42% 1,5-3,5% 0,90% 
Source: IMF  
 
Contrary to the criticism that rules-based frameworks are too rigid, well-
designed frameworks are sufficiently flexible to compensate for economic shocks. 
Indeed, inflation targeting can be constructed to all w explicitly or implicitly, in 
some cases automatically, for compensatory offsets to output shocks. For example, 
inflation targets can be formulated in implicit terms or within a band or (under the 
Taylor rule) with a dual mandate by including the output gap as an additional deter-
minant (Kopits 2014). 
4. IT in Hungary 
Table 3 showed that Hungary is using an IT monetary regime. The central bank law 
states that the main goal of the Hungarian National Bank is to reach and sustain the 
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price stability. For this purpose there has been introduced the inflation targeting 
monetary framework (IT) since 2001.6 The Hungarian National Bank with the gov-
ernment has a middle-term inflation rate goal, which is equal 3% of the official-, 
Central Statistic Office measured average consumer price index. The MNB said that 
this measure is consistent with the price stability, although many leader economists 
suggest that price stability may be 4% or above (seBlanchard et al. 2010, p. 11.). 
Figure 1 and Table 8. show the Hungarian IT’s results.  
Figure 1. CPI and Inflation Targeting in Hungary  
 
Source: Hungarian National Bank  
 
We can see that the IT has not been successful in Hungary. “The practical im-
plications of long-term optimal inflation in Hungary are, to a certain extent, limited 
by the fact that the medium/long-term inflation target should meet the criteria of 
adopting the euro. In order to join the euro area, Hungary must reduce inflation to a 
level consistent with the relevant convergence criterion (Kiss–Krekó 2004, p. 4.).” 
                                                   
 
6 Before 2001 there used to be the preannounced crawling exchange rate peg framework.  
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Table 8. Inflation and targets in Hungary 
Year Inflation Target 
2001 6,8% 5,8% 
2002 4,8% 3,5%-5,5% 
2003 5,7% 2,5%-4,5% 
2004 6,1% 2,5%-4,5% 
2005 3,3% 3%-5% 
2006 6,5% 2,5%-4,5% 
2007 8,0% 3,0% 
2008 6,0% 3,0% 
2009 4,2% 3,0% 
2010 4,9% 3,0% 
2011 3,9% 3,0% 
2012 5,7% 3,0% 
2013 1,7% 3,0% 
Source: MNB and KSH 
5. Hungarian monetary policy and the financial crisis 
Just like the other economies in the region, in autumn 2008 the Hungarian economy 
was hit by several extremely severe shocks at the same time. Firstly, the immediate 
impact to the real economy caused by the collapse of d mand in the export markets. 
Secondly, the liquidity shock as the entire economy was shaken by the sudden short-
age of foreign-currency and forint liquidity. Since monetary policy could only re-
spond to this upheaval tardily, and inefficiently due to reasons of principle and tech-
nical factors, all scope for budgetary-policy intervention was lost. It is an undispta-
ble fact that Hungary had already lost the means of applying an anti-cyclical budget-
ary policy – by actively increasing the deficit during the crisis – in the years preced-
ing the crisis. As a consequence of the grossly irresponsible economic (primarily 
budgetary) policies of previous years, unlike in neighboring countries, fiscal policy 
was unable or barely able to mitigate the terrible impacts of the crisis. 
The financing of the budget – except in countries with reserve currencies – 
has temporarily run into difficulties in many other countries, due to the general dry-
ing up of local money and capital markets. But in these countries assertive and con-
fident action by central banks, which often had no qualms about deploying unortho-
dox methods, succeeded in perceptibly dampening down the market tension related 
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to the financing of the government securities market. A necessary prerequisite for 
this, but not the only one, was that the central banks possess sufficient foreign ex-
change reserves to provide temporarily, over the short term, an adequate buffer to 
absorb the increased domestic demand for foreign currency, and to partly make up 
for the drop in foreign currency inflow, to meet payment obligations and fulfil con-
version requests; in other words, making it possible to avoid the currency exchange 
rate going into freefall and benchmark interest rates from rising sharply and sudden-
ly. For this reason, these countries were only forced to seek outside assistance con-
siderably later.  
The Hungarian economy was in a terrible shape when t  international finan-
cial turmoil reached the country due to its relatively high level of external indebted-
ness, the high public debt, the overly extensive and badly-structured fiscal redistri-
bution of funds, the extremely rapid and unfavourably-structured growth in forint 
and foreign-currency lending and the significantly overvalued forint, the high posi-
tive real interest rates. Figure 2 shows the base rte of that era.  
Figure 2. The base rate under Governor Simor  
 
Source: MNB data with my own figuring  
 
If we analyze the rate decisions of the Monetary Council we can state that un-
der the era of Governor Simor’s there were altogether 74 rate decision (see Figure 
4). 42 times out of it there were neither base rate rising, nor base rate decreasing. 23 
times were base rate decreasing and only 9 times decided the Monetary Council to 
raise the base rate. For a few drama-filled days in autumn 2008 the central bank 
raised the reference rate by 300 basis points (see in Figure 3), the only central bank 
in the region to do so with good reason.  
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Figure 3. Interest rate decisions of the MNB Monetary Council 
 
Source: MNB data with my own figuring 
 
Due to the shortage of sufficient foreign exchange reserves there wasn’t any 
monetary action in the currency market in this sever  times. The low international 
reserves prevented the central bank from performing one of its basic functions. Even 
over a short, 3-6-month horizon, the central bank was incapable of guaranteeing the 
liquidity of the Hungarian financial system without any major hitches; in other 
words it was only partially able to fulfil its role as the ‘lender of last resort’. Over 
and above the technical restriction caused by the shortage of reserves, however, 
weighty matters of principle also led to the MNB being far less prepared for the cri-
sis than its foreign counterparts. For many years prior to the crisis, the MNB be-
lieved in the self-regulating nature of the financial markets, and in their efficiency. It 
assigned itself the role of ‘night watchman’, and rejected out of hand any approaches 
that ran contrary to this. Before the crisis hit the central bank had not only passed 
over the opportunity to intervene in the currency market (as demonstrated by the 
strengthening of the forint exchange rate to HUF 228/EUR in the spring of 2008), 
but also declined to quote FX swaps (exchanges of foreign currency and forint de-
posits) and thus forewent the ability to influence liquidity, just as it had refused to 
take part in open-market transactions and actively shape market liquidity and market 
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expectations. After the agreement was concluded with the IMF, it was no longer so 
much the technical limitation that prevented the MNB from being active and coura-
geous, innovative and prepared to make wide use of unconventional means and react 
with the appropriate degree of flexibility, but rather its inability to step out of its 
own shadow. 
First and foremost, a fundamental change of principles and approach was 
needed, similar to the one that has taken place widly around the world as a result of 
the crisis. Despite an awareness of the substantial expansion in liquidity in the offing 
from the international financial institutions, there was no fundamental rethinking of 
the monetary-policy frameworks (Surányi 2010). 
A significant relaxation of monetary policy would have undermined the forint 
exchange rage, thereby letting inflation and inflation expectations off the leash. In 
January 2009 the central bank gave off signals and ma e decisions that pointed in 
the direction of a dangerous, across-the-board monetary loosening. The unfortunate 
central bank communication regarding the exchange rat  at the beginning of the 
year, and the further ill-advised interest-rate cuts, seemed to suggest that the central 
bank’s policy was shifting from one extreme (the forcing of a strong forint) to the 
other (preference for a weak forint (Surányi 2010). 
In an inflation targeting framework, the FX rate “in theory” floats freely. In 
the other group of countries, pegged or quasi-fix FX regimes are operated. The final 
goal of monetary policy is obviously to facilitate price stability. In text book cases, 
the most important tool of the central bank is setting he domestic interest rates in 
order to reach price stability and control inflation. This is true in theory and in big, 
closed economies. The effectiveness of the IT regims is subject to heated debates 
even in big, closed, developed economies, while in the small, open economies of the 
CEE region the track record of the IT systems is very poor. A long series of empiri-
cal studies have already proved that the interest rate channel in these countries is 
much weaker than the FX-rate channel. One can believe in the IT systems or not, but 
it can not be disputed, that the only effective tool of the central bank is the FX rate –
in a small, open economy. Hence, a central bank operating under an IT system, in 
practice should target the FX rate and adjust its interest rate level to the “implicit” 
FX target that is consistent with the inflation goal (Surányi 2009, 2010).  
6. Conclusions 
The fact that the inflation target has not been constantly achieved in Hungary, it 
does not in mean that the IT regime (which is much more than a public definition of 
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the inflation target) itself is unsuccessful. Many countries did not satisfy the precon-
ditions, difficulties in establishing credibility.  
A major argument for establishing a rules-based framework is to anchor ex-
pectations of economic agents and financial markets as regards policy goals and pol-
icymaking. Regarding monetary policy the expectations are to be anchored to price 
stability. Anchoring inflation expectations tends to reduce uncertainty and to en-
courage investment, saving and work effort decisions t  be taken from a longer term 
rather than a short-term perspective, so the reduction of uncertainty tends to lower 
the discount rate. The ensuing decisions contribute to higher economic growth.  
One can believe in the IT systems or not, but it can not be disputed, that the 
only effective tool of the central bank is the FX rate –in a small, open economy. 
Hence, a central bank operating under an IT system, in practice should target the FX 
rate and adjust its interest rate level to the “impl cit” FX target that is consistent with 
the inflation goal. Hungary is a role model to show the need of a rethinking Inflation 
targeting framework.  
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3. Islamic risk management and its role in defending 
from the Global Financial Crises:  
Useful practices for traditional banks 
Assil Bnayat 
 
Stability is a basic requirement for the proper functioning of the banking system and a key to 
its contribution to growth and development. During the 1980s, the failure of banks became a 
common phenomenon that preceded economic crises. Bank insurance funds in countries with 
deposit guarantee schemes have lost substantial amounts, causing the loss of taxpayers’ 
money. The hope was that the crisis would be restricted to financial markets, with few 
repercussions on the real economies. This hope was sh ttered in September 2008 as the 
crisis entered an acute phase, with strong downward fluctuations in the stock markets and 
reduced rates of economic growth. Despite the financial crisis of 2008 is nearly five years 
behind us, yet its impact on financial markets persists. Financial institutions face a “New 
Reality” of lower returns, higher volatility and increased scrutiny from boards and regula-
tors.  
In the meanwhile, Islamic finance has been experiencing a rapid acceleration 
worldwide. According to reports, which conducted a worldwide survey of the development of 
Islamic financial institutions comparing to traditional financial institution during 2009, it 
shows a two-digit growth by the Islamic industry despite the severe impact of the global 
financial crises of 2008 and 2009. While Islamic financial institutions have successfully 
qualified the robustness test by exhibiting greater r silience during the recent global 
financial crises, regulatory regimes are under review in the wake of the financial crisis as 
regulators seek to bolster financial stability and avoid a repeat of the problems that led to 
the current situation. 
The financial crisis has demonstrated the need for an integrated approach to risk ma-
nagement and one that encourages risk managers to think in terms of scenarios. In my 
research, I will discuss the challenges and opportunities of implementation the Islamic 
financial engineering methods that may assist conventional institutions facing in a changing 
market environment and frequent financial crisis.  
 
Keywords: Islamic finance, financial crisis, risk-sharing, debt, interest, economic growth, 
stability  




The financial system has definitely played an active role in the accelerated develop-
ment of the world economy, particularly the financial innovations: the revolution in 
information and communications technology. The system is, however, now infested 
by persistent and frequent crises. According to one estimate, there have been more 
than 100 crises over the last four decades (Stiglitz 2003, p. 54.). Not a single geo-
graphical area or major country, even though following sound fiscal and monetary 
policy, has been spared the effect of these crises. The prevailing financial crisis, 
which started in the summer of 2007, is more severe than any in the past and shows 
no sign of regress despite a coordinated bailout of three to four trillion dollars. It has 
seized-up money markets and led to a decline in property and stock values, bank 
failures, and nervous anxiety about the fate of the global economy and the financial 
system. This has created a feeling that there is something basically wrong with the 
system. 
This gives an idea of the nature of issues under consideration for shaping new 
financial landscape. The environment within which today’s financial institutions are 
operating is changing. By searching for a more enduri g stabile solution there was a 
consensus among researchers to restore the financial transactions to their basic func-
tion – to provide services that add value to the real economy. This, in fact, represents 
the core elements of Islamic Financial system. The basic framework for an Islamic 
financial system is a set of rules that govern economic, social, political, and cultural 
aspects of societies that lead to their ultimate welfare. The overall resurgence of 
fundamental Islamic values in today’s world has manifested itself on the economic 
system as well, with a number of countries, including western countries, having 
adopted Islamic institution into their economic system. However, concerns remain 
regarding the compatibility of Islamic financial principles with the conventional per-
formance metrics, particularly, whether socioeconomic goals can be reconciled with 
the goals of profitability and market share.  
This paper is at the crossroads of two literatures. The first literature addresses 
the issue of “what went wrong” in the development of the global financial crisis, 
starting from 2007 so called “sub-prime” crisis and culminating in 2008 into an un-
precedented halt of the financial system, a system that was precisely under regula-
tions aiming at providing such systemic crisis. The financial crisis is analysed from 
multiple points of view, including conventional and alternative. Both of them argue 
that the interest-based economy is unstable and leads, sooner or later, to distortion of 
all sectors of economy. The second literature addresses the topic of Islamic financial 
system capabilities to adjust to major disturbances.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section II discus es briefly the rationale 
for the causes of the global financial crisis. It ends up to a summary that crises are 
endemic to the interest based system. The third first sub-section will provide an ex-
tended model, that takes into consideration core elem nts that differentiate conven-
tional and Islamic financial systems, to prove that t e latter is more resistant to ma-
jor financial shocks. The next sub-section of this paper will be focusing on the em-
pirical analysis. The descriptive performance for each of the systems during the last 
few years in this analysis will also provided. The last section will cover the conclu-
sion for this research, with some suggestion of whether a system that abolishes the 
payment and receipt of interest can be viable in the arena of contemporary econo-
mies. 
In the light of these observations, the present paper presents the Islamic sys-
tem contribution to the overall economic stability through examining the contempo-
rary trends in Islamic risk management practices and assessing the compatibility of 
their inherent potential for developing into the conventional interest-based system. 
2. Causes of the global financial crisis 
2.1. Conventional and alternative View 
"The whole world economy has just hit the wall and is in free fall" 
Larry Brainard, Trusted Sources, 2008.  
 
The whole world for the last five years has been in clutch of a financial crisis that 
swiped more than $3 trillion of bailout and liquidity injections by governments to 
abate somewhat its intensity. It is said to be far mo e serious than any experienced 
since the Great Depression. 
There is, hence, a call for a new architecture that could help minimize the fre-
quency and severity of such a crisis in the future (Camdessus 2000, pp. 1. and 7-10., 
Stiglitz 2007, p. 3., Baily et al. 2008, p. 44.). 
It is not possible to design such a new architectur without first determining 
the primary cause of the crisis. It began in the subprime mortgage market of the US 
financial system. “Sub-prime” refers to a segment of market where loans, referred to 
as “Ninja Loans” (no income, no jobs and no assets), were extended in the lending 
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frenzy to buyers with low credit score and poor income-earning prospects.1 In the 
period of run-up to the crisis, the US and global economies displayed robust growth, 
which was expected to continue. Interest rates were low, liquidity was high and 
growing, financial innovations were proceeding at a rapid pace (especially in secu-
ritization and structure finance), complacency in the face of growing risk was deep-
ening, and regulation and supervision were receding a d weakening (Mirakhor–
Krichene 2009). All of this created an incentive struc ure that encouraged excessive 
risk-taking in search of higher yields.  
Figure 1. The financial landscape has experiences significant shifts with many 
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To encourage sub-prime borrowers, banks offered a 30-year mortgage with 
low or zero down-payment and low interest rates for the first 2-3 years, after which 
the loan would be reset at double-digit interest rates. Bank would then package these 
                                                   
 
1 The Subprime borrowers comprised a riskier class, generally with a FICO credit score of less than 
640 (a credit score developed by Fair Isaac & Company, ranging between 300 and 850, with a higher 
score indicating a better chance of repayment). For this class of borrowers to have access to credit, the 
mortgages would need to be structured differently and the underwriting standards would have to be 
substantially weaker. 
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mortgages and sell them to special purpose vehicle (SPV) subsidiary they had estab-
lished to securitize them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Hundreds of 
MBSs packed in a bunch to be rearranged and transformed into newly innovated in-
struments called collateralized debt obligations (CDO). They were divided into 
high-rated tranches that paid low interest but with the higher security of being the 
first to be paid in the event of default, and lower-rated subordinated tranches that 
paid higher interest rates but with lower security of repayment. Further innovation 
made it possible for an SPV to use these CDOs as an underlying asset to allow an-
other packaging into CDO-squared and repackaged again into CDO-cubed, the next 
layer of CDOs, to be dissected into various tranches and sold. In result, that created 
a greater distance between the original underlying MBS assets and every new layer 
of instruments, which were distributed and sold far to geographically dispersed buy-
ers in the form of structured investment vehicles (SIVs).2 To run effectively, some 
sort of credit rating system was needed to give confide ce to the purchaser of these 
instruments that the underlying risks were sufficiently analyzed and fairly rated. For 
this purpose, the SPVs, and other issuers of structured security, would always select 
the rating agency that granted investment grade at leas possible cost and avoid other 
cautious agencies.  
There was another factor that enhanced the downward spi al of the recent cri-
sis i.e. the marked-to-market accounting rules conducted by banks. By selling their 
assets to the SPVs they has established, the banks moved those assets off their bal-
ance sheets, which allowed them to expand their balance sheets and, at the same 
time pass the risks to the buyers of these assets. When the crisis hit, the guarantees 
forced these banks to bring the assets back on their balance sheet, thus contracting 
them, which led to reduced credit and worsening of the ongoing credit crunch. It is 
worth noting also, that while banks’ leverage ratio was about 10, these non-bank in-
stitutions, lacking from regulatory supervisory framework, could have leverage ratio 
as large as 30.  
A forth factor that has tended to provide a false sense of security is the “too 
big to fail” concept which provides an assurance to “big” banks that the central bank 
will come to their assistance and bail them out in case of any financial problem. 
Banks which are provided with such a safety net have incentives to take greater risk 
than what they otherwise would (Mishkin 1997, p. 62.). 
In addition to all above reasons, there was a fault risk management system 
that ignored the possibility of a market crisis, which should have been very im-
portant risk in the sub-prime market. This is due to interrelationship between mar-
                                                   
 
2 For a full explanation of these instruments, see: „Credit Derivatives Explained”, prepared by Lehman 
Brothers’ Structured Credit Research, available on the internet. 
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kets that when one market becomes liquidity constrained, the institutions are forced 
to sell assets (or positions) they hold in other makets, triggering asset sales by those 
highly leveraged non-bank institutions, producing this way a decline in asset prices 
in these other markets.  
2.2. Interest-based system and instability 
The alternative view of the financial crises sees that crises are endemic to the finan-
cial capitalism where prevailing mode of financing is the interest-based debt and 
credit contracts. The financial institutions make money off the interest rates they 
charge on the money lent. Borrowers, on the other hand, have three options to use 
this money to (i) finances new investments (which is obvious that this is the one 
mode to help the expansion of the economy) (ii) finances purchases of financial as-
sets (iii) finances current consumption.  
It is worth noting that, contrary to common belief, consumption today vali-
dates the debt obligations incurred for financing the past investments. Any fall in 
consumption represents a failure to validate payment obligations in the past. For val-
idation past and present obligations, investment and consumption must grow. Debt, 
however, grows or declines for reasons other than tose that cause investment in the 
real sector to grow. There is indirect connection between them through the interest 
rate mechanism. Banks, in fact, are not interested in real rate of return to an invest-
ment project but only, as the debt obligation is validated. To ensure that this will be 
the case, banks ask for collateral. Financial system b comes more sophisticated and 
innovations are much more needed to financialize as m ny commodities and real as-
sets as possible. The financialization process, through interest-rate based system, 
transform equity in real assets into debt. The result was growing corporate debt-to-
equity and household debt-to-income; income transfer from the real sector to the fi-
nancial sector, where the orientation has been changed from saving-investment-
production-export to borrowing-debt-consumption-import (Palley 2007).  
This was evident when following the US economic indicators over the past 
three decades. Palley (2007) estimates that the total credit-to-GDP ratio grew from 
140% to 328,6% of GDP between 1973 and 2005, while mortgage debt-to-GDP 
grew from 48,7% to 97,5% over the same period. Household debt-to-GDP grew 
from 45,2% in 1973 to 94% in 2005. The financialization process has also contribut-
ed, besides the expansion of debt, to adverse “changes i  the functional distribution 
of income, wage stagnation, and increased income inequality” (Palley 2007). As the 
financial sector grows to dominate the real sector, layer upon layer of securitization, 
thins the connection between the two to the point where an inverted pyramid of debt 
is supported by a very narrow base of real sector output and assets (Mirakhor 2007). 
In 2006, the total world GDP was $48 billion while the value of global financial as-
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sets was $140 billion (nearly three times more). As of 2007, the global liquidity 
market (80% of its liquidity composed of financial derivatives) was estimated to be 
12,5 times as large as the global GDP (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Derivative Market Vs. World GDP 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlement 
2.3. Keynes “euthanasia of the rentier” theory 
In his books “Treatise on Money” and “The general theory”, Keynes did not believe 
that there is neither theoretical explanation nor economic justification for the exist-
ence of ex ante, fixed interest rate payment. He sees that the scarcity of capital gives 
the financial capital owners demand interest rates for their money. Thus, interest is 
the price for the use of money, it is not the yield of capital. According to him, there 
is a class in market economies that lives on interes  income and finds advantage in 
holding liquid assets rather than risking their holdings in employment-creating in-
vestments. He agrees that interest encourages socially wasteful saving and discour-
ages socially desirable investments. It creates a wedge between saving and invest-
ment, conditions under which the whole system becoms unstable. In terms of the 
concept of “own rate of interest” he suggests that any commodity in the spot market 
will have a rate of return (+,0,-) in the future market. He explained that the future is 
uncertain so the rate of return to assets could not be known ex ante (fixed). While, 
he emphasis, the marginal efficiency of capital (the rate of return on real sector in-
vestments) is determined within the real sector of the economy, the x ante fixed in-
terest rate is determined by psychological and institutional conditions.  
Through his theory “euthanasia of the rentier” he str ssed the importance to 
increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to be scarce so that the functionless 
investor will no longer receive a bonus. All savings, in this way, will be channeled 
into productive employment-creating investment.  
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2.4. Minsky “Financial instability hypothesis” 
As did Keynes before him, Minsky considered interest-based financial system as in-
herently unstable and that dialectic forces of it would lead to disaster if left to its 
own devices. His major contribution is known as the “financial instability hypothe-
sis” (Mirakhor–Krichene 2009, Mirakhor 1985). This hypothesis contains two main 
propositions; the first states that there are two financing structures: one promotes 
stability, the other instability. The second propositi n states that, in the financial sys-
tem of money capitalism, stability is not sustainable because, during prosperity, sta-
bility contains the seeds of its own instability. Minsky referred to this proposition as 
“stability is destabilizing”.  
According to him, the system could be stabilized with “Big Government, as 
the effective employer of last resort’ and “Big central bank, as the effective lender of 
last resort” and more important, imposing dynamic regulatory system. 
2.5. Metzler’ model 
Although the financial systems dominated by interest-based debt contracts seen as 
more prone to financial instability, few, if any, notable economists have proposed 
explicit debtless system. Such works had just been th oretically investigated to ana-
lyze their implications in practice. One of the earli st analytically models of a stock 
market economy was developed by Llyod Metzler (1951), who investigated the eco-
nomic implications of an economic system in which private wealth is in only two 
forms” money (including demand deposits) and common st ck, and that all common 
stock involves appropriately the same degree of risk. Metzler assumed that common 
stock is the only non-monetary asset of the banking system. The model further as-
sumed that it is closed economy the labor supply and all means of production were 
produced at constant returns to scale. In this way, the interest-rate was merely based 
on the performance of the stock in the market and earnings from the investment ac-
tivity. The concept of ex post interest rate, rather than an ex ante, is then applied. 
Since it assumed away the existence of debt instruments, the Metzler’ model was a 
reasonable first approximation of an Islamic financi l system.  
3. The Stability of Islamic Financial System 
3.1. Theoretical consideration of the Islamic banking model 
The Metzler model, mentioned above, was used and extended in new directions and 
further equilibrium models have been constructed to investigate the implications of 
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operations of an Islamic financial system, particularly as to the effects on the econ-
omy’s capacity to adjust to disturbances, and on international capital flows (Khan–
Mirakhor 1989, Mirakhor–Zaidi 1988, Mirakhor 1990). The uniqueness in such 
works that the stability characteristics demonstrated are generated within a conven-
tional institutional framework and have proved to possibly, at least theoretically, en-
vision a non-interest-based financial structure within a conventional system. How-
ever, a majority of relevant literature suggests (though using theoretical arguments 
rather than a formal empirical analysis) that Islamic banks3 pose risks to the finan-
cial system that in many regards differ from those posed by conventional banks and 
that those features should be taken into account while assessing Islamic Banks’ con-
tribution to stability in a financial system where they are operating. Some of these 
risks4 arise due to the unique nature of Islamic banks and are, particularly, associated 
with specific Islamic contracts and business model compliant with Sharia’. To un-
derstand some of these risks arising in Islamic banks, appendix II briefly examine 
the various items in their balance sheet.  
Based on Metzler-Khan model, this system of investmnt deposits is quite 
closely related to proposals aimed at transforming the traditional banking system in-
to an equity basis made. Since the nominal value of investment deposits is not guar-
anteed and will fluctuate according to the performance of the bank, any shocks to 
asset positions are absorbed by changes in the valuof shares (deposits) held by the 
public. Therefore, an equity-based system of this type can respond more easily and 
rapidly in the face of the banking crisis. In the traditional banking system the bank is 
expected to guarantee the nominal value of the deposit, s  that any shock can cause 
a divergence between the real value of assets and li bilities. If the bank cannot ab-
sorb losses through its reserves and borrowings from the central bank, this diver-
gence may well result in instability and possible collapse of the payments mecha-
nism. With the value of deposits directly linked to the earnings, and therefore assets, 
of banks, such a possibility is excluded from the Islamic banking system.5 
Figure 3 shows differences when analyzing the way of breaking losses for 
conventional and Islamic banks. The expected loss in conventional bank is broken 
even from the profit made by a bank in that period; the unexpected loss is to a cer-
tain extent broken even from the bank capital while th  amount above that level is 
refunded from the insurance or the bank go in bankruptcy. The Islamic banks, how-
ever, break even the expected loss from the provision income; the unexpected loss, 
                                                   
 
3 Appendix I provides an overview of the basic characteristics of the Islamic Banking. 
4 Appendix III provides an overview of the Risk types that Islamic Banks face due to their unique 
nature. 
5 For a formal analysis of the process, see Khan (1986). 
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to a certain of reliability, is refunded from the PSIA (if the unexpected loss was a 
result of investment into PSIA) or from capital (if such loss was due to other bank 
activities); while above that amount will be covered by the insurance, takaful.  
Figure 3. Sustaining losses in conventional and Islamic banks 
 
Source: Khan (2004), Kozarević et al. (2013) 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, these features could make Islamic banks less 
vulnerable to risk than conventional banks. For example, Islamic banks are able to 
pass through a negative shock on the asset side (e.g. a Musharaka loss) to the in-
vestment depositors (a Mudarabah arrangement). The risk-sharing arrangements on 
the deposit side provide another layer of protection o the bank, in addition to its 
book capital. Also, the need to provide stable and competitive return to investors, the 
shareholders’ responsibility for negligence or misconduct (operational risk), and the 
more difficult access to liquidity put pressures on Islamic banks to be more con-
servative (resulting in less moral hazard and risk taking). Furthermore, because in-
vestors (depositors) share in the risks (and typically do not have deposit insurance), 
they have more incentives to exercise tight oversight over bank management. Final-
ly, Islamic banks have traditionally been holding a comparatively larger proportion 
of their assets than Conventional banks in reserve accounts with central banks or in 
correspondent accounts.6 So, even if Islamic investments are more risky than con-
                                                   
 
6
 Islamic banks operate couple of reserves, in addition to provision for loan losses (PLL). The profit 
equalization reserve (PER) is appropriated from the gross income of the murabaha for smoothing 
returns paid to the investment account holders and the shareholders. This reserve is deducted from both 
the shareholders and investment account holders. Note that while PER share of the bank (shareholders) 
is included in capital, the portion of the depositors is not. The investment risk reserve (IRR) is 
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ventional investments, the question from the financi l stability perspective is wheth-
er or not these higher risks are compensated for by higher buffers.  
3.2. Empirical analysis of systems performances 
The development of the Islamic finance industry during the last three decades, start-
ing from the introduction of Islamic Finance indices in conventional financial mar-
kets, followed by the financial innovations such as sukuk insurance, and last but not 
least, being successfully qualified the robustness t t by exhibiting greater, than the 
conventional counterparts did, resilience during the recent global financial crises 
captured the attention of the global financial system.  
As shown in a paper by (Kashyap et al. 2002), Islamic finance increased the 
potential pool supporting the system, and therefore providing extra liquidity, with 
the most important commodity in times of crises. This elped, with impetus of fi-
nancial innovations, to increase the risk bearing capa ity of economies, and thus, it 
improved the stability of the global economic system. In addition to their increment 
to the financial sector, it supported growth in real conomy by creating much more 
access to financial resources for SMEs, entrepreneus, firms and households, who 
were previously sidelined in financial system because of their religious, moral and 
ethical concerns.  
However, despite of the development, it cannot be denied at all that Islamic 
financial institutions and economies suffered signif cant blows during the last finan-
cial crisis. Indonesia and Malaysia’s losses in the East Asian Crisis; and the recent 
default of sukuk insurance market in Dubai, followed by numerous bankruptcy cases 
in the real economy, especially in the property development sector, are the very re-
cent examples that Islamic finance might not be immune to the weaknesses of the 
global financial system (Asutay–Aksak 2011).  
As a reflection of the arguments above, this section aims to address the impli-
cations of Islamic finance on the broader global economic system by investigating 
the sustainability of the theoretical benefits of such an introduction and development 
from both stability and growth sides. 
In order the possibly capture differences based on the theoretical business 
models and investment strategy differences, the contrast of daily volatility of con-
ventional and Islamic stock indices is strongly recommended.  
Figure 4 representing the performances of both conventional and Islamic fi-
nance in the financial market and shows that they have been very closely correlated 
                                                                                                
 
appropriated from the income of PSIA account holders only (i.e. after the deduction of the bank's share 
of the profit) to meet future losses on the investments financed by investment accounts. 
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to each other. As some preliminary studies suggest, one of the most important rea-
sons of such correlation turned out to be the increasing debt-based murabahah in-
strument as a source of financing in the Islamic and finance industry, while their eq-
uity and asset based contracts remain marginal. This may imply a closer relation to 
the conventional markets. 




Hassan–Dridi (2010) provide contradictory evidence that the business model 
and investment strategies of Islamic banks differ from those of conventional banks. 
They report factors related to Sharia compliance and Islamic banks’ business model 
helped them to contain the adverse impact on profitabili y in 2008 during the first 
phase of crisis; while weaknesses in risk management and corporate governance 
practices in some Islamic banks led to a larger decline in profitability compared to 
commercial banks in 2009, in the second phase. Theyalso emphasize the importance 
of Sharia compliance requirements that limit the Islamic banks exposure to the kind 
of toxic instruments which turned the initial financial crisis into a global epidemic. 
In addition, they also suggest that the default of Dubai sukuk market in the wake of 
current crisis in a direct result of exceeding the concentration limits of the financial 
institutions in the markets, especially concentrated on real estate investments.  
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Figure 5. Market Capitalization and number of constitutes (as at end – 1H12) 
 
 
Source: Dow Jones 
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As the main aspirations of Islamic finance were to achieve an alternative eco-
nomic paradigm, which requires risk sharing, stimulation of economic growth and 
prosperity, Asutay–Askak (2011) progress a step further and question the ability of 
Islamic finance to meet the requirements of the real economy in comparison to the 
means of conventional banks. They contrast the returns of the financial markets, 
both conventional and Islamic, with the growth of GDP of selected economies as an 
indicator of the aforementioned link. They found out that the correlation between the 
conventional markets and Islamic financial markets are much higher that the relation 
between the latter and the real economy. They suggest mimicking of conventional 
markets by Islamic markets. This can be a result of size disadvantages of Islamic fi-
nance (Figure 5), as well as the tendency of Islamic finance investors to use the con-
ventional markets as a benchmark for their diversification.  
As a result, it is evident that there was a strong need for Islamic finance and it 
was welcome warmly by Muslim investors throughout the world. After the phase of 
initial welcoming response, it can be suggested that Isl mic finance has moved into 
being an integral part of the financial system, rather than creating its own line to ad-
dress the glaring weaknesses of the current and financ al system. 
4. Conclusion 
In the light of the arguments above, we can definitely assume that the Islamic finan-
cial system is capable of minimizing the severity and frequency of financial crises 
by getting rid of the glaring weaknesses of the conventional system. It institutes 
greater discipline by requiring the financier to share in the risk. It links the growth of 
debt to the growth of real economy by allowing credit for purchasing real goods and 
services, which the seller poses and buyer wishes to take delivery. It prohibits the 
sale of debt so the creditor would be more careful when evaluating the risk associat-
ed. Islamic banking, by the system of justice, can also reduce the problem of sub-
prime borrowers and provide credit to them at affordable terms. 
However, there are a lot of problems that the Islamic Finance industry should 
encounter. First, it is still in its infancy and shares a very small proportion of interna-
tional finance, if comparing with conventional finance system. The greater use of 
debt-financing and marginal of equity-based financing mode is one of the fateful 
problems that Islamic Bank should analyze and face. Moreover, even in the case of 
debt-creating modes all the conditions laid down by the Sharia are not being faith-
fully observed. This is partly due to the lack of pro er understanding of ultimate ob-
jectives of Islamic finance, the non-availability of trained personnel, the absence of a 
number of support institutions (in terms of their exp rience in risk minimizing, deal-
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ing with moral hazard, principal/agent conflict of interest). The Islamic Finance sys-
tem is thus not fully prepared to play a significant role, and substitute the conven-
tional finance system, in ensuring the health and stability of the international system. 
It is, however, expected to get momentum in the coming few years so it can increase 
its share globally to be the main player in providing and sustaining health and stabil-
ity of the global financial system.  
Up to now, and since the current architecture of the conventional financial 
system has existed for a long time, it would be difficult for the international com-
munity to accept radical structural reform of the kind of Islamic finance system en-
visages. However, it would be better to adopt some elements of the Islamic system, 
which are also a part of the western heritage, that minimizes the severity of crises 
and ensures the stability within the global financil system. Chapra (2009), suggests: 
- Increasing the proportion of equity in total financing and decreasing that of 
debt. 
- Credit expansion must be linked to the real sector and does not promote de-
stabilizing speculation and gambling. 
- Leverage needs to be controlled. Credit should be limited to the ability of the 
borrower to repay. 
- Transparency standard to be maintained. In the case of CDOs, it would be de-
sirable to have the right of resource for the ultimate purchaser so as to ensure 
the lender has incentive to underwrite the debt carefully. 
- The CDOs protective role should be confined to the original lender and can-
not cover other purchasers who wish to wager on the debtor’s default. 
- Systematic and proper regulations and supervision over all financial institu-
tions. 
- Some arrangements, other than microfinance programs, should be made by 
governments to make credit more available for subprime borrowers at afford-
able terms.  
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APPENDIX I. Brief introduction to Islamic Banking 
- Islamic financial services, as name suggest, must be conformed to Islamic Re-
ligious practices and law. They are characterized by the prohibition of riba, as 
ex ante predetermined interest rate, due to the fact that i  is unsocial and harm-
ful. Instead, it encourages the profit-and-loss sharing arrangements (PLS), 
purchase and resale of goods and services for fees. In PLS modes, the rate of 
return is not known nor fixed prior to undertaking the transaction. In pur-
chase-resale transactions, a mark-up is lawful and must be agreed between the 
two sides of contracts, based on a benchmark rate of return (such as LIBOR in 
conventional system, with one difference that it cannot be changed during the 
time of contract). 
- The second feature of Islamic Finance is the prohibition of trading in financial 
risk (which is seen as a form of gambling). 
 
APPENDIX II. The characteristics of the Islamic bank balance sheet 
On the asset side of an Islamic bank, the investment tools are dominated by 
fixed-income modes of financing and to lesser extent profit-sharing instruments. On 
the liability side, Islamic banks have demand deposits or checking/current accounts 
and saving and investment deposits.  
Using profit-sharing principle to reward depositors is a unique feature of Is-
lamic banks. The returns on PSIA are state-contingent and neither the principal nor a 
return is guaranteed. The owners of PSIA participate in the risks and share in the 
bank’s profit and losses. Investment accounts can be further classified as restricted 
and unrestricted (PSIAr and PSIAu respectively), the former having restrictions on, 
among others, withdrawals before maturity date. 
 
APPENDIX III. Risk Types that Islamic Banks face 
Some unique risks arising in Islamic banks that are rel vant and should be in-
cluded in the risk management system assessment are discussed below.  
- Fiduciary Risk - when depositors/investors interpret a low rate of return as 
breaching of investment contract or mismanagement of funds by the bank. It 
can also take the form of causing a serious confidece problem due to 
inability of the Islamic bank to comply with the Sharia.  
- Withdrawal Risk – When a bank may not be able to pay competitive rates of 
return compared to its peer group of Islamic banks and other competitors. To 
prevent withdrawal and systemic risks, the owners of the bank will need to 
apportion part of their own share in profits to theinvestment depositors.  
- Treatment of PSIA as Capital – There is, however, ned for caution in treating 
all PSIA as capital. Depositors with funds in PSIAu are risk averse and too 
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much downside in their returns can lead to withdrawals that can create 
systematic risks. Thus, to minimize the withdrawal and systemic risk, none or 
very small portion of PSIAu should be treated as capital. When assets are 
funded by PSIAr, however, larger part of it can usea  capital.  
- Risks in Islamic Financial Instruments – Market risks can be systematic 
arising from macro-sources, or unsystematic that are asset or instrument 
specific. This problem arises due to the asymmetric information problem as 
the banks do not have sufficient information on the actual profit of the firm. 
To manage the risks, there is a need to clearly understand the risks involved in 
the Islamic instruments.  
1. Limitations in using Instruments to Mitigate Risks – as they are prohibited 
by law.  
- Operational Risks – direct or indirect loss – resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people, and technology or from external events. 
Non-standardization of contracts between countries and lack of Islamic 
statutes and courts that can enforce Islamic contracts increases the legal risks 
of using these contracts. 
 
 
Voszka, É. – Kiss, G. D. (eds) 2014: Crisis Management and the Changing Role of the State.  
University of Szeged Doctoral School in Economics, Szeged, pp. 71-87. 
 
4. Critical approach to European austerity policies –  
A statistical analysis 
Marcell Zoltán Végh – Klára Kazár 
 
The Great Recession started in 2008 has induced a desperate crisis management procedure 
among the member states of the EU. Without sufficient common budget and legitimate 
common crisis management strategy, member states had to pply their own set of measures 
to moderate the economic and social effects of the crisis. Most member states suffered a W-
shaped crisis, with a recession in 2008-2009, followed by a short period of stagnation or 
modest growth in 2010, and then in 2011, a second, more severe and prolonged relapse got 
started. Accordingly, the general phases of crisis management can be defined: firstly, anti-
cyclical measures were dominant to restore the declining demand while, when the sovereign 
debt crisis burst out, restrictive policies and austerity became dominant. 
The purpose of restrictive policies has been to resto  confidence on the markets by 
setting a sustainable and credible government budget. It can be realized by increase of tax 
revenues or cuttings in government spending; althoug  the first choice seems to be easier to 
realize, cuts in government spendings or the combinatio  of both appears more effective. 
Moreover, balance-improving measures are often futile if not accompanied by adequate 
structural reforms. Austerity policies are frequently criticized because they strangle 
economic growth and disregard social sacrifices like unemployment or income inequalities. 
However, in times of such hectic trends in sovereign markets, for member states with massive 
levels of public debt austerity does not have a real alternative. 
In our study, we aim to apply statistical analysis on austerity measures. As previous 
research suggests, too much austerity can be proven harmful for economic growth and 
impedes reaching pre-crisis levels of income. Our hypothesis is that member states applying 
the largest austerity packages recover more slowly than those applying moderate austerity. 
We collected our data from the AMECO database to examine the change in austerity 
measures and in recovery from the crisis for the EU-27 member states. We used variables 
such as the governments’ total expenditures or social benefits to estimate the austerity 
measures; and the recovery from crisis was measured, among others, by the unemployment 
rate or by the gap between the actual and potential GDP. In our methodology, we examined 
the relations between austerity measures and recovery from crisis variables with the help of 
graphical and correlation analysis. Our study confirms our hypothesis and reveals 
additional information about fiscal consolidation. 
 
Keywords: Great Recession, Eurozone crisis, economic policy, austerity policy, fiscal 
consolidation 




After Europe’s mostly prosperous decade, the Great Recession started in 2008 
brought numerous years of recession in the economy of the European Union. Real 
gross domestic product of the EU-27 fell by 4.5% in 2009 and, although the general 
economic climate ameliorated in 2010-2011, the 2013 GDP at constant prices was 
still almost 1 percentage point below the 2007 level (AMECO 2014). Some member 
states suffered deeper recession; others were not seri u ly affected by the crisis, in 
terms of change in GDP (Figure 1). While the outlook f other economic regions 
(e.g. Japan and the US) looks brighter in early 2014, prospects of the EU-28 are still 
worrying (OECD 2013). While the sovereign default crisis seems to be over in Eu-
rope because of the moderation of sovereign bonds in the peripheral member states 
(Krugman 2014), the capability of resisting future c ises seems unclear even if vast 
efforts have been made to strengthen the economic integration. 
As stated earlier (Végh 2014), several EU-level attempts have been made to 
fight the early effects of the crisis but crisis management mostly remained as a 
member state competence. The reason for this lies in the small size of the common 
budget, which did not let the EU launch sufficient subsidy programs to restore ag-
gregate demand in times of crisis (Wyplosz 2013). Common financial assets like the 
European Stability Mechanism basically could not decrease refinancing costs in the 
Eurozone. Moreover, the common monetary policy in the Eurozone has deprived its 
members of the option of generating inflation and performing currency devaluation 
(Krugman 2012, Dixon 2013) (Figure 2). This puts a different pressure on member 
states. Moreover, many member states have had to perf rm serious austerity 
measures to restore market confidence, especially where an EU-IMF intervention 
was realized. These austerity programs were often compelled and not well-founded 
and were mostly forced in a much criticized, ‘one-size fits for all’ method (Regan 
2013). 
In this paper, our goal is to present critical arguments towards restrictive poli-
cies of the EU member states. We identify and examine indicators to measure their 
volume and compare them with economic performance idicators. To establish a 
connection between the two sets of variables, we use correlation analysis and cluster 
analysis. 
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Figure 1. Change in real GDP at constant prices of EU-27 (percentage, 2007-2013) 





























Source: AMECO Database 
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Figure 2. Net export of goods and services per current GDP of the EU-27 in 2010 





























Source: Ameco Database 
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2. Austerity policies in the EU 
Comparison between economic policies of the EU member states can be trouble-
some. As Corsetti et al. (2012) points out, not only measures at country level, but 
conditions at regional and global levels could also affect macroeconomic results of 
an applied economic policy. What’s more, economic policy measures cannot be ex-
amined without international context as one country’s measures could affect the oth-
er’s economic performance. Nonetheless, we aim to grab the general characteristics 
of economic policy through a statistical analysis. We believe that a general deduc-
tion can be established in respect of austerity policies. However, we know that our 
analysis has its limitations. 
2.1. Necessity of austerity 
Before the Great Recession, the dominant economic framework was based on the 
faith of markets behaving rationally and in a self-correcting way, so market imper-
fections are unlikely. Policy-making emphasized the importance of good macroeco-
nomic governance; the school of saltwater economics dominated economic thinking. 
As Lucas (2003) concluded, the problem of depression-prevention has been perma-
nently solved by modern monetary policy. Unexpectedly, the Great Recession re-
vealed that market failures do occur, that financial m rkets are not necessarily self-
correcting and that investor rationality cannot be aken for granted (Masera 2010). 
In the EU, first reactions to the crisis were underestimating the volume of the 
economic shock. Firstly, the European Commission launched demand-increasing 
and job creating programs, to which member states reacted by applying anti-cyclical 
economic policies (Pelle 2010). However, due to the un xpected economic shock 
and risk avoidance, the costs of the demand-restoring packages had been underesti-
mated. Tax revenues dried up as well so, in 2009, governments had to face the un-
sustainability of public finances. This was accompanied by the continuous augmen-
tation of refinancing costs and rise of country-specific risks. In 2010, Ireland and 
Greece had to request financial help from the International Monetary Fund. 
Austerity can be an effective crisis management tool: if an economy’s refi-
nancing costs decline and a balanced fiscal position can be restored, reimbursement 
of government bonds and their interest can be guaranteed so escape of capital can be 
stopped and investments can rise again. According to the neo-Wicksellian equilibri-
um (Savings[Y] - NX = ∆ Bond_holdings[i - π, ρ]), within the framework of the EU, 
member states’ economies could only be boosted by reducing the riskiness of bonds 
as these economies were in a liquidity trap, making monetary policy ineffective 
 Marcell Zoltán Végh – Klára Kazár 
 
76
(DeLong–Summers 2012). Member states requesting financ al help from the Troika 
(IMF, EU, ECB) of international lenders1 had to apply subsequent austerity packag-
es (IMF 2011, Seitz–Jost 2012). Policy-makers from well-performing member states 
(e.g. Germany) urged austerity as well (Schäuble 2011). On the other hand, coun-
tries realizing fiscal consolidation took the risk of slow economic growth, persistent 
unemployment and social tension. In spite of the current decrease of refinancing 
costs, some argue that fiscal consolidation has not br ught much success. Some 
blame austerity measures to be the very reason for permanent economic slump. Fur-
thermore, even the IMF has partially shifted emphasis towards the importance of 
fiscal multipliers and stimulation (Plumer 2012, IMF 2012). By 2012 it became clear 
that the high level of indebtedness has no real effect on economic performance 
(Panizza-Presbitero 2012) and the popular Reinhart-Rogoff argument was also 
proved to be wrong (Herndon et al. 2013). 
Recently, the arguments against forced fiscal consolidation have strengthened, 
(Krugman 2012, Stiglitz 2014) as it worsens competitiv ness (Bagaria et al. 2012), 
scrutinizes the so far achieved social standards (Pelle 2013) and, as a natural conse-
quence, creates social resistance among voters. Even if so, for economies with high 
sovereign risk, austerity remains an important tool. The European financial frame-
work in its current form is still rather rigid and the Stability and Growth Pact does 
not leave much space for financial stimulation for indebted member states. 
2.2. Measurement and hypothesis 
Knowing all these arguments, our goal was to find a answer to the following ques-
tions: Is there any correlation between the size of fiscal consolidation and the vol-
ume of economic relapse? Is it possible to make critical remarks the current eco-
nomic framework of the EU, which demands continuous a terity from the member 
states? Has austerity proven harmful for the member states by resulting in several 
years of recession and longer recovery? 
Accordingly, we define our hypothesis: 
H: For the EU member states, the larger the size of austerity, the longer the 
period of recovery from the current recession. 
 
In our statistical analysis, we use data from the AMECO database for the 
2007-2013 period. The basic unit of our analysis is a member state of the EU-27. 
We use data from 2007 as a reference point as it is regarded as the last full year pre-
                                                   
 
1 Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Cyprus, Latvia, Portugal. 
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ceding the crisis. For describing the current economic situation of member states, we 
chose data from 2013. 
To measure the volume of fiscal consolidation, we have chosen the following 
indicators (reallocation variables): 
- Change of government total expenditure in percentage of GDP: this indicator 
can reveal the increase or decrease of reallocation level within a member 
state; however it can be distorted by the change of GDP as well. 
- Change of government total revenues in percentage of; it can also reveal the 
change of reallocation and also refers to the change of tax increases or de-
creases. 
- Change of current tax burden in the percentage of GDP. 
- Change of social benefits in percentage of GDP. This indicator is connected to 
the first one; it implies that fiscal consolidation is often accompanied by cuts 
in social spending. 
- Change of gross public debt in percentage of GDP. It shows the change in the 
level of indebtedness. Anti-cyclical measures are oft n accompanied by in-
crease of debt levels while austerity programs aim to decrease indebtedness.  
 
To measure economic recovery after the crisis, we defined three indicators 
(recovery variables): 
- Change of unemployment rate: one sign of the end of the crisis in an economy 
is when employment is restored to pre-crisis levels.  
- Change of GDP at constant prices: it refers to the most common concept of 
crisis being over when GDP reaches pre-crisis levels. 
- Gap between actual and potential GDP in 2013. 
3. Data analysis 
Firstly, we introduce descriptive statistics followed by results of our correlation 
analysis. Finally, the cluster analysis is displayed. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
In our analysis, we examined the EU-27 member states, variables of reallocation 
change were expressed in percentage of GDP. We calculated a difference between 
2013 and 2007, thus the variables show the change in reallocation expressed in per-
centage points. Within the recovery dataset, the unemployment rate also showed the 
difference between 2013 and 2007 in percentage points. The GDP at constant prices 
can be found on AMECO at 2005 market prices; we examined the ratio between 
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2013 and 2007, which is expressed in percentage. Th gap between the actual and 
potential GDP can also be found on AMECO at 2005 market prices; we examined 
the gap in 2013, which is expressed in percentage points (Appendix). 
In the case of reallocation variables, it can be seen that the means cannot be 
typical values for the EU-27 because the standard deviations are high compared to 
the means (Table 1, Appendix). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics about the variables of reallocation change  
(percentage point) 
Indicator Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Expenditure change (2013-2007) 3.79 3.88 3.41 -1.92 10.72 
Revenue change (2013-2007) 0.28 0.90 2.55 -5.05 3.91 
Current tax burden change (2013-2007) -0.50 0.13 2.37 -5.56 3.46 
Social benefits change (2013-2007) 2.46 2.61 1.47 -0.55 5.19 
Gross public debt change (2013-2007) 29.73 23.23 22.82 1.13 99.52 
Source: Own calculation 
 
It can be seen that in expenditure change, the maximum value was 10.72 per-
centage points (Greece). Greece had the maximum value in revenue change (3.91 
percentage points), Luxembourg had the maximum value in current tax burden 
change (3.46 percentage points), Spain had the maximum value in social benefit 
change (5.19 percentage points) and Ireland had the highest value in gross public 
debt change (99.52 percentage points). Half of the countries had at least 23.23 per-
centage points change (median) in gross public debt 
In the case of recovery variables, the standard deviations are also high com-
pared to the means, therefore the means are less informative in the EU-27 (Table 2). 
The maximum value in unemployment rate change was 18.70 percentage 
points (Greece) while the minimum value was a 3.3 percentage points decrease 
(Germany). Only Germany and Malta had a decrease in unemployment rate and half 
of the countries had at least a 3.4 percentage points (median) increase. Regarding 
GDP at constant prices, Poland had a 20 percent increase (from 2007 to 2013) while 
Greece had a 23 percent decrease (from 2007 to 2013). 
 
Critical approach to European austerity policies – A statistical analysis 
 
79 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics about the variables of recovry 
Indicator Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Unemployment rate change (2013-2007) 
(percentage point) 
4.75 3.40 5.16 -3.30 18.70 
GDP at 2005 market prices change 
(2013/2007) (percentage) 
0.99 0.98 0.08 0.77 1.20 
Gap between actual and potential gross 
domestic product (2013) (percentage 
point) 
-2.81 -2.35 2.62 -12.80 1.24 
Source: Own calculation 
3.2. Correlation analysis of the reallocation change and recovery 
Our research focuses on the relationship between the change of reallocation and re-
covery from crisis, which can be examined by correlation analysis. Some of the var-
iables (revenue change, gross public debt change, unemployment rate change and 
gap between actual and potential GDP) do not have a normal distribution (p-value of 
Shapiro-Wilk statistics for each variable is <0.05), therefore Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients were calculated. According to the correlation coefficients (Table 3), we 
can describe the relationships between each reallocation change and recovery varia-
bles. 





GDP at constant 
prices change 
(2013/2007) 
Gap between actual 
and potential gross 
domestic product 
(2013) 
Expenditure change (2013-2007) 0.312 -0.543 -0.430 
Revenue change (2013-2007) -0.146 -0.250 -0.130 
Current tax burden change (2013-
2007) 
-0.319 -0.063 -0.069 
Social benefits change (2013-
2007) 
0.631 -0.698 -0.454 
Gross public debt change (2013-
2007) 
0.617 -0.700 -0.447 
Source: Own calculation 
 
In the case of expenditure change and unemployment, the coefficient 
(rs=0.312) shows a weak relationship with a positive dir ction but in the case of 
GDP at constant prices change and gap between actual nd potential GDP, there are 
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moderate relationships with negative directions (rs=-0.543, rs=-0.430). This implies 
that countries with higher expenditure changes have low r changes in GDP at con-
stant prices (and vice versa).2 In the line of revenue change and current tax burden 
change, the correlation coefficients show only weak relationships. 
The social benefits change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
positive direction in relation to the unemployment rate change (rs=0.631). It implies 
that countries with higher social benefits changes have higher unemployment rate 
changes so increasing social benefits do not cause decreasing unemployment 
change. The social benefits change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
negative direction in relation to the GDP at constat prices change (rs=-0.698). It re-
fers to the fact that countries with higher social benefits changes have lower GDP at 
constant price changes so increasing social benefits cause decreasing GDP at con-
stant price change. The social benefits change has a moderate relationship with a 
negative direction in relation to the gap between actu l and potential GDP  
(rs=-0.454). It means that countries with higher social benefits changes have lower 
gaps between actual and potential GDP. 
The gross public debt change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
positive direction in relation to the unemployment rate change (rs=0.617). It shows 
that countries with higher gross public debt changes have higher unemployment 
changes so increasing gross public debt does not cause decreasing unemployment 
change. The gross public debt change has a strong relationship with a negative direc-
tion in relation to the GDP at constant prices change (rs=-0.700). It refers to the fact 
that countries with higher gross public debt changes have lower GDP at constant 
prices changes so increasing higher public debts cau e decreasing GDP at constant 
prices change. The gross public debt change has a moderate relationship with a neg-
ative direction in relation to the gap between actul and potential GDP (rs=-0,447). It 
means that countries with higher gross public debt changes have lower gaps between 
actual and potential GDP. 
Based on the relationships, we can be conclude that some of the variables (so-
cial benefits change, gross public debt change) support our hypothesis according to 
which greater reallocation change does not lead to more favorable changes in recov-
ery. However, the rest of the reallocation change variables (expenditure change, rev-
enue change, current tax burden change) did not support our assumption clearly, 
which suggests that further analysis is necessary. As it was mentioned in the descrip-
tive statistics part, the standard deviations of the indicators were quite high, which 
                                                   
 
2 For correlation coefficients, causality can be intrpreted from the point of view of both variables. 
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suggests that more homogenous groups of the countries should be created by cluster 
analysis. 
3.3. Cluster analysis based on the reallocation change variables 
The core idea of our study is to examine the effect of changes in reallocation on 
changes in recovery. We applied a hierarchical clustering (Ward’s method, Euclide-
an distance).3 The number of clusters can be determined based on the increase in 
squared Euclidean distance (Sajtos–Mitev 2007), which suggested a 4-cluster solu-
tion. We also examined the 3- and 5-cluster solutions but the interpretability was 
better in the 4-cluster solution. The clusters can be interpreted by the means of clus-
tering variables (changes in recovery variables). A mean can be a typical feature in a 
group if the group’s standard deviation is lower than the total (EU-27) standard de-
viation (Kovács et al. 2006). This criterion was fulfilled in the majority of the cells; 
there is only one high value in the fourth group, for gross public debt change. 
There are nine member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, France, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, United Kingdom) in the first cluster where all of 
the means of reallocation change variables were higher than the mean in EU-27, thus 
higher changes in reallocation variables can be in this group (see Table 4). 
In the second group, six countries can be found (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden) where the expenditures, revenu s and current tax bur-
dens decreased. The social benefits change was positive but lower than the EU-27 
mean and the gross public debt change was lower than the EU-27 mean. This group 
can show lower changes in reallocation than other groups or the EU-27 means. 
There are nine countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Hungary, 
Malta, Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia) in the third cluster. All of the means of 
reallocation change variables were positive but only the mean of revenue change and 
the mean of current tax burden change were higher than he means in EU-27. This 
cluster is similar to the first one but shows more moderate changes in reallocation 
variables than the first group. 
The fourth group contains three countries (Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) where 
there was a higher increase in expenditures, a higher decrease in revenues and a 
higher decrease in current tax burden than the EU-27 value. The highest social bene-
fit and gross public debt changes can be seen in this group among the clusters, caus-
ing a high standard deviation. It can be questioned why Greece does not belong to 
this group as, similarly to these countries, Greece also has a quite high gross public 
debt change (Appendix). The explanation can be found in revenue changes. While 
                                                   
 
3 For our analysis, we used SPSS 22.0 statistical program. 
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Ireland, Spain and Cyprus had a decrease in revenues, Gr ece had an increase simi-
lar to the other countries in the first cluster. 

























2.49 1.18 1.19 0.66 19.80 




1.37 1.50 1.24 0.98 13.16 




1.66 0.67 1.01 1.32 8.23 




0.77 1.53 1.60 0.64 24.06 
Total  
(EU-27) 




3.41 2.55 2.37 1.47 22.82 
Source: Own calculation 
 
After the description of the clusters based on changes in reallocation, the 
changes in recovery in each group can be examined. I  the first cluster, all of the 
countries had increasing unemployment rates, however, th  mean (5.09 percentage 
points) is not a typical value due to the high value of standard deviations (Table 5, 
Appendix). The change in GDP at constant prices show  also a mixed picture be-
cause Greece had a 23 percent decrease, which pulled down the mean of this group. 
As regards the gap between actual and potential GDP, the standard deviation is also 
higher than the EU-27 value, thus a typical feature cannot be drawn based on this 
variable. This group showed the highest changes in reallocation variables, however, 
only a mixed picture can be drawn about the changes in recovery indicators. 
Critical approach to European austerity policies – A statistical analysis 
 
83 
Table 5. Change in recovery in the clusters 
Cluster 
Unemployment 
rate change  
(2013-2007)  
(percentage point) 




Gap between actual 





Mean 5.09 0.95 -4.10 
Std. Deviation 5.67 0.08 3.42 
2 (n=6) 
Mean 3.85 1.04 -1.29 
Std. Deviation 2.92 0.09 1.09 
3 (n=9) 
Mean 2.18 1.01 -2.14 
Std. Deviation 2.81 0.06 1.88 
4 (n=3) 
Mean 13.23 0.93 -3.98 
Std. Deviation 4.86 0.01 2.65 
Total  
(EU-27) 
Mean 4.75 0.99 -2.81 
Std. Deviation 5.16 0.08 2.62 
Source: Own calculation 
 
The second cluster has lower standard deviations (compared to the EU-27 
values); therefore the means describe this group well. The change in unemployment 
rate was lower, the change in GDP at constant prices was higher, and the gap be-
tween the actual and potential GDP is lower than the EU-27 value. This group had 
the lowest changes in reallocation but the highest values in recovery. The third clus-
ter has also lower standard deviations (compared to the EU-27 values) and the 
means show a better picture in changes in recovery than the EU-27 values. This 
group had moderate changes in reallocation variables. 
In the fourth cluster, change in unemployment rate was higher and change in 
GDP at constant prices was lower than the EU-27 values. The change in gap be-
tween actual and potential GDP also shows a less favorable picture than that of the 
EU-27, however, there are differences in this indicator among the three countries. 
This group had the highest change in expenditure, social benefits and gross public 
debt change as well but the change in recovery variables cannot yet describe a pros-
perous situation. 
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These results show that the changes in reallocation or the increase of realloca-
tion do not clearly affect positive changes in recovery. Moreover, some of the corre-
lation coefficients and the results of the cluster analysis highlight that decreasing re-
allocation can be coupled with more favorable changes in recovery, which supports 
our hypothesis. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, our goal was to examine austerity policies applied in the EU member 
states during the years of the Great Recession. We presented the theoretical frame-
work for fiscal consolidation, and also presented various related economic views. 
Our hypothesis was that the larger the size of austerity, the longer the period of re-
covery from the current recession. We used descriptive s atistics and cluster analysis 
to approach this question. Of the most important results of the analysis we highlight 
that greater positive change in reallocation does not help economic recovery, which 
more social spending does not help fight unemployment, and that gross public debt 
change has a strong negative correlation with GDP at constant prices. 
With our results, we regard our hypothesis as confirmed, namely that larger 
austerity is not accompanied by quicker recovery. However, with our current statis-
tical assets, causality cannot be defined: we cannot claim that recovery is slow as a 
consequence of austerity, or austerity had to be applied because of economic slump 
and slow recovery. We plan to develop our model further in order to find statistical 
evidence concerning causality. We could overcome a s rious limitation of the analy-
sis by using data in proportion of potential GDP instead of real GDP because, by us-
ing the second one, the results are distorted by economic relapse. 
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5. Geographically extended integration –  
A new tool for crisis management? 
Ábel Czékus 
 
The crisis escalated in 2008 is being considered as the biggest economic recession since the 
1929-33 great depression. Although long term consequences of the recession are still un-
known, some post-crisis trends seem to loom. In the context of international economics, the 
crisis could be evaluated as the shift of leading position from the North Atlantic region to the 
Far East. In this reading, not only countries of the Far East have to get familiar with their 
new roles, but Western Europe and North America as well. Economic and political orienta-
tion and realignment of the latter entities could result in pioneer solutions for the future eco-
nomic and social prospects of their economies. 
We discuss some of the possible post-crisis ways of economic development with re-
gard to the opportunities Transatlantic cooperation hold out with putting special emphasis 
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Scrutinising and evaluating 
the EU-US free trade agreement would constitute a strong theoretical background of the 
post-crisis North Atlantic economic cooperation. However, cooperation of these economic 
giants would probably raise competition policy issue  as well. At the first blush, the distend-
ed economic area could lead to a heated antitrust activity and pose – already disputable – 
questions on State aid.  
The free trade agreement would undoubtedly count as a superior level in the contract-
ing parties’ economic development. Marriage portion f the TTIP would exert its positive 
effects chiefly in the EU and US economies, but the spill over would make stabilisation and 
growth felt in international economics as well. 
 
Key words: integration, North Atlantic region, post-crisis Transatlantic economic order 
1. Introduction 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) celebrate the 25th anniversary of 
their liberation from the soviet occupation. 1989 resulted in a turning point for these 
nations, but opened new perspectives for the whole c ntinent. Years of the Central 
European realignment coincide with some new trends i  the international econom-
ics; beside the opportunities provided by the info-telecommunication revolution, 
vaulting international financial activities and enha ced volume of world trade 
backed by the process of liberalisation, the new economic constellation has brought 
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challenges as well. These processes are popularly nmed as globalisation, but mak-
ing a clear sweep of all positive and negative consequencies into one hat would be a 
scientifically wanton attempt. On the other hand, in the post-cold war period the 
United States economy has played leading role in international economics. Not only 
its growing potential affects EU economy, but technological advancements induced 
by it as well. 
In the light of this, we discuss the newest trends that characterise EU and US 
economic relations. The apropo of this paper is the forthcoming free trade agreement 
(officially the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)). We consider 
TTIP as a tool for harmonising operational conditions on the markets covered; this 
agreement, furthermore, suits the decades-long trend of realigning transnational co-
operation based on regional agreements. Several studie  have been already issued on 
the settlement of TTIP (Bartl–Fahey 2013, Bergkamp–Kogan 2013, Bonciu 2013, 
Lester 2013). These articles discuss the negotiation and challenges risen by the 
agreement. Other authors (Aguilar et al. 2008, Fiott 2013, Lannoo 2013) highlight 
sectoral implications concerned by a Transatlantic cooperation. Going further, An-
drews et al. (2005), Hamilton (2013), Hoffman (2013) or Siebert et al. (1996) dissect 
strategic issues on North Atlantic cooperation. Variable approaches shows that the 
evolving agreement involves heated scientific activity, both in Europe and overseas. 
2.  Intentions and obstacles on the road toward the trade agreement 
Since the 1990s various attempts have being made by the EU and US administration 
with the clear aim of realigning economic relations. In this process signing the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 1995 and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) 
show in a way of deepening economic linkages (EEAS 1995, Pollack–Shaffer 
2005), but, in the meantime, trade disputes represents (or, in some cases, represent-
ed) considerable frictions. These emerge on the field of agricultural products 
(GMOs, Bananas, etc.), trade mark issues, or State aid considerations (Airbus-
Boeing) (EP 2013a). Although disputes “block” the development the trade of a field, 
by virtue of this they have contributed to the sketch of a need for a new regulatory 
framework between the parties. However, the regulatory initiative of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) provides a settlement framework, in more specific cases 
it seems inefficient (Lester 2013). EU-US relations have reached a maturity level 
that calls out for a more chiselled agreement; Lester (2013) designed protectionism, 
regulatory issues and impacts on international trade as issues to be addressed. 
Pollack–Shaffer (2005) argue a ternary concept on the EU-US economic rela-
tions. Firstly, they highlight the stability, contiuity and resilience of the Transatlan-
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tic relations even in the years of major (foreign) political discrepancies. The soaring 
volume of trade or FDI could be mentioned as the best examples on this field. Regu-
latory issues, on the other hand, mirror rather a variable stance since their advance-
ment highly depends on the policy in question. Observing competition policy they 
conclude a complementary regime with minor frictions. The other end is that of the 
GMO-issue with conflicting interests and approach towards. However, MRAs could 
be handled as the fields of cooperation where regims live side by side, even if there 
are only limited fields covered by these agreements. And finally, authors highlight 
that “changes in institutional and market power have shaped policy outcomes in dis-
tinct regulatory areas” (p. 6.) since international success is deeply affected by the 
parties' domestic institutional structure. 
Scrutinising the previous legislative efforts on convergence and preparations 
of the TTIP, political and social factors couldn't be ignored. Spying scandal last year 
seemed to jeopardise and jamming the EU-US negotiations on TTIP, but the Euro-
pean Parliament – due to mutual economic interest – went on with preparations (EP 
2013b). This approach totally fits the row previously mentioned on the superiority of 
the common economic interests. On the other hand, intensification of economic ac-
tivities kindled by the new agreement, considerable social tension and challenges 
could dawn on the EU and US societies. Vice versa, the hang of economic growth 
could spur European politicians to hovel the agreement due to potentials it involves 
(Bonciu 2013). Parties highlight the magnitude of the Transatlantic trade, emphasis-
ing the benefits of a fully implemented agreement. According to the European 
Commission's calculation (EC 2013a) the cooperation w uld embodied in an extra 
income of €545 per househould and would result in a 0,5-1% extra economic growth 
regarding the Old continent's economy. On the other hand, scholars hitherto ignored 
to review deeply impacts on employment of an agreement with such great implica-
tions. The EC (2013b) calms anxiety down by its own estimation of 0,7% of labour 
move due to the TTIP. The main question is whether labour markets and institutions 
responsible for employment and social affairs (governments, higher educational in-
stitutions, trade schools, LLL institutions, etc.) are prepared for the dowries of the 
agreement and blunting possible adverse effects induced by it. Only assessing and 
managing labour market recoils would result in long-term and enduring benefits for 
the signing parties. Considerations about economic activities on social embed-
dedness should therefore play crucial role in shaping macroeconomic policies, and – 
as seen in Granovetter's (2005) arguements – only an interpretation observing indi-
vidual (on the level of entities) definiteness is watertight. 
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3. What could the TTIP result in? 
Several governmental studies are scrutinizing would-be effects of the TTIP agree-
ment (Barker et al. 2013, Cooper 2014, EC 2013b). The agreement would constitute 
the biggest free trade area in the world embracing two economic giants. They repre-
sent 45% of the world GDP (Barker et al. 2013) and Transatlantic commercial and 
investment linkages renders stability for the interational trade. Economic coopera-
tion of the EU and US would therefore mean not only an additional spur for the 
signing economies but stability and impetus for their trading partners as well.1 It is 
worth to bear in mind, that in 2013 the EU was the most important merchandise 
trading partner of the US2; a year earlier statistics show a 100,1 billions of USD 
merchandise trade balance deficit for the States. Supplementing this Figure by the 
services sector, the weight of the EU in the US trade was much more notable, by a 
lowering deficit.3 The last decade's change is represented in a three-steps Table (Ta-
ble 1). 
Table 1. US trade with the EU, trade and services, billions f USD 
 2002 2007 2012 
Exports 
Goods and services 238,4 424,7 463,5 
Goods 140,4 242,2 269,7 
Services 98 182,5 193,8 
Imports 
Goods and services 311,3 502 534 
Goods 225,4 356,2 384,3 
Services 85,2 145,8 149,7 
Balance 
Goods and services -72,9 -77,2 -59,8 
Goods -85 -113,9 -100,1 
Services 9,7 36,7 40,4 
Source: Own edition based on Cooper (2014, p. 5.) 
 
                                                   
 
1 According to the European Commission calculation this spill over effect could be slightly under €100 
billion (EC 2013b). 
2 This statement is referring to the cumulated (exports plus imports) values, since the biggest export 
partners of the US was Canada, the biggest imports China. 
3 In 2012 the total (goods plus services) US exports t  the EU reached 463,5 billions of USD, while 
imports 534 billions of USD. 
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Estimations on the benefits of the agreement were bing made both for the US 
and EU economies. The European Commission states that “by 2027 we could expect 
the European Union’s economy to be around €120 billion arger and the US econo-
my to be €95 billion larger than they would be without TTIP” (EC 2013b, p. 6.) that 
is equal to 0,5% and 0,4% GDP growth, respectively. It should be noted that these 
gains do not constitute a one-off growth, but – after the agreement is being fully im-
plemented – it would involve long-term favourable effects, too. Scaling these Fig-
ures onto benefits for common men, every European Union household would gain a 
€545 extra income, while this amount in the United States is €655 (Barker et al. 
2013). Taking into account other macroeconomic indicators, authors demonstrate 
750.000 new jobs4 would be created by the positive impetus of the agreement only 
in the United States. On the field of employment, the EC highlights that export-
oriented sectors would be the biggest job creating branches by stating that “TTIP 
may result in an increase by several million of the number of jobs dependent on ex-
ports in the EU” (EC 2013b, p. 2.). 
Figure 1. Estimated percentage increase in US State exports to the EU after the 
implementation of the TTIP 
 
Source: Barker et al. (2013, p. 4.) 
 
                                                   
 
4 Under the supposition of 100% tariffs reduction, 25% reduction of nontariff burderns and in 
procurement barriers reduction of 50%. 
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Transatlantic economic relations are inevitable for b th parties. More than 
20% of total US export goes to the Old continent, while export of services counts 
32% (Barker et al. 2013). States' share within these Figures varies, but generally 
spoken the liberalisation would put the agreement's watertightness in perspective. 
This is underpinned by Figure 1. On the other side, th  US import would rise 28%5 
that would affect mostly the motor vehicle industry, metal products, processed foods 
and chemicals, as it is foreseen in the EC analysis, not taken into consideration bene-
ficial impacts of the intensified competition. The most favoured EU industrial 
branches with their foreseen increasement are repres nt d in Table 2. Barker et al. 
(2013), on the other hand, flash advanced manufacturing, financial services, hospi-
tality and retail as the advantageously affected branches. 
Table 2. Foreseen EU export increase due to the agreement 
Industry branch Percentage change 
Motor vehicles 41 
Metal products 12 
Processed foods 12 
Chemicals 9 
Other manufactured goods 6 
Other transport equipment 6 
Note: These Figures embraces total EU export increase, not only that of toward the US 
Source: Own edition based on EC (2013b) 
 
Summarising, would-be advantages of the TTIP read out fr m the statistics 
shortly represented – although they are still only estimations – are more than attrac-
tive. Furthermore, a levelled current account balance (Cooper 2014) permits of par-
ties to start negotiations on such an agreement. The agreement between the EU and 
US would give primarily new motion for their economic growth and development 
(embodied in enhanced competition and competitiveness, trade creation, etc.), but its 
sectorial and industrial dissemination shows rather a various stance. Important to 
emphasise the profound motivations of the agreement underlining the fact that “the 
EU and the US want to tackle barriers behind the customs border – such as differ-
ences in technical regulations, standards and approval procedures” (EC 2014, p. 1.), 
and this would include agricultural products as well. Furthermore, the spill over ef-
                                                   
 
5 Trade diversion is taken into account. 
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fect of the EU-US liberalisation would be beneficial for the rest of the international 
economy as well.6 
4. TTIP regulatory considerations 
Moulding a North Atlantic free trade area and setting single investment standards 
could be achieved by trade-offs. As the European Commission notification states, 
“the agreement is expected (…) achieving greater regulatory compatibility between 
the EU and the US, and paving the way for setting global standards” (EC 2013a, p. 
1.), admitting inevitability of certain level of harmonisation of legal systems. More 
precisely, existing barriers, such as EU protectionary measures on trade, limitation 
of US public procurement, restriction on the flow of services, ought to be cutbacked. 
All these efforts need to be supplemented by the harmonisation of the EU-US com-
petition regimes.7 
Regulatory issues to be addressed by the negotiations might be labelled into 
three categories (EC 2013a, Lester 2013). Given the leitmotiv of mutually freeing 
market access, tariff regulations, trade defence and prescriptions on rules of origin 
need to be reconciled. In the services sector parties should grant the MFN treatment, 
supplemented by the US recognition of European qualifications. Another pivotal is-
sue is that of degrading obstacles hampering investment, including the ticklish topic 
of American public procurement. On the other hand, the „behind-the-border” (EC 
2013a, p. 1.) obstacles seem to obstruct much more liberal economic activities due 
to the co-existence of different health, environmental or patent norms. In this sense, 
TTIP would consummate initiatives of the 1990s since it exerts on hovelling com-
patibility of regulatory fields. Thirdly, parties are committed for a 21st century 
agreement that is able to address global challenges like sustainability is, and, fur-
thermore, serving as a string for future agreements with similar intentions. This view 
is welcomed by the overseas party as well, since “if the US and Europe (...) can 
agree to a single set of rules, the rest of the world will likely follow” (Barker et al. 
2013, p. 1.). 
In the light of this, the need for competition policy harmonisation, as a tool 
for nearing operational conditions, is plain. Bonciu (2013) highlights the importance 
of rethinking State aid practices in this process, while Langhammer et al. (2002) un-
                                                   
 
6 Bonciu (2013) acknowledges this to the far-gone European (see EU-Turkey customs union) and North 
American (see NAFTA) integration that opens markets of other: non-signatory contries, and to other 
Transatlantic cooperation (for example EU-Canada free trade negotiations). 
7 For institutional considerations see Bartl–Fahey (2013). 
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derline the importance of the competition policy generally (including enforcement as 
well) in such a kind of integration. 
Kovacic (2005) argues that the EU and the USA should mutually adopt com-
petition policy best (more precisely 'better' – due to the never-ending evolutionary 
feature of the policy) practices with the clear aim of converging their competition 
policy regimes. He, based on Muris (2002), proposes a three-steps process (Kovacic 
2002, p. 67.), in a strong correlation with NTA's objectives: 
1. decentralized experimentation at the national or regional level; 
2. the identification of superior approaches;  
3. the opting-in to superior approaches by individual j risdictions. 
 
This scheme of interaction has to work not only on inter- and transgovern-
mental level, but on transnational level as well. Examples to follow are, as such, the 
renewed pre-merger notification process, merger guidelines, leniency programmes 
or the enhanced international competition policy cooperation. Gerber (2005), on the 
other hand, flashes the question not only of cooperation but frictions as well and 
states that “competition law was an area that seemed to many to be particularly suit-
ed to cooperative initiatives”, while in the meantime – as well due to the EC deci-
sion on GE/Honeywell planned merger –, “the transatlantic governance relationship 
presented a murky and ambiguous picture” (p. 82.). 
Lester (2013) furthermore argues another aspects of regulatory considerations. 
He supposes that in trading issues WTO regulations would prevail after the TTIP is 
being negotiated and signed. The SPS-plus (sanitary and phytosanitary) formula, on 
the other hand, would constitute a qualitative development and could be treated as a 
general novelty in the parties' cooperation. With the clear aim of yielding “greater 
openness, transparency, and convergence in regulatory approaches and requirements 
and related standards-development processes, as well as, inter alia, to reduce redun-
dant and burdensome testing and certification requiments, promote confidence in 
our respective conformity assessment bodies, and enhance cooperation on conformi-
ty assessment and standardization issues globally” (p. 3.), this consideration is sound 
and the TBT-plus (Technical Barriers to Trade) chapter, that embodies these goals, 
would push the agreement further. And thirdly, convergence of regulatory practices 
would result in a more harmonious economic area. Bergkamp–Kogan (2013) wel-
come regulatory efforts, since – although dissimilarit es in the parties' approaches – 
it would lead to “mutual recognition of equivalent product-related standards (…). If 
the EU and US are up this challenge, both trade and risk regulation, and ultimately, 
the citizens of the world’s two largest markets, will be the winners” (p. 507.). 
As seen above, and proved by the regulators' continuous efforts on policy 
streamlining, either competition regimes couldn't be handled as a matured collection 
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of rules and norms, but out and away an open-ended process. In this reading this 
policy is proactive; we argue if competition policy streamlining could follow the rate 
of economic changes and challenges (new types of cooperation, higher volume to be 
valued, more complex proprietary forms, etc.) it is faced by. Advisely, Kovacic 
(2005) underlines the need for investments in competition policy staff. This is even 
more important in the US-EU cooperation, since they are major partners in competi-
tion policy issues on the international scene. Exchanging best practices is therefore 
inevitable. 
5. Conclusions 
In this essay we rendered a short overview on the main otivations observable be-
hind the desire of TTIP negotiations. We picked out only the most important estima-
tions on the would-be effects of the borning North Atlantic free trade agreement. 
These data foreshadow considerable economic benefits for both the US and EU, but 
there are still only a limited number of scientific articles written on the topic. We at-
tribute this to the initiation phase negotiations are t. 
Based on the above mentioned considerations, the EU and US administrations 
are fully committed to the TTIP. A free trade agreem nt would primarily result in a 
mutually liberalised market access; in the case of the EU we highlight trade limita-
tion cutbacks, while in the US access to the public procurements seems to be one of 
the most prominent questions. Furthermore, studies show the rest of the world econ-
omy would profit from such an agreement as well dueto its spill over effects (trade 
creation, intensified competition, growing volume of investments, etc.). 
Nearing trading and investment conditions implies harmonisation of policies 
and norms. In this process competition, trade, industrial, R+D and environmental 
policy augur to play special role, but some sectoral implications could attract atten-
tion as well. These trends suit the parties' decades-long commitment toward deeper 
cooperation and, as such, their enhanced cooperation could be one of the nascent 
corollary of the crisis. Summing up, TTIP would result in considerable economic 
benefits and could serve as a string for other economies with the desire of stitching 
economic relations more powerfully. 
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6. EU-15 countries, new member states and 
harmonization of corporate income tax 
Andrzej Karpowicz 
 
The idea of common corporate income tax (CIT) in EU gains even more attendance. Howev-
er, there are several features of particular EU countries, which make the benefits of EU-wide 
harmonization dubious and its effects could be uneqally distributed. Among these features 
are inter alia: (i) requirement for capital, (ii) size of the economies, (iii) differences in labor 
taxation, (iv) set of public goods available to taxp yers, (v) agglomeration externalities, (vi) 
richness of societies and (vii) tax culture including tax morale. The differences within the EU 
are particularly visible taking into consideration two groups of countries i.e. the Old EU and 
New Member States. Based on some approximation of the economies of EU-15 and EU-12 
countries, the article shows the obstacles for future CIT harmonization. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Income Tax, Macroeconomic Policy, Fiscal Policy, Optimal Taxation  
1. Introduction 
The EU seeks to foster its internal market. This process involves also taxation. 
Therefore, it indents to harmonize taxes among the Member States. Following that 
path several indirect taxes (i.e. Value Added Tax, customs duty and excise duty) has 
been already unified to a great extend. Currently, the European Commission focuses 
on unification of direct taxes and particularly on CIT.  
In view of the above, the European Commission proposed to introduce in the 
EU a unified method of calculation of the tax base (i.e. so called Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base or CCCTB). According to the project, multinational cor-
porations will be free to choose between CCCTB and existing national taxation 
rules. The decision on the tax rates under CCCTB should be left to the discretion of 
Member States. However, in the future a natural step forward should be both elimi-
nation of national regulations and harmonization of the tax rates to achieve full uni-
fication of CIT. Especially countries with elevated tax rates may be the strong advo-
cates of such developments, in the hope that this will diminish their competitive dis-
advantage against Member States with low tax rates. 
It is of course a future and uncertain matter and therefore cannot be subject to 
scientific verification. However, a question arises whether the whole EU, taking into 
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consideration current features of Member States, is economically able to accommo-
date a fully common CIT. Unfortunately, the EU seems not to be an optimal single 
fiscal area. This is because particular countries differ vastly. In this article I will 
show these varieties only based on general and approximated features two groups of 
countries represent – namely New Member States1 and the Old EU countries.2 In the 
following sections I discuss the differences, which are particularly relevant for CIT 
purposes for these regions. 
2. Requirement for capital 
Globalization of the world economy reveals in increas d abilities of the international 
firms to shift taxable profits between countries and easiness of abroad investments. 
This has led to tax competition between the states. Not surprisingly Member States 
also take part in the so called “race to the bottom”.  
The most vivid feature of any tax system are taxation rates and therefore, they 
are often used in tax competition. Countries are encouraged to lower the CIT rates 
because they perceive them as an important factor, which either lures or deters for-
eign investments. Such reasoning is especially vivid, when the process is analyzed 
from the perspective of two groups of countries i.e. th  New Member States and the 
EU-15. The Old EU on average significantly cut their CIT rates. The New Member 
States have responded to the CIT competition pressu and decreased their corporate 
income tax rates even more. This forced again the EU-15 to further tax rate reduc-
tions. The trend of disparity of average CIT rates in the Old EU and New Member 
States is depicted on the below graph. 
Based on the below Figure it seems that New Member States were more “in 
need” of capital than the Old EU, where the capital w s already installed. After the 
fall of communism and in the years of transformation capital in Central Europe was 
scarce, which was unlike the Western countries. Even now the disparity is signifi-
cant. Whereas according to the Eurostat data for 2012 the stock of foreign direct in-
vestments (“FDI”) in EU-15 was EUR 6.1 trillion, this Figure for the New Member 
States was just EUR 0.5 trillion – a value much lower taking even into consideration 
the population of respective areas.  
Taxation of foreign capital is always tempting. For example Huizinga and 
Nicodème estimated that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership of the 
                                                   
 
1 12 countries, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Croatia, which accessed EU in 2013 is not 
included in the analysis). 
2 15 countries, which formed EU before 2004. 
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companies increases the average CIT rate between a half and one percent 
(Huizinga–Nicodeme 2003). Therefore, the New Member States should constantly 
put more pressure on CIT competition than the Old EU and as a result full EU-wide 
CIT harmonization may not be beneficial for them. 
Figure 1. Difference between average top CIT rates 
 
Source: Own construction based on data from Taxation trends i  the European Union (2013) 
3. Size of economies 
The appropriateness of lower CIT burden levied on cmpanies in the New Member 
States can be explained also by the differences in ize of those countries. New 
Member States are on average smaller, if not always in terms of population, then at 
least measured by the size of the economy. Such comparison is presented below. 
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Source: Own construction based on data from Eurostat 
 
As for 2013 among the twelve smallest economies of the EU, eleven were 
New Member States. The only exception was Poland with the economy of the size 
just in the middle of the stake of remaining 15 countries.  
It may be stated that in fact independent tax jurisdictions share a mobile CIT 
base by competing for scarce capital. Classic economic models claim that assuming 
perfect capital mobility the optimal CIT rate for a small open economy equals to ze-
ro (Diamond–Mirrlees 1971, Zodrow–Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 1986)). Small 
economies are proportionally more affected by the seady increase in capital mobili-
ty than the large countries. This is due to the fact, that outflow of certain amount of 
capital from a small economy could trigger more sever  consequences for such state 
than the loss of the same amount of capital for a large country.  
Gordon and Varian conclude that bigger countries may h ve some market 
power in the world capital market, which supports taxation of capital (Gordon–
Varian 1989). Large jurisdictions, which have some onopsony power, are able to 
“export” part of its tax burden to non-residents in the form of their reduced after-tax 
returns to capital (Zodrow–Mieszkowski 1983). Thus, quite an intuitive conclusion 
would be that small countries, like New Member States, could improve national wel-
fare by cutting CIT rates more than the big countries as the response from capital 
owners would be there higher. It seems, that at present those states follow this con-
clusion in reality. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson show that a small country should tax only labor, 
which supply elasticity, unlike in case of capital supply, is finite (Bucovetsky–
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Wilson 1991). Large regions on the other hand, which can influence the equilibrium 
of after-tax returns on capital, can tax capital on a source-basis.  
Summarizing, small economies should keep the CIT burden on the low level. 
Therefore, countries belonging to the Old EU can tax corporations more heavily 
than smaller New Member States, which now happens in practice. Consequently, 
disparity in size of the economies is the following ar ument against full harmoniza-
tion of CIT. 
4. Labor taxation 
A company, which as a rule is subject to CIT, is not the final income taxpayer. A 
company is always owned by individual or a group of individuals. Therefore, indi-
vidual shareholders are always subject to double taxation both at the level of a com-
pany (with CIT) and at their own level (with PIT). It is worth considering the actual 
income tax burden of the individuals. 
This relation partially explains Miller in his model (Miller 1977). The after-
tax return from equity income is , where CIT is the corpo-
rate income tax rate and  is the personal income tax rate imposed on dividends. 
If instead of dividends the investor derives income from debt, the net income would 
be ( , where  is the progressive PIT rate. Thus, as long as the fol-
lowing inequation is met  the investor 
should prefer to hold shares in a company rather than gain an interest income. Con-
sequently, from this perspective the investor who takes a decision whether to buy 
shares or gain income from non-corporate sources should compare (i) the after-tax 
returns on investments in corporate sector (subject to CIT and subsequently PIT on 
dividend distribution) with (ii) the after-tax returns in non-corporate sector, which 
would be subject to progressive PIT tax rates but no CIT would be charged at any 
stage.  
From purely tax point of view investments in non-corporate sector could be 
more profitable for the majority of population because most people are subject to 
low PIT rates as they are in low taxation brackets. However, a relatively small per-
centage of individuals with the highest income hold a significant number of shares 
in companies. Hence, as they are subject to high progressive PIT rates, they may 
prefer to derive income from corporate sources. The reasoning is shown on the be-
low Figure. 
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Figure 3. Debt vs. equity investing under different income and PIT brackets 
















Source: Own construction based on Miller (1977) 
 
Thus, more affluent people, who are subject to higher PIT rate brackets 
should prefer equity income, which is not taxed with progressive PIT rates (depicted 
by gridded field). However, those who earn less and re subject to lower progressive 
PIT rates should be better off if they do not invest in equity (depicted by the stripped 
field) but in debt instruments. Assuming that among EU-15 countries there are more 
affluent people, this partially explains the capacity of those countries to maintain 
higher CIT rates, which on the other hand may turn out to be too high for the New 
Member States (if full tax harmonization is executed) and significantly decrease the 
profitability of local companies. 
The following reason supporting maintenance of the CIT wedge between the 
New Member States and the EU-15 is also disparity in he level of PIT rates. Name-
ly, CIT is often seen as a part of progressive tax system and a backstop for PIT. The 
reason is that some taxpayers could choose whether to pay PIT or CIT, depending 
on what taxation system they perceive as more favorable to them. In the absence of 
CIT or with more favorable regulations of CIT than PIT those taxpayers, which pay 
PIT would feel incentive to incorporate to avoid income taxation. Consequently, the 
PIT revenues would erode and the income taxation practically would cease to exist. 
Thus, as evidence shows, the CIT rates are usually higher in countries, which im-
pose high top PIT rates. Slemrod found in his cross c untry analysis a strong associ-
ation between the top statutory CIT rate and the top statutory PIT rates (Slemrod 
Return to holding 
equity (1-CIT)(1-PITd) 
 
Return to holding debt 
(1-CIT)(1-PITp) T
I
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2004). Therefore, unification of CIT should be accompanied by harmonization of 
PIT. Otherwise too high CIT burden in low CIT countries (mostly New Member 
States), would erode there the taxation base, becaus  entities would feel incentive to 
change their legal form in order to become PIT payers (which still could be lower). 
On the below graph is presented the development of the average top PIT rates for 
the EU-15 and the New Member Countries. 
Figure 4. Average top PIT rates in EU-15 countries and New Memb r States 
 
Source: Own construction based on data from Taxation Trends i  the European Union 2013 
 
Taking into consideration the above on average top PIT rates in the EU-15 are 
higher than among New Member States. Therefore, having in mind that PIT func-
tions as a CIT backstop this is a following argument against unification of CIT 
across the whole EU. 
5. Public goods 
A tax in general is an enforced contribution without direct counter service. Natural-
ly, so is also CIT. Therefore, any taxpayer should be interested in paying least pos-
sible taxes. Public goods are accessible to all free of charge. Hence, if taxes weren’t 
obligatory, the free rider problem would arise i.e.taxpayers would feel no incentive 
to pay (indirectly) for public goods, as public goods are available for the whole soci-
ety, also for those, who do not pay public contributions.  
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The Tiebout model assumes that different regions offer certain basket of 
goods at various prices (Tiebout 1956). Those goods are public goods and their 
availability corresponds to the taxation burden imposed by each tax jurisdiction. 
Given that (i) taxpayers have different preferences with respect to the scope of gov-
ernment services they require and (ii) the price they are ready to pay in form of taxes 
varies, they move between different tax jurisdictions. In course of the choice process 
of the taxpayers and through appropriate reactions t  that choices of particular re-
gions, economic agents and tax jurisdictions determine the equilibria in a number of 
countries where the taxpayers maximize their utility functions by moving to the tax 
jurisdiction, which they found most suitable. The model proposed by Tibeout was 
designed originally for individuals. Fischel, White and more recently Wellisch sug-
gested, however, that the theory can be also easily dopted for multinational firms, 
which can change their residence according to their pr ferences depending on the 
mix of public goods and taxes (Fischel 1975, White 1975, Wellisch 2000). 
Consequently, particular countries provide for different set of public goods. 
Therefore, although generally investors may be inclined to pay lower taxes, concur-
rently they are interested in usage of public goods, which are financed by those taxes 
and accessible only on the territory of that particular state. As a result, higher CIT is 
justified in the EU-15. Concurrently, if CIT was on the same level among the New 
Member States, the investors could resign from locating capital there. 
6. Agglomeration externalities  
The economic geography literature claims that companies focus on the size of host 
domestic market and take into consideration its density i.e. concentration of the de-
mand around specific centers (Brakman et al. 2001). The key is thus the market po-
tential connected with a particular location. Hence, th  preferable choice are usually 
agglomerations, where investors could save on logistics and take advantage from 
agglomeration externalities. Those benefits include int r alia access to new technol-
ogies, well educated labor force, financial, social and political stability. To the ex-
tend this factors are financed from taxes, high taxes should not discourage invest-
ments but even attract FDI (Campbell 2005). 
In high tax locations residents demand high level of public services and sup-
port elevated CIT as a financing source. Governments can impose high CIT in ag-
glomerations, which would not trigger outflow of capit l as the tax would be im-
posed largely on location-specific rents. Baldwin and Krugman claim that this holds 
for European area appointed by the triangle between London, Hamburg and Milan 
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(Baldwin–Krugman 2004). This means, that CIT should not discourage capital in 
these locations to flee.  
Thus, governments – like those of Old EU – compensat  investors for higher 
CIT (Slemrod 2004, Devereux et al. 2008). As investors perceive CIT as price for 
availability of agglomeration externalities, they will accept high income taxation. 
This is also the reason why they expect New Member States to keep CIT on the 
lower level. Unification of CIT may harm these states also from this perspective. 
7. Richness of the societies 
There are five commonly accepted features a good taxation system should meet. 
One of them is justice, which means that a good tax system should provide for just 
treatment of various economic agents. However, according to this idea justice is not 
exactly what it may seem. There is a concept of so called vertical justice, which 
states that parties capable of paying higher taxes should simply pay them.  
Taking into consideration the above, imposing on entrepreneurs in different 
locations the same amount of CIT is not appropriate. Namely, EU-15 countries levy 
on average higher CIT burden than New Member States, because taxpayers in those 
countries are typically more affluent and therefore capable of paying proportionally 
more taxes (according to vertical justice concept).  
Moreover, people who earn more, save also more (Żyżyński 2009). Therefore, 
without major loss in their well-being they could bear more CIT (assuming that the 
economic cost of any tax – including CIT – is eventually born by individuals and not 
by companies, which was broadly discussed in the lierature). 
It should be underlined that CIT bear not the companies but their ultimate 
owner, which are individuals. The richness of residnts of various EU countries is 
presented below. 
Taking into consideration the above thirteen countries, where the GDP per in-
habitant is highest belong to EU-15. The only exceptions are Greece and Portugal. 
However, still those states are in the middle of the stake. Importantly, the above 
Figure compares only the current incomes. However, if the total possessions were 
taken into consideration the discrepancy between an average EU-15 and New Mem-
ber State resident would be even greater. 
Consequently, the same tax for the whole EU would not be just according to 
the concept of good taxation system. The cost of tax should correspond to a particu-
lar economy of each Member State. 
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Source: Own construction based on data from Eurostat 
8. Tax morale 
Several researchers claim that most standard economic models fail to grasp the tax 
compliance of the taxpayers properly. In particular tax compliance cannot be ex-
plained solely by deterrence, risk aversion, tax burden or density of tax regulations. 
For example Alm et al. as well as Frey and Feld argue that most economic models 
assume too much tax evasion (Alm et al. 1992, Frey–F ld 2002). In fact several tax-
payers do not even seek ways to evade taxes and canot be seen as simple utility 
maximizers, although in certain situations omitting taxes could be more favorable to 
them. 
Frey underlines that tax morality differs across countries (Frey 1997). He 
points inter alia social norms and societal institutions, which are important determi-
nants of tax morality and vary between states. Therefore, assuming that tax morale is 
higher among Old EU, these countries are able to impose higher CIT burden with 
lower risk of tax evasion.  
Torgler and Schneider found strong negative correlation between shadow 
economy (Torgler–Schneider 2007) and tax morale. According to their study the 
lower is tax morale, the more likely is that the shadow economy will be bigger. They 
claim that if taxpayers perceive government as helpful rather than wasteful, they 
tend to comply with own tax obligations and stay in the official sector. Shadow 
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economy differs in the EU and tends to be greater among New Member States. As-
suming that the level of tax morale follows the size of shadow economy, this also 
supports the claim that CIT burden in the New Member Countries should be lower 
than among Old EU. 
Abed and Gupta claimed that among former soviet state  institutional weak-
nesses and corruption was one of the major obstacle to market reforms (Abed–
Gupta 2002). If economic agents feel that they are cheated, the corruption is wide-
spread and that they are not well protected by law,they are more inclined to be ac-
tive in the informal sector and evade taxes. Hence, this also supports our hypothesis. 
Religion also supports tax morale as it acts as a “supernatural police” (Ander-
son–Tollison 1992). Alm and Torgler found that higher church attendance leads to 
greater tax morality (Alm–Torgler 2006). Again, most post-communistic New 
Member States do not feature high religiosity.  
Anyway, customs are very difficult to change. Taxes have a long tradition in 
the Old EU and local citizens appreciate it. In general state tax administration seems 
there also to be more responsive and less corrupted. Economic agents probably 
evade there taxes less than in Central Europe partially because they have higher tax 
morale. All these features, which however are difficult to measure, suggest that 
equalization of the corporate tax within the whole EU could be counterproductive. 
Even if the CIT burden is set on some medium level both the Old EU and New 
Member States might lose tax revenues but for different reasons – i.e. Western Eu-
rope because reduction of taxation and Central Europe because of increase of cor-
ruption and shadow economy in general. 
9. Conclusion 
Harmonization of CIT in the EU is recently on the agenda. It should contribute to a 
common market and ease the life for the multinationl companies. However, poten-
tial harmonization of CIT will include also several consequences, which are far 
more reaching than taxation only. Economies of Membr States differ significantly 
and may not be ready for a common taxation. In this article I tried to highlight sev-
eral arguments, which support this hypothesis. Among them are inter alia such is-
sues as: (i) requirement for capital, (ii) size of the economies, (iii) differences in la-
bor taxation, (iv) set of public goods available to taxpayers, (v) agglomeration exter-
nalities, (vi) richness of societies or (vii) level of tax morale. 
Introduction of CCCTB indeed could be appropriate solution for the whole 
EU. Surprisingly, it may even foster the tax competition, because comparison of 
corporate income taxation burden will be easier with a unified tax base. However, 
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taking into consideration different features of theeconomies of particular Member 
States, it seems that EU is not homogenous enough to adopt full CIT harmonization 
(i.e. including tax rate). 
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7. Economic policy measures on the environment and 
energy sources for sustainability conflict in Romania 
Andrea Csata 
 
The paper describes sustainability conflicts created by some of the economic policies on en-
vironmental protection and to achieve a sustainable en rgy policy.  
The present paper draws on the hypothesis that green en rgy projects create conflicts 
of sustainability by increasing the price of electrici y, thus damaging the economy by de-
creasing the competitiveness of production factors and also creates social conflicts and other 
serious problems for exposed social strata. 
This paper describes the first global aspects regarding the use of natural resources 
and energy, a short presentation of the European policies, country (Romania) and local level 
situations with special attention to the energy sector and environmental requirements. It de-
scribes the general framework of policies for the us  of natural resources in Romania. The 
social and economic conflicts presented are related to broader conflicts concerning green 
energy, in particular wind energy. Although the objective of green energy projects is a very 
good one, as they have less negative impacts on the environment. However, these projects 
have also some disadvantages and may present inconvenie ces that might be disadvanta-
geous in the long run. The economic aspects analysed here are: the structure of ownership of 
these investments and their way of subsidising the costs and benefits. From a social perspec-
tive the paper focuses on the positive side of these investments, their costs and social risks as 
well as on the measures taken by and the involvement of the Government and the effects 
brought by these measures. In the section related to environmental problems there will be 
discussed some of the negative effects of green-green and green investments. The paper re-
lies on data given in formal agreements, contracts with European Union, statistical data 
from the National Institute for Statistics, National Agency in Energy and Government data. 
 
Keywords: sustainability, economic policy, sustainability conflicts, natural resources, 
Environmental Kuznets Curve 
1. Introduction 
Creating a sustainable and safe environment for energy production is part of our dai-
ly preoccupations. This necessity for sustainability has become of vital importance 
due to recent succession of events which point out the weaknesses of current sys-
tems and energy supply. Some of the recent examples are the nuclear accident in 
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Fukushima in 2011 or actions taken by Russia which use energy supply to gain po-
litical and economic leverage.  
The present paper aims to describe some of the social and economic conflicts 
that are brought about by economic policies that mean to create a strategy for sus-
tainable energy policy. The topic of the paper is discussed from a rural point of 
view, specifically rural development thus economic policies are analyzed 
considering rural economy and the effects of economic energy policies on rural 
areas. 
To verify our hypothesis the study analyses in detail two policies that have 
generated divergence in Romania, these being the green energy policy and the ex-
ploitation of natural resources (mineral, oils and shale gases). The analysis below is 
structured as follows: first the paper discusses th global situation followed by ex-
amples of sustainability conflicts on a global scale, then it moves on the situation in 
Romania describing in detail the sustainability conflicts in our country. As the topic 
of my doctoral dissertation concerns the sustainability of rural development, the 
problem will be presented from a national and local (rural areas) level.  
2.  Describing the global and European framework 
On a global scale we can observe the same level of globalization in terms of energy 
as in any other economic sector. Global competitors can have influence through: 
natural resources or technology. As far as natural resources are concerned, some 
countries have a significant advantage over others – e.g. countries with large re-
sources in oil and gases like Russia, Kazakhstan, Ir etc. or mineral resources like 
China. The global market of these commodities shows a high dependency on these 
countries, the European Union being one of the largest importers of energy generat-
ing fuels, and largely depends on this market. Current technology used in everyday 
life and industry relies heavily on these resources. Developing new technology is a 
very slow process especially if investors are not mivated enough. The competitive 
advantage is, one the one hand, obtaining these resources, and on the other hand the 
technology used to exploit these resources. From this perspective, the global players 
are the USA in exploiting shale gases, China in making wind turbines and solar pan-
els and Western European countries, like Germany who also have the capacity to 
make and export leading technology.   
The International Agency for Energy predicts a massive increase of energy 
demand (with 50% more in 2030 compared to 2003). If the shift in technology 
doesn’t occur this tendency will also present itself also in the case of oil demand 
which will rise by 46%. According to our present knowledge, if we continue to ex-
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ploit oil reserves at the current rate, it will only last till 2040 and natural gases till 
2070. Moreover, predictions indicate an economic growth which involves increased 
energy consumption. The International Agency for Energy (IEA) points out that 
global consumption between 2010 and 2020 should change faster towards using re-
newable energy sources and natural gases. Coal should remain an important source 
of energy covering one quarter of the world’s primary energy needs (this resource 
should hold for another 200 years if exploited at the current rate). Recent geopoliti-
cal problems, the increasing demand, the growing inelasticity of refining capacity 
and increasing the states’ resource reserves for crisis scenarios, have all lead to an 
increase of the prices. In these circumstances, the primary issue is stability and short 
term energy supply security meaning environmental sustainability.  
Nuclear energy seemed to be a solid choice until the accident in Fukushima 
(Japan) in 2011. These events lead to massive reorientation of energy dependent 
countries towards renewable energy sources (especially Europe). The commitment 
of the EU towards having a competitive and clean energy is also motivated by cli-
mate change and the vision of a sustainable Europe can be found in the Europe 2020 
strategy. The European Union policy on energy for the 2014-2020 period has three 
main objectives: Sustainability by reducing greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the 
global warming effect to only 2°C more than in the pr -industrial era. Competitive-
nessmeans to effectively implement the internal energy market and creating energy 
supply safety. As far as energy imports are concerned, the aim is to reduce EU’s en-
ergetic dependency and to avoid supply disruption and possible energy crisis or in-
sufficient supply in the future. The above mentioned objectives are described in the 
“20-20-20” targets, namely:  
- reducing greenhouse gas emissions at EU level by atleas  20% compared to 
1990;  
- increasing the use of renewable energy resources with up to 20% of the total 
energy consumption in the EU and up to 10%renewable bio-fuels of the total 
energy consumption in transport. For this reason a common framework has 
been created in order to promote renewable energy rsou ces in order for the 
EU to achieve a 20% share for renewable energy fromthe total energy con-
sumption by 2020; 
- reducing basic energy consumption with 20%, by improving energy efficiency 
compared to the level achieved without these measurs.  
 
Another important EU objective proposes to reduce the level of greenhouse 
emissions with 30% by 2020 given that other developd countries will adopt similar 
objectives (EC 2010). 
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Moreover this change of policy favoring green energy deployment can be 
seen in the research conducted by the European WindEnergy Association, which 
indicates that between 2000-2013 the dominating source of green energy installed 
was wind energy followed closely by natural gas. 
3. Theoretical framework on sustainability conflicts 
It is an obvious reality that achieving sustainability has its limitations, economic 
sustainability and sustainable economic policies are both hard to achieve. Some 
important arguments are described by Antal (2004): on the one hand, it is doubtful 
that debts even below 60% are sustainable, on the other hand, maturing debts can 
cause tensions if these are to be paid from important social funds. Once the national 
currency depreciates, government debt increases, even if severe restrictions and 
budget cuts are appliedit may not reduce the debt to a desired level. If these 
measures affect purchasing power (the wage cut of public servants by 25% or the 
increase of energy prices), these reduce consumption affecting economic growth. 
Attracting foreign capital and investments will not transform directly into debt, but 
revenues from these are easily repatriated and obligations contracted by the 
government need to be fulfilled which may be hard to achieve (a typical case is the 
implementation of green certificates). 
Simon Kuznets (1955) in his work „Economic Growth and Income 
Inequality” analyzed the relationship between economic growth and economic 
inequality and illustrated it with help of a curve. His hypothesis is that once an 
economy develops, the GDP after peaking will lead to a higher level of national 
income and as a direct effect economic inequality decreases. Based on the analogy 
of this idea the environmental Kuznets curve was formulated (Grossman–Krueger 
1995). 
Agras and Chapman (1999) categorize the influencing factors of the 
environmental Kuznets curve. In case of developing economies, if the GDP grows 
the environment deteriorates, while in case of developed economies GDP growth 
has a positive effect conom environment.  
This means that some of the factors listed below have  positive effect 
conom GDP but they have a negative impact onom environment. These factors 
are the following: export-led growth and industrializ tion, as well as declining 
energy prices. The opposite effect occurs with increasing imports. Energy efficiency 
development in conjunction with environmental protection policies have a positive 
effect conomy the GDP and the environment.  
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The GDP growth will have a positive effect conom environment once 
energy efficiency is implemented and the principle is applied. Both developed and 
developing countries have environmental policies. 
Sustainability conflicts may arise from specific investments which endanger 
local biodiversity or the natural habitat of some sp cies. This case is also described 
by Hoexter (2012), where he discusses about the natural habitat of condors affected 
by windmills.  
On the other hand, conflicts may arise from applying e ergy policies to cer-
tain levels of economic policy and it may also affect national, local and intermediate 
policies (Byrnea et al. 2007). Another energy conflict in the United Kingdom, de-
scribed by Upreti (2004) focuses on the social dimensions of development of bio-
mass power plants, based on the four case studies from England and Wales. The pa-
per examines impacts of public oppositions on planning permission because local 
communities value environmental benefits of biomass energy; they are more con-
cerned about the immediate negative local effects of power plants on their respective 
regions. Main sources of conflict over biomass energy development were related to 
location of the plant, perceived risks, and negative effects to ecology and landscape 
compared to few economic benefits to local people. The author also mentions prob-
lems related to the implementation of these policies, namely, the stakehold-
ers’feeling of injustice, weak public relation strategy of the developers and low level 
of awareness. 
A similar sustainability conflict which is relevant from our perspective is the 
conflict generated by the water used for producing green energy – “blue impacts of 
green energy” (de Fraiture et al. 2008).The authors p int out the possibility that bi-
omass production for energy will compete with food crops for scarce land and water 
resources, already a major constraint on agricultural production in many parts of the 
world. 
Furthermore, another frequently described conflict with various manifesta-
tions is the high price of green energy. For now, we can say that with the exception 
of hydroelectric dams the production costs of electric energy in power plants which 
use renewable energy sourcesare currently superior to thosethat use fossil and nucle-
ar fuel. The use of these resources and the attraction of investors in renewable ener-
gy production are motivated by state aids conform to the EU practices and measures 
which eventually lead to an increased energy price for the end user. Thus, they have 
a negative impact on competitiveness. The energy being used by the industry has an 
inflationary effect and diverts demand structure and this results in less money for 
other goods in households. In their article Carbaugh–St. Brown (2012) mention the 
trade conflict between different countries, especially conflicts between USA, China 
and Europe. Thepaper discusses the relationship between industrial policy and trade 
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disputes in renewable energy which arise when governm nts use industrial policy to 
promote the development of new industries and the creation and adoption of new 
technologies. The green energy policy involves subsidie  granted to producers and 
consumers, usually for the purpose of correcting a market failure. Concerning re-
newable energies such as wind energy and solar energy China, United States, and 
the European Union provide extensive support to producers and consumers and this 
support has resulted in trade frictions among these nations. 
4. Energy policy in Romania 
The legislative approximation in Romania has been achieved gradually. The first 
important step was the Government Decision no. 644/2005 which foresaw an energy 
market opening of 83.5% and in November 2005 the green certificate market was 
introduced. The legal framework for the total opening of the energy and natural gas 
markets was made possible by the GD no. 638/2007. From the perspective of legis-
lative approximation of the European 2020 strategy, meaning a 20% increase of re-
newable energy sources from the total energy consumption and a 10% increase in 
renewable biofuel in transportation. In order to achieve this target, national manda-
tory objectives are set for each member state. For Romania, the national target is 
24%, to be achieved by 2020. This objective was already accomplished last year in a 
record time – implementing the green energy system which produces 24% of the 
necessary energy was subsidized by green certificates paid directly by the end users. 
Due to this generous policy, which favours green energy investors, this sector was 
the most attractive in Romania, resulting in over 3 billion euros invested in this sec-
tor.  
The most important investments were not made by the local actors, but by in-
ternational investors like the Czechs (CEZ group) who invested 1.1 billion euros last 
year in a wind farm consisting of 240 wind turbines, this being the largest invest-
ment of its kind in Europe. The Italians (ENEL) invested over 400 million euros in 
order to take advantage of one of the most generous sub idies. Energias de Portugal 
or other companies with massive investments in the Romanian energy market.  
It can be observed that the exploitation of natural resources is in most cases 
left to foreign companies due to the lack of competitiv ness of local companies. This 
outsourcing process of natural resources exploitatin triggered two major public im-
pacts. The exploitation of gold resources was outsourced to a Canadian firm which 
proposed an exploitation technology using potassium cyanide.  
The subject of another controversy was Snake Island (Black Sea). From the 
moment of winning the trial with Ukraine regarding the area rich in conventional re-
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sources (like oil) to be exploited, these areas had already been outsourced to foreign 
companies in exchange for very little benefits.  
Romania has doubled its capacity to produce wind energy compared to 2012. 
This way Romania is among the first 10 countries who invested in wind energy. The 
biggest investments were made by Germany and the UK, Romanian occupying the 
5th position in the European Union (6% of the total investment being made in Roma-
nia).  
Figure 1. EU member state market shares for new capacity installed during 2013 in 
mw. total 11 159 mw 
 
Source: The European Wind Energy Association (2014, p. 5.) 
 
Due to this massive investment increase in wind energy and other green ener-
gies with the help of green certificates, a massive increase in prices has been experi-
enced, especially at household level. The price of lectricity was 0.105 euros/ KWh 
in 2012 and it increased to 0.135 euros/ KWh in 2013 this being one of the largest 
increase ever recorded. Unfortunately, this increase of the electricity price didn’t 
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happen in a favourable economic environment, meaning that the incomes didn’t fol-
low the same upward trajectory. Similar increase could be observed in other coun-
tries as well, such as Germany, but the buying power and incomes in this country are 
significantly larger. One positive aspect of this is that the price of electricity re-
mained basically the same for industrial consumers. If green certificates had been 
applied entirely, this increase would have been even higher, but in mid-2013 a part 
of the green certificate payments were delayed and rescheduled after 2017. This pro-
cess is part of the total liberalization process of electric energy markets and includes 
not only the increase of electric energy prices but also that of natural gases from 
49,8 RON/MWh (1 July 2013) to 119 RON/MWh (1 October 2018). These prices 
have been increasing every three months with dynamic quotas for industrial manu-
facturers as well as households. The highest increase of energy price among the EU 
member states occurred in Romania between 2011-2013 (from 0,108 euro to 0,132 
euro/KWh). Although this price is below the European average the increase had a 
negative effect conom Romanian population because it took place simultaneously 
with the decline of wages and purchasing power.  
Households and industrial consumers are the two most affected market seg-
ments. As Table 1 (Romanian Prognosis Comission) show , these two market seg-
ments represent 65,4% of end users and they are predicted to experience further in-
crease in the near future and that this process will stabilize along with the achieve-
ment of energy cogeneration objectives. 
Table 1. The structure of end user energy consumption in Romania 2009-2020 (%) 
Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
End user energy consumption, out 
of which 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Household energy consumption 35,9 35,7 35,5 35,6 35,4 35 34,5 31,9 
Economy-wide level consumption 64,1 64,3 64,5 64,4 64,6 65 65,5 68,1 
Industry 27,8 29,1 29,9 29,9 30 30,4 30,8 32,5 
Constructions 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 2 2,4 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 2 
Transport and communication 24 22,5 22,1 22 22 22 22 22,1 
Other economic sectors 8,8 9,2 9 9 9 9 9 9,1 
Source: Comisia Naţională de Prognoză (2012, p. 10.) 
 
This is important because as it is mentioned in the Romanian partnership 
agreement (p. 12.) Romania ranks among the EU Member States with the highest 
share in GDP of industry (29%) and agriculture (6,6%) and one of the lowest share 
of Business Activities and financial services (15,3%). Thus the price of electricity 
for industrial consumers is very important.  
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Some important aspects regarding energy consumption in Romania: according 
to the data provided by the Ministry of Industries basic energy consumption in-
creased between 1999-2008 by 8,2% which is lower than e gross national product 
in the same period (23,9%). It has been noticed that Romania also faces the separa-
tion of economic growth and the rise of electricity prices. This is a phenomenon pre-
sent in all developed countries starting from the period after the first oil crisis, and 
this process can be also found in the data provided by the Romanian Prognosis 
Comission on energetic intensity (Table 2).  
Table 2. Energetic intensity indicators (tep/1000 euro 2008) 



























tion per GDP) 
0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
Source: Comisia Naţională de Prognoză (2012, p. 11.) 
 
Green energies are subsidized directly, the amount bei g calculated according 
to the quantity of energy used. We, as consumers, pay for the manufacturersforthe 
green certificates appearing on the invoices of the products we buy, we also pay for 
high efficiency cogeneration (by which consumers actu lly subsidize technological 
development) and from this year we pay for regulated compensatory, i.e. for possi-
ble losses suffered by producers from trading in the free market. These payments 
appear as consumer taxes as they are calculated on the basis consumption. For the 
moment there is no risk of price competitiveness in the industry but on a long-term 
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basis, increasing prices may seriously affect the economy and there might appear the 
risk of de-industrialization of the country. The Romanian Partnership Agreement 
contains an analysis of the country’s competitiveness, and the table below supports 
what has been said before by showing those indicators that are connected to the en-
ergetic sector. 
In the Romanian energetic sector there are two major problems that need to be 
solved in the near future: on the one hand, the large number of depreciated assets, 
the modernization of energy transportation and storage; on the other hand, energy 
infrastructure, especially green energy, should be eveloped and broadened in order 
that our country be able to export the generated enrgy surplus.   
For what regards green energy, the following problems and possible conflicts 
can be observed: a systematic problem connected to our accession to the European 
Union and the harmonization of the legal and economic frameworks is that the con-
tracts and agreements between our country and the EU as well as the legislation 
harmonization does not properly account for the country’s economic development 
and the possible changes in trajectory of the local and global economy. There is no 
framework that would allow for changes in case of agreements and contracts. 
Changes should be allowed and applying such changes should be related to social 
and economic factors. In this case, for example, gren certificates could be intro-
duced on account of income increase or the two could be adjusted somehow. There 
are no “if” clauses linked to real economic and social hanges.  
Table 3. Romania Competitiveness Scoreboard – Distance from EU Average 
(standard deviations)  
 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Innovative Industrial Policy         
Labour productivity per hour worked (2010)  X      
Sustainable industry        
Energy intensity in industry and The energy sector (2010) X       
Environmental Protection expenditurein Europe (2009)     X  
Exports of environmental goods (2011)   X    
Service Sectors        
Electricity prices for medium size enterprises (2011)       
Source: Ministry of European Funds (2013, pp. 11-12.) 
 
At the macroeconomic level: the present green energy subsidizing system in-
troduces, in fact, double taxation: on the consumed el ctricity (on green energy and 
efficient energy cogeneration) and we also pay VAT on these, in other words we pay 
double consumer taxes – we pay for the producer and we pay for the government a 
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VAT for subsidizing green energy producers. Moreover, we can even say that we 
pay triple tax because manufacturers include the electricity prices in the price of the 
given product we buy. As electricity prices increas the government’s income will 
also go up due to the double taxation described above. This seems to be a downward 
spiral which will destroy the economy. It will generate inflation, will reduce the real 
income of consumers, it will reduce the consumption all which will result in bank-
ruptcies, the rise of unemployment rate and an income decrease.  
Up till now, the increase of electricity prices were adjusted to the inflation rate 
and now inflation is brought about by rising energy prices. 
Another problem generated by these investments is that they mean neither an 
economic backward nor an economic forwardbecause it requires workforce only at 
the installation phase (and the equipment is imported from Western Europe and Chi-
na) and afterwards it functions with minimum personnel: a guard, a mechanic and an 
administrator. After energy plants are constructed the energy doesn’t need to be 
“transported” and it doesn’t link to any other sector or transfer its excess costs. Thus, 
it doesn’t generate economic growth.  
At the microeconomic level: our life could be described using an astrological 
metaphor: we are the microeconomic planet, our sun i  our income which we work 
for, our moons which affect us daily are the exchange rates of currency, electricity 
bills and fuel prices. The effects of these three “moons” are felt in every aspect of 
our daily lives and any change is paid by us, as we are the end users. Our worst fear 
is total eclipse, meaning the simultaneous rise of lectricity price, exchange rate and 
fuel price and all these will use up all of our income and leave nothing from our sal-
ary after we paid our bills and we bought the necessary items. Unfortunately, those 
with average or below national average level of income have a consumer basket con-
taining only the elements influenced by our “moons” (food, electricity, fuel).  
At the rural area level, the most affected social strata is composed of those 
with low income and living in poor social conditions, rural areas being characterized 
by low income population. The increase of electricity prices due to green energy 
leads to a heightened risk of poverty and to social exc usion.  
Some proposed solution would the following: 
- One of the first and easiest solutions would be not to apply VAT to green cer-
tificates or high efficiency cogeneration. Thus, the price paid by us would 
slightly decrease and we wouldn’t be subjects to double taxation. This de-
pends on the government and could be easily applied as we pay the radio and 
TV tax with no VAT applied to it. Not applying VAT to green energy would 
stop double taxation and would be one of the fastest olutions available at the 
present moment.  
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- Setting the limits of green certificate prices (inferior and superior limits) 
would be beneficial for both consumers and investors. Consumers wouldn’t 
pay more than the maximum limit and investors would surely benefit from a 
minimum subsidy, so it would be easier to predict the functioning of these 
firms. However, these limits should be respected; otherwise investors would 
face an unforeseeable situation.  
- The increase of electricity prices should be rescheduled according to the 
growth of the population’s real income. For this reason, Romania should col-
laborate with Bulgaria (where the government was forced to resign due to the 
forced increase of energy prices) and other countries facing the same prob-
lems, in order to renegotiate the conditions imposed by the EU. The rise of 
electricity prices should be adjusted to income levels, especially since we 
achieved the proposed target.  
- An idealistic objective is to benefit from these resources. For example: shares 
from the state companies producing green energy. We could have a special 
investment fund where we get shares according to how much we paid for 
green energy or a fix monthly amount (thus we would have equal chances, 
protecting the vulnerable strata of society). This fund could be financed by 
state energy companies’ profits or revenues. This country has exploitable re-
sources and we could receive revenues from the exploitation of the resources. 
If these resources are to be invested the long term effects are positive, but the 
profitability will not occur from one day to another and the problems needs to 
be solved faster. Thus, the resources need to be divide  and a part of the reve-
nues should become subsidies of this kind. This waye can compensate the 
rise of prices directly just like the money which is taken directly from us by 
the electricity bills.  
- Local level solution would mean investment in green nergy in the public sec-
tor (city and county councils) and the profits from these investments should 
redistributed by reducing local taxes. The problem is that city and county 
councils also lack funding, with the decrease of household incomes and com-
panies’ profits lead to a drop in the local authorities’ income. Thus, very few 
will be able to invest in green energy. These investm nt for the public sector 
should be financed entirely (for example street lighting with green energy – it 
would mean a lower cost for the town hall and they could impose lower local 
taxes). In order to be achieved, these should be introduced among the 2014-
2020 priorities and the state should grant enough resources.  
- The Ministry of Industry proposes that exposed social strata should benefit 
from state aids to partially cover their electricity payments  
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- Possible solutions offered by the Ministry of Justice for rural areas include 
counselling, thermal insulation, modern stoves (which are considered too ex-
pensive, thus less accessible and the procurement of which would require sub-
sidies), street lighting with green or alternative energy resource to ensure re-
duced consumption. The use of biomass seems to be an achievable factor also 
in rural areas especially space and water heating. 
- Small hydropower plants appear to be another potential i vestment in rural 
areas (accessible for a limited number of market segments). With regards to 
small hydropower plants, a possible conflicting situation might arise (already 
present at some investments), namely not taking into account the natural envi-
ronment, inadequate and/or insufficient measures ar taken regarding the wa-
ter’s flora and fauna, or environment protection (for example non-functional 
fish ladders).  
- In areas with geothermal energy capacity, these can also be exploited – using 
geothermal water as an energy resource – however, th y require big 
investments. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper discusses issues related to sustainability conflicts and highlights the 
possible conflicts among different sustainability principles. The present case study 
analyzes the conflict created by green energy investm nts in Romania, in other 
words how green energy subsidies have had a negativ impact conom society and 
economy. By implementing some energy policies Romania has done some important 
steps towards achieving cleaner energy and ensuring the country’s energetic safety. 
The measures, the present paper analysed, were the green energy subsidies through 
direct payments by the end users. These massive subsidies have attracted big in-
vestments in this sector reaching the target of ensuring 24% of the energy need on a 
country level by the end of 2013.  
This process resulted in several sustainability conflicts: steps taken to ensure a 
clean environment and a greener energy from renewabl  resources have led to unfor-
tunate economic and social effects. Negative conomyic effects are the inflationary 
pressures caused by increased prices, reduced consumption and on the long run the 
decreased competitiveness of companies and of the industry in general. At the social 
level increases the risk of impoverishment and social exclusion, the most affected 
social strata consisting of those with low income rates and rural areas. Certain 
situations proved that the natural environment and habitat can also suffer from green 
energy investments.  
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In the next phase of the research I will attempt to quantify the effects of eco-
nomic policies related to the energy sector, with special attention to rural areas. 
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8. State-owned enterprises in Russia −  
The origin, importance and principles of operation1 
Paweł Augustynowicz 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the state enterprise sector in Russia in terms of its origin, 
economic significance, principles of operation and efficiency. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and those dependent on the state – constituting about 30–40% of the full potential of 
the Russian economy – are particularly strongly represented within the largest Russian com-
panies, in sectors defined as strategic. Therefore, th  classification, legal basis and forms of 
the above-mentioned enterprises will be analysed. It appears that Russian state-owned en-
terprises operate according to an entirely different set of rules than companies in developed 
countries and this situation is likely to be intentio al.  
This study will be conducted on the basis of official statistics, a few empirical studies 
and the analysis of international literature (mainly contained in the various studies conduct-
ed by organisations such as the OECD and the World Bank). The following analyses will be 
carried out: the analysis of legal acts concerning SOEs in Russia, the presence of SOEs will 
be analysed across the ranking list of the largest Russian companies (including the Top 400 
list). Studies of scientific papers in Russian and E glish will also be carried out.  
Knowledge on the functioning of the Russian state-owned enterprises and information 
about the model of corporate governance used in this country (corporate governance of the 
country) are very limited. Moreover, in papers by various authors one can find ambiguous or 
even contradictory opinions. This results mostly from differences in the assumptions and def-
initions, or simply from the use of unreliable / incomplete data. The author expects that this 
paper will result in the creation of a clear, dependable and objective image of the Russian 
state-owned enterprise sector. 
During the past twenty years of the Russian transformation there have been two op-
posite processes in the field of state property. The first one is privatisation and the second 
one is the process of strengthening the presence of the state in certain branches of the Rus-
sian economy. These two processes will be analyzed in this paper. This analysis will clearly 
show that despite a huge decline in the SOE sector af e the transformation, this sector is 
still very significant to the Russian economy. Moreover, these enterprises play a crucial role, 
since they are concentrated in the most strategic sectors, and are more profitable and have 
other competitive advantages over private enterprises. 
                                                   
 
1 The project was financed by the National Science Centre pursuant to the decision number DEC-
2012/05/N/HS4/00507. 
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1. Introduction 
Even after twenty years from the collapse of the socialist regime the state is still 
very strongly present in the Russian economy. This ha  a vast impact on both the 
regulatory and institutional, as well as ownership areas. State-owned enterprises (al-
so dependent on the state) have a dominant share in some of the largest Russian 
companies. They also play a very crucial role in many strategic industries (see Table 
1 below). The Russian economy and the Chinese one, are the only major economies 
in the world, in which state enterprises are so important. 
Table 1. The structure of privatised enterprises by form of state ownership in the  
period 1993-2011 
Year 
Number of privatised en-
terprises - total 
Including, by form of state ownership 
Federal Local Municipal 
1993 42924 7063 9521 26340 
1994 21905 5685 5112 11108 
1995 10152 1875 1317 6960 
1996 4997 928 715 3354 
1997 2743 374 548 1821 
1998 2129 264 321 1544 
1999 1536 104 298 1134 
2000 2274 170 274 1830 
2001 2287 125 231 1931 
2002 2557 86 226 2245 
2003 434 161 152 121 
2004 502 121 246 135 
2005 491 112 226 153 
2006 444 98 254 92 
2007 302 73 115 114 
2008 260 26 135 99 
2009 366 140 87 139 
2010 217 97 56 64 
2011 276 119 80 77 
Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10 and 13.11. 
 
The role, scope and current way of functioning of SOEs in Russia is unique, 
not only among the largest economies in the world, but also among the group of 
post-socialist countries, where the dominance of state ownership was a natural fea-
ture of the previous economic system. Russia, becaus  of its distinctiveness (that re-
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sulted from its size and geographical location, wealth in natural resources and impe-
rial ambitions), has always followed a specific economic policy. The tradition of the 
state as the main guardian of the economy, also in terms of ownership, has in Russia 
a long and established position. 
After changing its political and economic systems in the early 1990s, the Rus-
sian economy, like other post-socialist economies, experienced a period of rapid and 
spontaneous privatisation. As a result, there was a ri e of the whole new sector of 
formally private enterprises, that often had their majority stakes owned by the pri-
vate capital and the minority stakes owned by the sate capital. Nonetheless, these 
enterprises were still highly dependent on state policy. However, after a few years 
even these highly controversial privatisations were halted. Since 2005, Russia has 
increased the share of the state sector in the economy (EBRD 2009). 
Both in the English and Russian literature there are only a few significant 
publications containing the analysis of the state ent rprise sector in Russia and cor-
porate governance issues of the state. Papers dated 2000–2005 (based mainly on the 
data from the 1990s) are now rather obsolete and outdated. Furthermore, they often 
contain contradictory results regarding both the scale and efficiency of state enter-
prises in Russia. Russian studies in general positively evaluate the process of change 
in ownership and the resulting efficiency of the private sector in the 1990s 
(Степашин 2004, Радыгин–Мальгинов 2001). The existence and functioning of 
the state enterprise sector in this period has beenconsidered as having had a nega-
tive impact on the economy. These statements are not consistent with the conclu-
sions of researchers from outside Russia, where the efficiency of both public and 
private sectors in the 1990s in the Russian economy has been severely criticised 
(Perevalov et al. 2000). 
Recent studies on the functioning of state-owned enterprises also provide con-
flicting data. An econometric analysis shows a significant positive effect of state 
ownership on the quality of corporate governance in Russia in 2001−2004 (Ya-
kovlev 2008). This can be explained by the change in government policy in the 
sphere of privatisation and state property management, which took place after 2000 
(Yakovlev 2011). Other data indicate a positive impact of state capital on the quality 
of corporate governance in this period (Avdasheva 2007). A number of studies rep-
resent a distinct view, providing an extensive list of arguments that point to a lower 
efficiency and poor corporate-governance practices in Russian enterprises. Sprenger 
(2010) presents a review of literature in this area and a set of arguments about the 
unreliability of the state as an owner within the Russian economy. 
These conclusions are confirmed by the recent Western publications concern-
ing the analysis of the transformation processes. The state is generally considered as 
a poor owner in post-socialist economies (Estrin et al. 2009, pp. 699-728., Hanousek 
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et al. 2009, pp. 43-73.). Note, however, that these claims are based on data from 
smaller countries, with a slightly different history, such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. Therefore, one can doubt, whether it is possible to generalise 
the theory to cover this very special case of the Russian economy. 
2. The definition and classification of SOEs in Russia 
There is no unified definition of a state-owned enterprise in Russia, neither in offi-
cial documents, nor in the scientific literature. This term can denote a whole spec-
trum of entities. It can be given to enterprises with 100 percent share of the state 
capital, as well as to entities with majority shareholdings, and to firms with minority 
state shareholding that still allows it to enjoy actu l corporate-governance rights. 
The legal basis for the functioning of state enterprises in the modern Russian 
economy is regulated by a number of different acts. The Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation lists three possible legal forms of enterprises: 
1. The biggest enterprises from the public domain are mainly joint-stock 
companies (so-called open companies). This legal form provides the pri-
vate capital with the opportunity to take a share in the ownership, as well 
as with the ability to conquer foreign stock-exchange markets. 
2. Unitary enterprise is a specific form of organisation and operation of en-
terprises with 100 percent state ownership in Russia. Unitary enterprises 
do not own any property that still belongs to the state, as represented by 
the federal, regional (republics, oblasts, etc.) or local (in the case of munic-
ipal enterprises) entities. Unitary enterprises are li ble for their obligations 
in respect of all the assets that cannot be divided nto shares or equity – 
they always remain owned by the state. Business managers of unitary en-
terprises have to obtain approvals for most of their d cisions. This often 
results in the emergence of allegations against “manual control” applied to 
these enterprises. 
3. Another specific product of the Russian state property-management model 
are state corporations, which are partly business entities and partly state 
agencies (non-profit organisations). The legal basis for the creation of state 
corporations has existed since 1999. Each of these operates under a sepa-
rate law. Therefore, they have very little in common. Generally, one can 
say that these companies: 
- are relatively independent from the state-owner; 
- are the sole owners of their assets; 
- have limited disclosure obligations to the state. 
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3. The size of SOE sector in Russia and it’s change over time 
The SOE sector within the Russian economy was an object of significant and un-
precedented changes during the transformation period. Russian policymakers decid-
ed to apply a fairly radical approach to change, which implied a rapid change in 
ownership within the economy. An in-depth analysis of these events in the most tur-
bulent period of the privatisation process (in 1991−1994) is virtually impossible due 
to the fact, that there is almost no official statistics on the said period.  
The first spontaneous processes of privatisation in the Russian economy could 
already be observed in 1991. However, at the end of that year, the structure of the 
economy still had a negligible share of the private property. By the end of 1991, the 
share of private ownership in the economy had reached 4.2% (Степашин 2004, p. 
82.). 
According to the Central Statistical Office of the Russian Federation, befor 
the start of the rapid privatisation, the state of SOEs was as follows: 
- 349.3 thousand of state-owned enterprises belonging to all levels of govern-
ment (national, federal, and municipal) with total assets valued at 35.6 billion 
rubles; 
- 80.1 thousand of non-business organisations with total assets valued at 24.1 
billion rubles (Goskomstat 1992). 
 
These data suggest that the value of the state property, that could hypotheti-
cally be privatised, amounted to 35.6 billion rubles. However, this approach is too 
simplified, since companies in the Soviet Union had a completely different nature, 
and even the definition of an enterprise was far from the definition accepted by to-
day’s market economy. Therefore, not all of the nearly 350 thousand companies 
could be called companies. In contrast, a number of o ganisations (among the above-
mentioned 80 thousand that were categorised as non-e terprise entities) could have 
features specific to a typical enterprise. This applies to many holiday resorts and so-
cial facilities belonging to different types of departments of the state apparatus. In 
subsequent years, these units had been separated from their parent units and success-
fully became the subject of privatisation proceedings. 
The acceleration of the privatisation process can be associated with the en-
actment of two documents important from the perspectiv  of the process: 
- The Ordinance on the introduction of the system of privatisation vouchers in 
the Russian Federation (dated 14 August 1992); 
- The Ordinance on the expansion of the system of privatisation vouchers in the 
Russian Federation (of 14 October 1992). 
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The above-mentioned regulations allowed for non-monetary methods of pri-
vatisation. Namely, they introduced vouchers (also kn wn as privatisation certifi-
cates) as a means of settlement in privatisation tra sactions. The moment of intro-
duction of these laws could be considered as the beginning of mass privatisation and 
decline in the SOE sector in Russia. 
The scarce data from the beginning of the privatisation period mentions about 
36.8 thousand state-owned enterprises privatised in 1991−1992, while in 1993 this 
number amounted to 42.9 thousand and dropped to 21.9 thousand in 1994. As shown 
in Figure 1, the years 1993 and 1994 were particularly abundant in privatisation 
transactions, while in 1995−1997 the number of privatisations fell, and in subse-
quent years it remained at a relatively low level. 













1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
National Local Municipal
 
Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10 and 13.11. 
 
Table 1 shows the details of the number of enterprises privatised between 
1993 and 2011, broken down by various forms of ownership before privatisation. A 
sharp decline in the number of enterprises privatised in 2003 may be noted. Data 
broken down by form of ownership show that this declin  was associated with a 
shrinkage in the number of privatised enterprises owned by the Municipality (from 
2,245 in 2002 to 121 in 2003). 
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Figure 2 shows the share of municipal, local and federal forms of ownership 
in the structure of enterprises privatised in select d years. In the period 1993−2002 
municipal enterprises were by far the largest group, which accounted for more than 
half of all the privatised enterprises. In the years 2002−2011 the share of municipal 
enterprises was much smaller. In 2004−2008 companies owned by local govern-
ments took the lead, and in the years 2009−2011 the majority of privatisation trans-
actions applied to federal enterprises. This division reflects the different strategies of 
privatisation across these years. Municipal enterprises definitely comprise the largest 
group, but they are very small entities. By contrast, federal companies were general-
ly much larger units, most of which were sold out in 1992–1995 (see Table 1). 
Figure 2. The share of the different forms of state ownership in the structure of pri-










Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10, 13.11; and (Gos-
komstat 2012), Table 13.10. 
 
One of the natural consequences of changes in the own rship structure of the 
economy of Russia is the change in the employment structure. Table 2 contains data 
on the employment within the Russian economy (and in the case of the period 
1970−1990 in the economy of the USSR). It is worth noting that − according to offi-
cial Figures − certain activities in the USSR were treated as employment in the pri-
vate sector. 
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Table 2. The structure of employment in the Russian and former Soviet Union  
economy in years 1970−2010 by type of ownership, in% 
Type of ownership 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
State 86 88.8 90.4 91.1 82.6 42.1 37.8 33.7 30.4 
Private 14 11.2 9.6 8.9 12.5 34.4 46.1 54.1 58.6 
Mixed Russian ... ... ... ... 4.0 22.2 12.6 7.8 5.7 
NGOs and religious organisations ... ... ... ... 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 
Foreign and mixed Russian-foreign ... ... ... ... 0.1 0.6 2.7 3.8 4.8 
Total within the Russian economy 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations based on (Goskomstat 2003) Table 6.5; (Goskomstat 2007) Table 
5.5; and (Goskomstat 2012) Table 5.4. 
 
Figure 3 presents more detailed data on the structure of employment by type 
of ownership in recent years. Several important trends should be emphasized here. 
An increase in the share of employment in the private sector and the decline in em-
ployment in the state sector seem to be obvious. But the level of employment in the 
private sector, according to the latest data, still remains relatively small. Only 58.8% 
of the economically active population were employed in the private sector as at the 
end of 2011. The issue of employment in the sector kn wn as a mixed state-private 
deserves an in-depth examination. These are of course nothing else that state-owned 
enterprises with the participation of private capitl or private enterprises with the 
participation of state capital. However, as was already mentioned, these companies 
are still strictly controlled by the government, so they can be included into the do-
main of the SOEs. Therefore, state-owned enterprises and enterprises controlled by 
the state employed 35.7% of the economically active population, 5% were employed 
in enterprises with foreign capital, and 0.5% − in other organisations. Another note-
worthy fact is the decline in the share of mixed ownership during the transition pro-
cess. In 1995, the share of employment in this sector was 22.2%, but at the end of 
2011 this share already declined to no more than 6.3%. This may be a consequence 
of the policy in the sphere of privatization, involing the so-called residual privatisa-
tion, i.e. the sale of shares in these companies in wh ch the state has only partial par-
ticipation. 
Over the past 20 years, the Russian labour market has strongly changed its 
image. The share of employment in the public and mixed sectors fell from 86.6% in 
1990 to 35.7% in 2011, and in late 2000 and early 2001, the share of employment in 
sectors dependent on the state fell below 50%. 
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Figure 3. The structure of employment in the Russian and former Soviet-Union 
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Foreign and mixed Russian-foreign
 
Source: Own calculations based on (Goskomstat 2003) Table 6.5; (Goskomstat 2007) Table 
5.5; and (Goskomstat 2012) Table 5.4. 
 
In summary, the level of employment is one of the indirect measures to esti-
mate the scope of the domination of the state within t e economy. Of course, the use 
of this measure may lead to some distortion, because − in general – companies in the 
public sector have a higher level of employment compared to private companies. On 
the other hand, it can be assumed that the state sector in Russia − due to its concen-
tration in highly profitable and monopolistic areas – plays even more important role 
than it seems at first glance. 
4. Other indirect measures of the SOE sector in Russia 
Statistical data on the Russian economy, especially that regarding the state-owned 
enterprise sector, published by the National Bureau of Statistics (Goskomstat), can 
be considered as unreliable. Due to the fact that there are fundamental differences in 
the statistical methodology, and also because of the various accepted definitions of 
analysed companies, we can speak of a strong inconsiste cy in Russian statistics 
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compared to data from European countries, that are members of Eurostat. The diffi-
culty in accessing these data follows from the facttha  some Russian statistical pub-
lications are not distributed abroad. Moreover, until the end of the 1990s, the Rus-
sian statistical offices did not keep up in their studies with the turbulent changes in 
the real economic system. For this reason, there was often a problem that certain sets 
of data from this period did not have the continuity, definitions and classifications of 
the studied phenomena and processes were changing si nificantly over time. Russia 
does not belong to the OECD, and consequently many important issues are not in-
cluded in OECD reports, or are included to a very limited extent. What is more, 
there is no unified database of SOEs (or at least none that would be accessible to the 
scientific community). Even commercial databases do not include information on 
the ownership structure of Russian companies. 
Therefore, the share of the SOE sector within the Russian economy could on-
ly be estimated using various indirect measurements. At empts to do this have been 
made by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. According to the 
EBRD report produced in 2009, the share of the public sector (which is of course a 
broader term than the SOE sector share) in the Russian GDP amounts to about 35%, 
although in 2004 it amounted to 30% (EBRD 2009). Unfortunately, the report does 
not disclose the underlying methodology for the calcul tions used to measure this.  
Another estimation of the economic significance of the SOEs sector could be 
made by means of analysing the TOP400 list of Russian enterprises. This ranking 
provides i.a. information on revenues and profits across the largest Russian compa-
nies. Among them there is a considerable number of SOEs.  
Table 3 shows a list of 25 largest enterprises in Russia. It is worth noting that, 
out of the total of 25 included in this list, there are 10 state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, the revenues of state enterprises on this list exceed those of private com-
panies by USD 81 billion. Compared with the total revenues of the 400 largest en-
terprises in Russia (TOP-400), the revenues of the first 10 state-owned enterprises 
account for almost 30% of the total. The advantage of SOEs is even more significant 
when it comes to comparing profits. The largest 10 state companies generate more 
than 53% of profits compared to the profits of enterprises form the whole TOP-400 
list.  
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Table 3. Revenues, net profits and ownership of the first 25 companies from the 








2013, in USD  
billion 
Net profit in 
2013, in USD 
million 
1 "Gazprom"  SOE 153.3 38950 
2 The oil company "Lukoil"  private 116.3 10925 
3 The oil company "Rosneft"  SOE 67.5 11004 
4 Railways  SOE 49.6 2518 
5 Sberbank of Russia  SOE 43.3 11194 
6 "TNK-BP Holding"  private 39.9 9009 
7 AFK "System"  private 34.2 947 
8 "Surgutneftegaz"  SOE 27.3 5796 
9 "Transneft"  SOE 23.6 5933 
10 "IDGC Holding"  SOE 20.0 1018 
11 VTB Group  SOE 19.8 2915 
12 The "Inter RAO"  private 17.9 -719 
13 X5 Retail Group  private 15.8 -127 
14 "Evraz"  private 14.7 -335 
15 "Magnet"  private 14.4 808 
16 "Tatneft"  SOE 14.3 2524 
17 "Severstal"  private 14.1 762 
18 "Stroygazkonsalting"  private 12.5 b.d 
19 NLMK (NLMK)  private 12.2 596 
20 MMC "Norilsk Nickel"  private 12.1 2143 
21 "Mechel"  private 11.3 -1665 
22 "VimpelCom"  private 10.9 2280 
23 The combined company "Rusal"  private 10.9 -337 
24 "SGM"  private 10.4 954 
25 "Rostelecom"  SOE 10.3 1134 
 TOTAL SOEs   429.1 (29.4%) 82986 (53.1%) 
 TOTAL private  347.7 25241 
 TOTAL for the TOP-400  1457.5 156214 
Source: Own calculation based on data from RA Expert, www.raexpert.ru 
5. Conclusions 
The research conducted within this paper reveals a whole list of methodological is-
sues that hinder the proper examination of the state-owned enterprises sector within 
the Russian economy. The main limitation is the lack of reliable data on this subject. 
Another problem is connected with the term "state-owned enterprise" itself. This 
term applies to the whole list of different entities that have different parameters of 
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operation. Unitary enterprises are very widespread at the municipal level and repre-
sent mainly utility services. These companies have be n partially privatised, since 
they are not very attractive for the government. When analysing privatisation data, 
SOEs from the local and municipal levels were the main targets for privatisation, es-
pecially during the first decade of the transformation.  
In contrast, joint-stock companies that are owned by the Russian government 
are big and powerful enterprises that often operate within very profitable sectors of 
the economy and are considered as the “blue chips” of the Russian economy. The 
analysis of the TOP-400 list shows that the largest SOEs often surpass their private 
counterparts in terms of revenue and profits.  
The scope of the research conducted within this paper has not covered the 
analysis of the SOEs that are organised in the formof state corporations, but many 
facts suggest that this form of state-owned enterprises is the least transparent one. 
Every single state corporation is established by a separate law. These legal acts often 
give some privileges to state corporations. This leads to numerous instances of un-
fair competition with the private sector, separate (pr ferential) procedures for access 
to capital and lower disclosure requirements (Sprenger 2010, pp. 90-110.). 
All of the abovementioned facts suggest that the state-owned enterprises sec-
tor within the Russian economy is divided into two structurally different subsectors: 
small obsolete enterprises that often operate within the utilities sector and which are 
the remnants of the bygone era of communism, and big corporations that are very 
important for their owner (the Russian state). The first subgroup is a burden for the 
economy and must be eliminated as fast as possible. The second one plays a very 
important – if not the leading – role within the Russian economy.  
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9. Is the state ownership of enterprises gaining in 
importance in a modern economy? 
Grzegorz Kwiatkowski 
 
Despite the ongoing privatization, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still play an important 
role in many countries. Moreover, some scholars argue that today we are dealing with a 
possible of return of state-owned enterprises in the global economy. This paper reviews 
available data on SOEs in the context of the above mentioned thesis. First we review data on 
the current scope, structure and importance of the state-owned enterprise sector in a modern 
economy. It can be concluded that the SOEs play a significant role in a modern economy. 
Primarily this statement can be applied to developing countries. However, in developed 
countries SOEs constitute an important part of the economy as well. Next we review data on 
changing importance of SOEs. For this purpose we examine the Fortune Global 500 list, 
Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator data and the list of the largest Polish compa-
nies. Subsequently we try to explain those ongoing trends. We could say that SOEs play a 
significant role in a modern economy and there is some evidence that they are gaining in im-
portance. Among the factors responsible for this posible increase of the importance of SOEs 
in the world economy are: 
- The changes in the balance of power in the global economy, especially due to the rise 
of China and other BRIC countries, where government ownership plays a relatively 
large role in comparison with OECD countries. 
- Issues related to the control over natural resources. 
- The increase in government activity in many areas of the economy as a result of the 
financial crisis. 
 
However this process is not leading to a return to the number of SOEs that we saw in 
the 20th century, but what we see is a change in the way in which SOEs are used by the state 
owner. Governments are attempting to maintain the control and simultaneously to improve 
the efficiency of SOEs through better governance and greater reliance on market mecha-
nisms. 
 
Keywords: state-owned enterprise, BRIC, OECD, governm nt activity 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the ongoing privatization, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still play an im-
portant role in many countries. Moreover, some scholars argue that today we are 
dealing with some kind of return of state-owned enterprises in the global economy 
(Flores-Macias−Musacchio 2009, Bremmer 2010, The Economist 2012, Florio 
2014). This paper reviews available data on SOEs in the context of the above men-
tioned thesis. However, some difficulties due to incomplete or incompatible data 
available should be noticed. These problems arise fom the nature of the category of 
the state-owned enterprise because this can include a wide range of items. They can 
differ in the legal basis (joint-stock companies or statutory companies), by the level 
of the state’s share in ownership (some reports only include enterprises where the 
ownership is higher than 50%, but many enterprises ar  effectively controlled by 
governments with a much lower stake) and by the levl of state (central government, 
federal or local). 
2. How important are SOEs in a modern economy? 
These objections, though important, should not prevent the estimation of the cur-
rent status of state ownership. First, we examine the OECD report entitled The Size 
and Composition of the SOEs Sector in OECD Countries, which includes 27 of the 
34 OECD countries. The data contained in the report is f om the years 2008−2009. 
The aggregate results indicate that state-owned enterprises in OECD countries (de-
fined as one hundred percent or majority state shareholding) employ a total of over 6 
million people, and its value is close to 2 trillion dollars. If these figures were to take 
into account the companies in which the state has a minority stake, but sufficient to 
exercise effective control, these numbers should be increased by about 3 million 
people and 1 trillion dollars. The study has also examined the structure of SOEs by 
sector. Half of them can be classified into network industries (mainly transport and 
energy) and a large part (one quarter) are financial institutions. It is worth noting 
that these sectors are very important to other parts of he economy. To describe the 
importance of state-owned enterprises only two indicators – due to incomplete data 
– have been used: the value of assets held by state-own d enterprises in relation to 
the GDP of the country and employment in state-owned enterprises in relation to the 
overall level of employment in the economy. For thefirst indicator the leader is 
Mexico1, where the ratio exceeds 100%, next are countries such as the Czech Re-
                                                   
 
1 Mostly due to hydrocarbons company PEMEX. 
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public, Poland, Finland and Norway, where the result are between 20 and 30%. The 
average for all countries surveyed is 15%. In the case of employment the report in-
dicates Norway as the country with the highest propo tion of people employed in 
SOEs. Closer examination of the report shows there are certain problems that indi-
cate data and conclusions contained in the report sh uld be used with considerable 
caution. As the authors themselves admit, the quality of supplied data by individual 
countries is quite varied, in some economies the data is not complete (e.g. Poland) 
and state-owned enterprise definitions vary from country to country. The report also 
lacks statistics from important economies such as the U.S. or Japan (Christiansen 
2011, pp. 3-5.).  
Another recent report based on an analysis of companies in the Forbes Global 
2000 list, estimates that state-owned enterprises account for about 10% of the fea-
tured corporations (Kowalski et al. 2013, p. 6.). Florio (2014, p. 14.) used this data 
to conclude that SOEs would represent between 11% and 16% of total sale, profits, 
assets, market value of the Forbes Global 2000 aggregate.  
In terms of geographical distribution it is worth noti g the following facts:  
- of the 1,500 companies from OECD countries 41 are considered as SOEs, 
which gives 3%. For the BRIC countries – this ratio is 116 to 234 (i.e. almost 
50%); 
- among the OECD countries, a relatively large number of SOEs on the list 
come from Poland (6), Switzerland (6), France (5) and South Korea (4); 
- 3 companies are from the USA; 
- from non-OECD countries the largest number of corporati ns are from China 
(70), India (30), Russia (9), Brazil (7) and Indonesia (6). 
 
Sectors where the share of SOEs is high include coal mining, land transport, 
transport via pipelines, oil extraction, electricity and gas, telecommunications, fi-
nancial institutions, engineering, warehousing, manuf cturing and air transport 
(Kowalski et al. 2013, pp. 6-7.). However, care must be taken when analyzing the 
Forbes list because it contains only companies listed on the stock exchange. 
According to the data contained in the Robinett (2006, p. 1) report, the im-
portance of state-owned enterprises in emerging economies is conditioned by their 
presence in key sectors of the economy. They are particul rly present in industries 
such as rail and air transport, electricity, water and gas, utilities, mining of natural 
resources, telecommunications, banking and insurance. The share of the state-owned 
enterprises in the economies of these countries is var ed. According to Lazzarini and 
Musacchio (2012) contribution to GDP (excluding thefinancial sector) ranges from 
approximately 30% (China, Brazil, Vietnam) through to around 13% (Singapore, 
India, Turkey) and to 2–3% (Indonesia and Mexico).  
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Summarizing the above presented data it can be concluded that the SOEs play 
a significant role in a modern economy. Primarily this statement can be applied to 
developing countries. However, in developed countries they constitute an important 
part of the economy as well. 
3. Are state-owned enterprises really gaining in importance? 
Flores-Macias and Musacchio (2009) put the thesis that today we are dealing with 
some kind of return of state-owned enterprises in the global economy. According to 
these researchers the importance of SOEs in recent years has grown and will con-
tinue to grow in the future. A similar statement appears in (Bremmer 2010) and 
(Florio 2014). 
One of the measures of the importance of SOEs in the modern economy could 
be their share in the list of the largest companies in the world.2 For this purpose an 
analysis of the Fortune Global 500 list for the years 2005 to 2012 was conducted. 
The number of state-owned enterprises over the examined period continued to grow. 
In 2005, the list included 49 SOEs, and in 2012 there were 95 of them. Share by 
quantity grew from 10% to 19%. When looking at employment in companies on the 
Fortune Global 500 list, in 2005 18.4% were employed by SOEs and this figure 
grew to almost 30% in 2012. Revenues of SOEs on the list in 2005 reached a value 
of $1.3 trillion (8% of the total), while in 2012 it was $5.8 trillion (19.6% of the to-
tal). 
Table 1. Shares of SOEs on Fortune Global 500 list according to various criteria, % 
Year Share by 
quantity 









Share by total 
shareholders’  
equity 
2005 9,8 18,4 8 8,2 8,9 9,2 
2006 10,8 19,9 8,8 9,9 9,2 11,3 
2007 11 19,7 9,2 10,4 8,8 12,3 
2008 11,4 19,9 10,3 12 9,1 13,8 
2009 13,8 23,6 14,5 11,9 15,7 16,5 
2010 15 24,8 15,3 9,3 18,8 17,7 
2011 17,2 27,7 17,8 16,9 22,2 19,2 
2012 19 29,8 19,6 22,2 19,3 21,1 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Fortune Global 500 list (2013) 
 
                                                   
 
2 This part draws from Augustynowicz and Kwiatkowski (2013). 
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To explain the cause of the increase of the share of state-owned enterprises on 
the Fortune Global 500 list we should analyze it by he country of origin. The largest 
number of SOEs is in China. The share of Chinese stat -owned enterprises as a pro-
portion of the total number of SOEs increased from about 28% in 2005 to 65% in 
2012 (there were 61 Chinese SOEs on the list at the end of 2012). 
Table 2. Areas of activity of SOEs 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of SOEs on the list 
Public utilities 21 19 18 17 18 18 20 22 
Natural resources 14 16 19 19 23 24 31 33 
Financial institutions 10 11 10 11 15 18 15 16 
Other 4 8 8 10 13 15 20 24 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Fortune Global 500 list (2013) 
 
As illustrated in Table 2 the largest number of state-owned enterprises oper-
ates in the natural resource sector. Moreover, the number of these companies in-
creased from 14 to 33. The number of enterprises providing public services ranged 
between 17 to 22, although the share of this group increased slightly (from 26.3 to 
31%). The number of financial institutions has also increased from 10 to 16 compa-
nies. 
The role of state-owned enterprises in the natural resources sector can be illus-
trated by the fact that they control about ¾ of the world's oil reserves (Bremmer 
2010, p. 9). It is worth noting that they mostly come from countries that aren’t 
OECD members. The current situation is the result of a progressive process of na-
tionalization of natural resources in the twentieth century, starting in Mexico in the 
30s, continuing in the Middle East in the 70s and now taking place in countries such 
as Venezuela and Russia. 
Additional information is provided in the Product Market Regulation (PMR) 
indicator developed by the OECD. It is a complex indicator that takes into account 
certain qualitative and quantitative aspects of interference in market competition. 
Currently, the number for the years 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 are available. Im-
portant in the context of this article part of the indicator determines the level of the 
share of state ownership in the economy based on four components (Product Market 
Regulation 2013):  
1. Scope of public enterprises; 
2. Government involvement in network sectors; 
3. Direct control over business enterprises; 
4. Governance of state-owned enterprises. 
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This last component lacks data prior to 2008 so a comparison of indicators 
over time must be taken into account to change the methodology of calculating the 
indicator. After this adjustment, it turns out that for most of the countries surveyed 
value of the index is decreasing. For the years 1998 and 2003 complete data is avail-
able for 22 countries and only for three of them (Australia, Canada and New Zea-
land) the indicator increased (which should be interpreted as an increase in the im-
portance of state ownership). For the years 2003 and 2008 we have data from 23 
countries − in those years, the index rose only for five countries (Australia, Belgium, 
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom). For the year 2008 and 2013 the 
data is available for 26 OECD countries and we see increases for 7 economies 
(Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Slovakia and Switzerland). It is 
not surprising that the score in non-OECD countries on average are higher than in 
OECD countries.  
An interesting conclusion comes from the analysis of the largest companies in 
certain countries. For example if we examine the 1300 largest Polish companies for 
the presence of SOEs, it turns out that the share of SOEs decreases in time. In 2004 
the state-owned enterprises constituted 12.5% of the companies, earned almost 25% 
of revenue and had 40% of employment. Five years later these shares had decreased 
significantly: the number of enterprises by around 50%, revenues to less than 15% 
and employment to less than 30%. However, if we focus only on the top 20 compa-
nies we could check every company ownership structue to take into account those 
companies in which the state has a share of less than 50% (but sufficient to exercise 
effective control of ownership). 
Figure 1. Total share of revenues of companies controlled by the state in the group 
of largest 20 companies 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the list of Polish largest companies (published 
by Rzeczpospolita). 
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The graph shows the share of revenues of companies controlled by the state in 
the total revenues. The paradox is that although in t e discussed period of time the 
privatization processes continued, the analyzed category increased. Minority stakes 
of companies such as PGE, Lotos, KGHM, JSW or Tauron were sold, but in every 
case the government kept the controlling stake. This p enomenon can be analyzed 
by framework presented by Musacchio and Lazzarini (2012). They distinguish two 
general types of modern state capitalism due to the stat 's share in the ownership of 
enterprises: the first in which the state holds majority stakes in many companies 
(Leviathan as a majority investor) and the second that relies on minority shares in 
companies held by development banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and 
the government itself (Leviathan as a minority investor). The state control over en-
terprises with formal minority ownership shares canbe implemented at least in three 
ways:  
1. the use of “golden share”; 
2. special rules in the articles of association of a joint-stock company; 
3. reaching the position of a dominant shareholder. 
 
Comparison of the two models leads to the conclusion that the transition to 
Leviathan as a minority investor model can reduce ag ncy problems (i.e. different 
objectives of managers and owners) and lessen threat of using SOEs to obtain non-
economic goals. On the other side this happens at the cost of losing some degree of 
influence on the activities of these companies, and so using SOEs to implement the 
economic policies by the state. 
Another important factor influencing the importance of state ownership is the 
global financial crisis. Governments in many countries decided to take active 
measures to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. Among these measures was 
the nationalization of enterprises (SNS Bank − the Netherlands, Anglo Irish Bank − 
Ireland, BNP − Portugal, Royal Bank of Scotland − United Kingdom, AIG and Gen-
eral Motors – USA). Although in many cases, nationalization was temporary − na-
tionalized companies were later reprivatized, the qu stion arises whether these ac-
tions are the exception to the rules of the economic policy or a permanent change of 
the ownership function of the state. It seems to be too early to assess the long-term 
effects of the crisis. Also there are some reports n re-municipalization (Florio 2014, 
p. 6.), which means that municipal or public services are again not only financed but 
also provided by the state. 
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4. Conclusions and final remarks 
Concluding on above presented data we could say that SOEs play a significant role 
in a modern economy and there is some evidence that they are gaining in im-
portance. Among the factors responsible for this posible increase of the importance 
of SOEs in the world economy are: 
1. the changes in the balance of power in the global economy, especially due 
to the rise of China and other BRIC countries, where government owner-
ship plays a relatively larger role in comparison with OECD countries; 
2. issues related to the control over natural resources; 
3. the increase in government activity in many areas of the economy as a re-
sult of the financial crisis. 
 
However this process is not leading to a return to the number of SOEs that we 
saw in the 20th century (as shown in the analysis of Product Market Regulation da-
ta), but what we see is the change of ways in which SOEs are used by governments. 
To gain in importance SOEs have to operate more efficiently than in the past. Tradi-
tional theoretical approaches to explaining the ineffici ncy of state enterprises can 
be divided into two general groups: the first refers to the environment (limited or 
lack of competition) and the second explains it as a problem of inherent features of 
state ownership, referring mainly to the theory of property rights (Bartel–Harrison 
pp. 1-4.). These include issues such as: agency problem, soft budget constraint, mul-
tiple goals (vaguely defined social goals), direct influence of politicians, bureaucra-
cy, restrictions on remuneration, as well as hiring a d firing of workers, strong in-
fluence of unions, low ability to reduce costs and to innovate.  
Modern methods of management and supervision to some extent limit the 
negative effects of the those "classical" causes of the inefficiency of state-owned en-
terprises. Flores-Macias and Musacchio (2009) list the five characteristics of modern 
state-owned enterprises, which significantly improve the way they operate. These 
are: 
1. emission of shares in stock exchanges, with the dual p rpose of raising 
capital and subjecting management to the daily evaluation of the stock 
prices; 
2. independent auditors and members of the Board of Directors; 
3. credible restrictions on the transfer of subsidies from the government; 
4. recruitment of more highly qualified executives; 
5. incentive schemes for managerial pay. 
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Many of these changes − especially in developed countries − took place as a 
result of the problems caused by the earlier, often very inefficient operation of state-
owned enterprises. Given the fiscal problems of many countries in the 1980s and 
1990s many state-owned enterprises subsequently had to look for opportunities to 
raise capital in the financial markets. As a result, they were partially privatized. Oth-
ers had to raise capital through the issue of bonds r taking loans from financial in-
stitutions. In any case it was related, at least to ome extent, to the necessity of meet-
ing the standards of reporting, the evaluation of rating agencies and the high cost of 
hiring external auditors etc. This meant SOEs had to operate in a similar way to pri-
vate sector enterprises. 
More coherent government policy towards state-owned enterprises will result 
in increased efficiency. These policies should include clearly defined social objec-
tives, as well as clear criteria for the creation and management of such entities. Cri-
teria can also include a requirement for periodic inspection, evaluation and justifica-
tion for the company remaining in the domain of thestate. Another improvement 
might be to create special agencies supervising the whole or part of the SOEs sector. 
In addition, the process of privatization in the last thirty years has led to a reduction 
of the number of SOEs, which makes it easier to control and to evaluate them. This 
does not mean, however, that all state-owned enterpris s are as efficient as their 
best-functioning private counterparts. However, there are many examples (Statoil, 
Petrobras or Indian Railways) which show that it ispo sible to significantly improve 
the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises. 
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10. Sustainable investment decision making for Biogas 
plants in Hungary and the utility cost reduction measure 
Bálint Valentin Pikler 
 
This study attempts to biogas plants for combined power plus heat and bio methane produc-
tion the decision making process. The second part will present the licensing process of bio-
gas plants. I will take all aspects of investments i to account. This will be the macro econom-
ical aspects like inflation for different products u ed for or complementary to biogenic pro-
cesses in biogas production. Furthermore, the study will shows different investment calcula-
tions based on feed in tariffs, EU investment incentiv  schemes and the utility cost reduction 
masures by the Hungarian government. The third aspect for the investment decision will be 
the licensing process and the costs for the facility costs itself. This will calculated on a sam-
ple biogas plants which are a small and a middle siz  facilities. The study is complex, the in-
vestment decisions must be well based, as the plants are running over decades. The admin-
istration process of biogas plants is also a larger issue, as the legal background of renewa-
ble energy is about to change permanently in recent y ars. This aspect makes the study actu-
al and the legal changes are absolutely necessary take into account.  
 
Keywords: decision making process, investment biogas, bio-energy, biogas, renewable 
energy in Hungary, utility cost reduction 
1. Introduction and Background 
The social and political aspirations of a sustainable energy grew stronger in recent 
years. Due to the adverse environmental impacts of climate change and dwindling 
fossil fuels. "Renewable energy" is the buzzword - it will in future replace conven-
tional energy sources. A special role plays the power generation from biomass, par-
ticularly illustrating the biogas production is a promising form of energy (Kalt-
schmitt–Hartmann 2001). Where the economic and enviro mental benefits of biogas 
production are evident: for planners, producers, intallers and operators of biogas 
plants offers a wide range of activities. In particular, for agriculture open up new 
sources of income as "energy industry" or as producers of energy crops. Contributes 
to the production of biogas to conserve natural resources and a decentralized energy 
supply. The aim of this case study is the preparation of an investment decision be-
tween two mutually exclusive investment alternatives in terms of agricultural biogas 
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plants. The Hungarian energy market is in the course of their accession to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) been fully liberalised. The major providers are government owned 
MVM and MOL, they have still a dominant influence on the market. From more 
characteristics of the Hungarian energy market are the distinct dependence on im-
ports and the low energy efficiency in European comparison. Natural gas is in a pro-
portion of about 43% (2009) of the total primary energy consumption of the most 
important energy source in Hungary. Renewable energy plays of primary energy 
supply not a significant role. According to a study WWF, the share of renewable en-
ergy in primary energy consumption in 2008 5.6%. The IEA and the MVM indicate 
a value of less than 5%. Structure of energy sources in lectricity generation in the 
last years on averge 21.8% on gas (Statistical office: KSH).  
The domestic production of primary energy sources in Hungary is continuing 
steadily. During 1990, she was 48.5% and in 2000 at 44.26%, the resulting Figures 
for 2003, in-house production of only 35.6%. This becomes particularly clear the in-
creasing dependence on imported oil and natural gas: in 2003, the Import quota of 
natural gas at about 80 percent of oil and oil products at 86 % (Eurostat). This fac-
tors shows that the there is further a need of decentral and local energy generation in 
Hungary.  
In the case study the farmer as an investor is faced with the decision to build a 
small 150 kW system for the exclusive fermentation of manure and solid manure 
from on-site dairy farm, or in a larger 500 kW system, which in addition to the re-
newable resource "corn silage" codigestion to invest. The decision in the sense of 
economic evaluation is to take place by means of selected monetary investment cal-
culation method and a non-monetary cost-benefit analysis. Essential data of this 
study are based on the German Association for Technology and Construction in Ag-
riculture (KTBL) publish laboratory values and test results.  
In Hungary the dataset is not given in the deepth as in Germany, but the Cen-
tral Statistic Office (KSH) publishing about the subject. These are found in practice 
with a lot of attention and include physical, techni al and business information. Un-
der an investment is the use of capital, ie, the longer-term bond funds understood in 
assets affected Becker (2009), Hoffmeister (2008). In case of biogas investment is 
especially the procurement of balance sheet assets (fixed assets as non-current assets 
as opposed to short-term working capital) with production of useful way. Formally, 
the investment can be defined as cash flow, the first begins with an issue and draws 
a future benefit or net income by itself (Blohm et al. 2006), Seicht 2001, Walz–
Gramlich 2009). Also the types of investments in intangible investments (conces-
sions, patents, licenses) capital investment (land, buildings, machinery) and financial 
investments (investments, securities) can be classified.  
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Investment decisions have a significant impact on the success or failure of the 
company, because it usually has a high and long -term capital commitment (Blohm 
et al. 2006). Because of the associated long-term consequences and regular impact 
on other divisions, it requires intensive preparation in which the later consequences 
of the respective investment alternatives carefully evaluated possible werden (Kru-
schwitz 2000). The investment decision always implies an assessment of the profita-
bility of an investment. Is directed to a single project investment, it is the absolute 
advantageousness. If at least two investment alterntives evaluated, the relative ad-
vantage is considered. If it appears that an investm n  alternative as relatively ad-
vantageous, it may nevertheless only be realized if also given their absolute favora-
bility. The decision on the profitability of an investment alternative based on a cer-
tain (subjective) objective of the investor (Walz–Gramlich 2009). Unter objectives 
are understood as desirable to seeing future states that will occur as a result of cer-
tain behaviors (Kruschwitz 2000). To find out which of several investment alterna-
tives, the best, the goals must be operationalized, i. . it requires a clear definition of 
objectives in terms of a clear, understandable and differentiating description (Kru-
schwitz 2000). It has usually several goals, it makes sense to bundle target set (target 
systems), which consist of monetary and non-monetary goals. These will be de-
scribed in more detail in the following chapter. 
In many cases a single farmer, single individual investor or even a group of 
investors is not capable of financing the whole project by equity capital. Therefore, 
borrowed capital, EU subvention or subsidy is essential for the implementation of a 
biogas plant. Common financing methods are credits from private banks or state 
owned banks. Traditional loan financing is the most common way of receiving bor-
rowed capital from banks. This form of financing is not just used for major invest-
ments, as they are regularly needed within biogas projects, but also covers many 
smaller private loans. The bank or state owned subsidy office checks the financial 
background of the borrower in order to decide on the reliability and risk of the en-
gagement. Of particular interest for financial institutes are securities in case the pro-
ject fails. Such securities may consist of estate, components of the biogas plant, pri-
vate – and company asset, and all other assets that cover the loan sum. Furthermore, 
the prospects of success of the project are analysed. The prospect and decision mak-
ing of biogas projects in Hungary will be deepen in the second section of this study. 
As example, in Germany the duration of loans for biogas projects as well as the 
number of grace years is strongly dependent on the prerequisites of each particular 
biogas project. However, regular loan and subsidy periods with fixed interest rates 
and feed in tariffs are about 15 years and typically one or two grace years are grant-
ed for the starting up phase for the loan. 
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2. Monetary objectives 
Monetary targets have the advantage that they always c n be quantified and can be 
simulated by means of static and dynamic investment calculations over non -
monetary goals (Kruschwitz 2000). The most important monetary target is the long-
term gain. It may in assets struts (Valuemaximizing) and income aspiration (removal 
maximization) are divided regularly. Assets pursuit aims at a maximum assets at the 
end of an operation period, which can be calculated using the net present value. Fi-
nally, the net present value brings the increase or dec ease in financial assets at a 
given rate of return in terms of value relative to the beginning of the planning period 
(Blohm et al. 2006). Income struts aims to maximize th  removal of each period, 
which can be quantified with the annuity. The annuity is a profit ratio that reflects 
the periodic success. As a further monetary goal the maximization of return can be 
set and it is measured on the basis of internal interes  rate methods. 
The following specific objectives for the investor fa mer are to define: 
- Capital value € 1 million at a discount rate of mini um 5 %; 
- Income (annuity) of at least € 100,000 or 30.000.00 HUF a year; 
- Profitability of at least 10 % and internal rate of return of at least 5 %. 
 
The achievement of the non-monetary objectives is checked outside of the 
capital budgeting process by means of a cost-benefit analysis. Under non- monetary 
objectives utility values are understood to be quantified not based on incoming and 
outgoing payments and bring the subjective perception of the investor's specific de-
mands on the virtue worthy investment alternative to xpression (Seicht 2001). The 
investor pursues here the following non-monetary goals that are legal, environmen-
tal and technical nature: 
- Warranty period for the plant of at least four years; 
- Bureaucratic approval procedures; 
- Advantageous properties of the digestate; 
- Positive record; 
- Process stability; 
- High degree of automation. 
 
As already indicated, biogas is particularly distinguished by its variety of us-
es. It is designed to support preparation and injection into natural gas networks not 
only as fuel and natural gas substitute, but CHP can also be used to generate electric-
ity and heat generation using combined heat and power in cogeneration plants. The 
obtained electrical and thermal energy can be fed into supply networks and self-
consumed. Typical areas of use for the biogas-generated thermal energy are in farms 
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feeding into a district heating network to heat resid ntial and commercial buildings 
as well as stables and animal breeding places and the hot water supply Kaltschmitt–
Hartmann (2001). In Hungary, a large potential of bi mass for energy production is 
given. It is important to distinguish between the potential of the forestry sector and 
the biomass potential from agriculture. In general, the potential assessment should 
be evaluated very carefully. While the wood potential is largely exhausted, the bio-
gas potential is only about 10%. Hungarian agriculture provides good opportunities 
to increase the biogas sector. 57% of the country occupy agricultural land. Each year 
14 to 15 million m³ manure to fall in livestock farming as well as 300,000 tonnes of 
slaughter waste that can be recycled and disposed of in biogas plants. To the agricul-
tural waste sludge coming from the municipal sewage disposal. This is to be ex-
pected in the future with a larger volume. Agriculture can use brownfield sites for 
the cultivation of energy crops such as rapeseed or sunflower. For this sequence us-
ing the farmers can again take EU subsidies. The highest methane content in the bi-
ogas obtained the substance group of proteins with 71% Fats provide a gas with a 
methane content of approximately 68%. The worst performers from carbohydrates, 
with only 50% methane content (Eder–Schulz 2006). 
3. Planning of Biogas project decisions 
In general there are many objectives to cover by the decision making for a large in-
vestment like a biogas plant. They are the energy pices in short and long term, In-
dustry structure: Share of renewable energies and policy objectives, economic ar-
guments pro and cons, Feed-in tariff, Green Certificate Mechanism revenue, Agri-
cultural Potential, Biomass potential, Income from sales of electricity and heat, Ap-
proval procedures for Biogas plants, Subsidy schemes, Partners, Concluding long-
term supply contracts. Based on a German KTBL calcul tion, we set our starting 
point is an existing agricultural operation from the definied sample farmer investor 
which has (sole proprietorship) with 320 cattle for the dairy farm. The obtained in 
the dairy cattle manure (slurry and solid manure) to be fermented in each case in a 
still to be constructed agricultural biogas plant. The biogas produced in the plant is 
to be converted in each case by means of combined heat and power in a connected 
CHP heat and electricity. The electricity will be each entirely fed into the power 
grid. For the use of waste heat utilization is a concept which provides to heat the 
houses and farm buildings with a total floor space of 1,000 m2. The digestate is to 
be sold as a high quality fertilizer to agricultural customers. The investor faces the 
following investment alternatives: 
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1. Alternative: The first investment alternative only manure and solid manure 
is fermented from the cattle. In this respect, a smll biogas plant will be 
built with an installed electrical capacity of 150 kW. 
2. Alternative: In the second investment alternative th establishment of a 
much larger 500 kW biogas plant is being considered. The background is 
the idea that the co-fermentation of renewable raw's because of their higher 
biogas and methane yield is often more economical th n the exclusive 
fermentation of manure. In view of these investment alternatives, it is now 
exactly match the dimensions of the major system coponents on the pro-
posed substrate volume and its gas yield. Only by afull utilization of all 
system components can be ensured later the efficiency of the systems. To 
determine the annual manure and manure volume of livestock on the farm 
in standardized livestock units (LU) is converted (Anspach 2010). After 
the conversion of the key KTBL result from 320 cattle of different ages. 
The livestock unit has an annual manure seizure of 20 tons and an annual 
Mista case of 11 t to be expected (KTBL 2009). In the second alternative 
also 7,000 tons of silage maize to be purchased from a neighboring farmer 
and used for co-fermentation. 
4. Financing of Biogas plants 
Interest in the construction of biogas plants have before the one the suppliers of in-
put material. Therefore, they can also act as investors of the project. Hungarian 
banks yet gained no special expertise in the field of financing of renewable energy 
projects. At most, the OTP Bank identifies himself as a specialist in this area, but 
comes only as a partner in major projects in question. The OTP is based on its own 
information on the time and know-how can use the experience of the DZ Bank 
Group. It comes as a partner for small projects in question is represented by the sav-
ings cooperative banks heavily on location fundamental problem in the search for 
investors, however, is the political uncertainty of the grant of the feed in tariff. A 
fully secure financial planning can therefore be in the long run not so deterred many 
investors. Project financing in general is intended to finance a very particular in-
vestment which is repaid by its own cash flow. The financing bank makes its deci-
sion on the loan in the first place on the estimated cash flow of the project. In con-
trast to conventional loan financing, the financier usually has little or no access to 
private or company capital. In case of financing a biogas project, the financier’s in-
vestment is secured by the estimated cash flow of the plant selling electricity, the 
plant components and by the property of the plant site. Prerequisite to achieve pro-
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ject financing is the formation of a dedicated biogas project company. Project fi-
nancing provides considerably higher risks for financiers than conventional financ-
ing, since the loan can only be repaid when the project is operational. Therefore, 
banks are interested in minimizing potential risks. All aspects of the project are ana-
lysed very carefully. This leads to increased administrative work for both parties. 
The investor has to prepare all project documentation in high detail. This procedure 
can be considerably time consuming. Advantages and disadvantages of project fi-
nancing structure: 
+ The investor is not liable with private asset in case of project failure. 
+ The financial institute helps identifying and allocating potential week points 
of the project. 
+ It does not matter, how many people join the project company. Thus, a con-
sortium of farmers can jointly operate a biogas plant. 
+ Capacity for further loans is not constrained, as private estate is not charged. 
− High administrative complexity. 
− A project company has to be founded. 
− Not every bank provides the option of project financing. 
− Interest rates might be higher. 
 
Acquiring leasing partners is a frequently applied method for gathering equity 
capital for a biogas project. Leasing is characterised by the distinction of plant con-
structor (leasing company) and plant operator (lesse ). The leasing company con-
structs and finances the plant by company capital or equity capital from leasing 
partners. Afterwards the company leaves the plant to the lessee who has to take the 
risks of operation. The lessee keeps all revenues from the operation of the biogas 
plant but has to pay leasing rates to the leasing company. After the contract expired, 
the lessee can either buy the plant corresponding to its residual value, or the leasing 
company has to remove it. 
Advantages and disadvantages: 
+ Leasing partners provide expertise in biogas plant implementation and op-
eration. 
+ External investors have the opportunity to join the leasing company. 
+ Farmers with low equity capital have the opportunity to operate a biogas 
plant. 
− The leasing company does not have direct influence on the operation of the 
plant. Thus, success or failure of the project lies in “someone else’s hand” 
(lessee). 
− After the contract expired, the biogas plant might have a considerable resid-
ual value, which makes removal uneconomic for the leasing company. 
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5. Decision making process, main drivers 
Due to the opening of the Hungarian energy market, th  Hungarian energy prices re-
flect realistic market prices. According to the price index for energy costs of the 
Austrian Energy Agency (EVA), energy prices for households and industry in the 
period 1995 to 2001 have increased substantially (for households by 130% to 150% 
for the industry). After the price of electricity from 1985 to 2008 more than doubled, 
is for industrial power users now have a slight decrease in electricity prices ex-
pected, while the price of homes will continue to rise. 
After the input in the form of substrate amounts and the dimensioning of the 
biogas plant alternatives are fixed, now, a quantittive yield and subsequent investi-
gation proceeds held in terms of the output. This is in electrical energy (electricity), 
and – as a by-or co-products – in thermal energy (heat) and digestate, Anspach 
(2010). A meaningful utilization of the end products is also essential for economic 
production of biogas. The current revenues are made up of the feed-in remuneration 
for the electricity produced from the cost saving for the used amount of heat and of 
the achievable selling prices for the heat produced. In order to later be able to deter-
mine the produced electricity and heat, the first biogas and methane yield in the fer-
mentation must be known. This is substrate specific, depends on the respective or-
ganic dry mass fractions of the substrates and can be calculated according to the 
KTBL. In the following we take the methane yield for the 150 kW plant in the 
amount of 303 724 Nm3 and for the 500 kW system results in the amount of 
1,049,854 Nm3. 1 m3 of methane has a heating value (gross energy value) of 10 
kWh. Hence the approximated gross annual amount of energy (kWh) in the amount 
of 3,037,238 kWh and 10,498,538 kWh. 
Regarding the EU policy objectives the Hungarian government has to increase 
the share of renewable energies in the total energy production by 2010 to increase to 
5%. Long term, the EU funds will reach 12%. This goal is, among other things, by 
the requirements of EU directives in the field of renewable energy (Directive 
77/2002), the environment and security of supply. As the reserves of its own fossil 
fuels are estimated to be very low, which is as yet little used bioenergy potential 
should be better exploited. In this way, the increasingly pronounced dependence on 
imports is reduced. Furthermore, the development of bioenergy in the interests of the 
Hungarian government, since the cooperation with suppliers biomass as agricultural 
and forestry enterprises maintain employment in rural a eas or created. 
Biomass biogas plants or to offer to the wind energy as compared to the ad-
vantage of uniformly to generate power. This leads, for example, compared to wind 
power at lower power and control costs. From distribu ed generation and degrada-
tion of energy in turn accounts for high net development or maintenance costs, and 
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transport losses in the network. In rural areas especially, the biogas plant can also be 
used to process agricultural waste such as manure or municipal sewage sludge and 
reduce the cost of disposal. Overall, it is desirable both from the political side as 
well as from a purely economic point of view, a further expansion of bioenergy in 
Hungary.  
For German suppliers of modern technology offers therefore a larger market. 
The Economic and Transport Ministry drafts the policy and regulatory environment 
in Hungary and settled in this manner determine the long-term energy strategy. The 
essential task of the Ministry the annual determinatio  of energy prices (electricity 
and gas). The Hungarian Energy Office, the Hungarian Energy Office performs the 
function of a regulator in the Hungarian energy market. Under the supervision of the 
Authority are the electricity and gas sector, monitring the quality of public services, 
the granting of licenses and the provision of consumer protection. On behalf of the 
Ministry of Economy and Transport Authority designs the working principles for the 
design of national energy policy. The Hungarian Energy Centre (Energia Központ 
Kht.) (see contact list), the Hungarian Energy Centre (Energia Központ Kht) coordi-
nates national and international support measures for the introduction of renewable 
energy sources and to increase energy efficiency. Among since EU accession also 
includes the funds from the EU Cohesion Fund. In addition to providing information 
regarding subsidy leads the energy center of a natio al energy statistics and publish-
es information brochures on general energy issues. El ctricity Act (Act CX of 2001).  
The regulations for the supply of electricity from renewable sources is defined 
in the Electricity Act (Act CX of 2001 on electricity completed with the Govern-
mental Decree 180/2002 (VIII. 23.) on the enforcement of it). Under this law, the 
supply grid operator MVM Ltd., obliges electricity from renewable sources, inde-
pendent power producers, which is produced by plants with a capacity of 0.1 MW to 
decrease. If the system is not connected to the transmission network of MVM Ltd., 
the compensation granted by the regional distribution system operators Édász, 
Demasz, DEDASZ, Titász, ELMU and EMASZ). The purchase price is determined 
in accordance with Decree 56/2002 (XII. 29.) GKM by the Ministry of Economy. 
The price is adjusted annually by the inflation rate. In 2003 was at 24 HUF / kWh 
(about 9.26 EURct) for electricity for peak loads and 15 HUF / kWh (about 5.78 
EURct) for electricity to cover basic loads. This gves an average payment of 17.41 
HUF / kWh (6.6 EURct). This scheme retains initially to 31 December 2010 its va-
lidity.  
A major criticism of this scheme is the lack of predictability and the uniform 
grant of compensation, regardless of the renewable energy source. In addition, the 
amount of compensation deemed insufficient. Besides th  guaranteed feed-in price, 
there is a Green Certificate system in Hungary. According to the statutory scheme, a 
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certificate system for renewably generated electricity s introduced. HEO certified 
producer of green electricity this can for each produced unit power output a corre-
sponding certificate. Electricity consumers are bound to end u p a year to seize a de-
termined percentage of their electricity consumption with such Green Certificates. 
This can directly relate the power producers or buyon a set up market. For the pro-
ducers of renewable electricity is obtained through the sale of allowances a source of 
revenues. The calculation of the by-products as quantitative output size is important 
in that the fermented substrate amounts can be sold a  high-quality, nutrient-rich fer-
tilizer to agricultural customers. The nutrients do not go through the fermentation 
that is lost, but are rather highly concentrated as digestate and odour in flowable 
form. The digestate can extent a conventional and polluting fertilizers (Eder–Schulz 
2006). The value of the digestate fertilizer depends ot only on the amounts of its 
nutrient content (N, P, K) and the current nutrient prices. Also taken into account 
minor treatment costs a fertilizer proceeds of 2.00 € / m3 can be recognized.  
In the agricultural sector, personnel costs are to be brought to approach as 
wages and non-wage labor costs, ie variable costs. While the system support com-
prises essentially routine work such as operating checks, maintenance and fault fix-
es, as well as office work in terms of data collection and organization, the substrate 
binds Management working hours for the feeding of the plant and for the processing, 
storage and dosage of the substrates used (Koch 2009). In principle, the time re-
quired for the operation of a fermentation plant of he operational concept, size and 
the substrates used depends. In general, in agricultural biogas plants – as opposed to 
waste fermentation plants that require multiple full-time employees – one to five 
hours a day sufficient are. In the literature, the view is uniformly represented that 
with increasing size of the system also increases th  level of automation, which is a 
decrease of care burden result (Eder–Schulz 2006). In the literature, the view is uni-
formly represented that with increasing size of the system also increases the level of 
automation, which is a decrease of care burden result. D e to the high technical re-
quirements to work in a biogas plant, a high claim should be placed on the qualifica-
tions and reliability of the staff, which would appear justifiable an hourly rate in-
cluding all non-wage costs of 5 € / h (Koch 2010). In the larger biogas plant, a high-
er workload than the smaller plant is assumed, because in addition here 's renewable 
resources are differentiate, so that require a higher daily time spent on the substrate 
management. The cattle manure and cattle solid manure represents a waste product 
of the company's own dairy cattle and the biogas plnt is free of charge. In the sec-
ond Investment alternative is bought to in silage maize for biogas production. Maize 
is particularly beneficial in growing and very undemanding in terms of the soil. De-
pending on the specific cultivation costs (seed, fertilizer, labor and machinery costs 
for fertilizer spreading, mowing, chopping and transport) fall for 1 ha of silage 
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maize € 1,072. At an average yield level of 44 t / ha corresponds to a price per tonne 
inclusive of 5% profit and risk surcharge of € 25.50 / t (Röder 2005) in Germany. 
Hungarian cost structure is highly dependent on the location. 
6. Investment decision under uncertainty 
Investment decisions are always based on the forecast of future values (recoverable 
proceeds to be paid expenses), which are always subject to uncertainty because of 
their unpredictability. Uncertainty means that the value of the target (eg, the net pre-
sent value) clearly and unambiguously is not predictable, but be that several future 
values considered possible. If the uncertainty is not i cluded in the investment cal-
culus, wrong decisions, changes in feed-in-tariff system or gas and power prices, but 
also the selection of investment alternative can be the result (Mensch 2002). Uncer-
tainty can be divided into uncertainty and risk. If there are no probabilities for the 
predictions are determined, a decision is available under uncertainty, but are the 
probabilities for forecast values known and used in ecision-making, as is spoken of 
decisions under risk (Hoffmeister 2008). In order to incorporate the uncertainty in 
the investment decisions are in the investment accounting practice three methods to 
choose from: the correction method and risk analysis. The correction method is cope 
with simple methods the investment risk by putting all calculated and estimated val-
ues (input and output sizes) are provided with a surcharge or discount (Kruschwitz 
2000). This method is very popular in practice because it is relatively easy to handle. 
A critical examination of this method, however, reached the conclusion that it is un-
suitable for sound risky investment decisions. The reason lies in the arbitrariness of 
the flat and surcharges that are not derived analytic ly and that the security calculi 
often double in the bill incorporated (eg by increasing the calculation rate while re-
ducing the intake values, Kruschwitz 2000). Because of its methodological weak-
nesses, the correction method is only useful for smaller scale projects, for which a 
high planning effort is not worthwhile. Therefore, the correction method is for this 
case study are not mainly considered. Used but it was in the 1.5 % inflation sur-
charge on payments made under the provisions of the periodic series of payments. 
Risk analysis is a process by which hazards are and their causes Detected and 
are to be detected qualitatively and quantitatively their risks. The essential basic 
principle of risk analysis is to derive a probability analysis the output size of invest-
ment appraisal (eg net present value) and secure information about the relevant input 
variables (Hoffmeister 2008). First, the relevant ucertain input variables of invest-
ment appraisal must be selected. Subsequently, various environmental conditions 
must be defined and are generally assigned to them subjective probability assump-
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tions for their entry (values between 0 (does not occur) and 1 (surefooted a), Hoff-
meister 2008). Taking into account stochastic dependencies between the uncertain 
input variables then the probability distributions for the output size can be deter-
mined (Kruschwitz 2000). This can be done by simulative analysis method. Howev-
er, these processes are so complex and diverse that it is beyond the scope of this 
work. The decision on the preferability of an investment alternative depends in each 
case on the particular risk attitude of the investor (Hoffmeister 2008). The selection 
of the input variables are regarded as uncertain investment expenditure, discount 
rate, useful life of the investment, sales volume, sales prices, expenditure fixed and 
variable costs and purchase prices available (Blohm et al. 2006). Investment ex-
penditure discount rate, length of use should be considered in the biogas plant as a 
relatively safe levels. Sales volumes in the operation of a biogas plant electrical en-
ergy (electricity), thermal energy (heat) and the digestate (fertilizer). The amounts of 
energy (electricity and heat quantities) produced can be very accurately predicted 
and calculated according to the biogas and methane yields and the efficiencies of the 
cogeneration system. Also, the current paragraphs can be considered as not safe, be-
cause on the one hand, the renewable law requires the network operators to prioritize 
purchase of electricity produced and on the other hand, a rate is every year changea-
ble and also dependent from the current power and gs prices which can be changed 
by the government even twice a year. The heat produced is a de facto a saving of 
other resources. It is a substituted fossil fuel oil, which would otherwise have pur-
chased. Because the slightest substitution value has already been set (approx. 0.55 € 
per litre) and it is a purchase price which decreases as inflation and demand-driven 
rather increases, the more can be expected from a secure expectation here. Although 
the amount produced can be in the digestate also accurately predict and calculate, 
unlike the current or in the heat here is both the achievable sales volume as well as 
the selling price be uncertain. Finally, it can notbe predicted whether the digestate 
ever find a purchaser and, if so, at what price. On the expenditure side the principle 
uncertainties was countered by an inflation premium has been mainstreamed by 
1.5% in the analysis. Particular attention should however be paid to the substrate 
costs for the procurement of Silomaises. The raw material is subject to this experi-
ence, strong price fluctuations. On the revenue sidof the series of payments is the 
paragraph of the digestate and on the expenditure side, the substrate costs are con-
sidered to be unsafe. Below are selected as uncertain input variables individually 
varied and the sensitivity of the net present value are examined for these fluctua-
tions. 
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7. Summary and outline 
Biogas projects can be financed by many different options. Each financing model 
has particular advantages and disadvantages for the investor and the financing bod-
ies. It is very important for a successful implementation and operation to select the 
correct financing option for the regarding project. It has to be assessed very careful-
ly, which costs occurs and which revenues can be exp cted from the operation of the 
biogas plant previously to the implementation of the project. This case study has a 
decision to invest in an agricultural biogas plant to the object. Examines this was the 
preferability of one of two mutually exclusive investment alternatives: establishment 
of a pure liquid manure fermentation plant with an installed electrical capacity of 
150 kW as the first alternative or construction of a industry size 500 kW system, in 
addition silage maize to be fermented. The operation of an agricultural biogas plant 
has been demonstrated. The decision on the advantages - both in absolute and in rel-
ative terms - was made on the basis of specific investor objectives through appropri-
ate investment appraisal method. As a suitable calculation methods were static and 
dynamic investment calculations and for the non-monetary goals, a cost-benefit 
analysis in consideration for financial goals. In preparation for the investment calcu-
lations dedicated earnings, revenue and cost investigations were necessary. As a re-
sult, the investment calculations, the second 500 kW biogas plant alternative was 
found to co-fermentation of silage maize as relative and absolute preferable, only 
she was able, the required monetary investors objectives, namely: 
- capital value of € 1 million at a discount rate of 5 %; 
- income (annuity) of at least € 100,000 a year; 
- profitability of at least 10 %; 
- internal rate of return of at least 5 % to meet.  
 
A control performed by sensitivity analysis, investment decision under uncer-
tainty led to a different result. Thus, the investment decision can be seen in the con-
struction of the smaller biogas plant as a long-term conomically viable perspective, 
especially when the legislative rules are under changes. Intervention in the energy 
sector would not mind if the government measures of efficiency, rationalization and 
reducing energy dependence would result. In contrast, the overhead reduction affect-
ing the sector and other charges („Robin Hood” tax,utility tax) may point in the op-
posite direction: investment reduction, cut backs, utting costs. The economic point 
of view it is already too raises social issues. The ne d for a solidarity based on 
ground support system for the technology developement and agriculture would 
probably be justified. The need for a long run program for the renewable energy is 
essential, otherwise the decision making process will run to absolute clear answer, 
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not to invest in vague conjecture and approximations. I  the future - especially if the 
government is serious about the additional overhead r duction of 10 percent, so in 
overall 20 or even 30 percent cut would result commn disorders in investments or 
even a provider exodus in the market. Meanwhile, th energy efficiency and agricul-
tural development is not moving forward. 
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Significant attention has been paid to the notions f relatedness, related variety and unrelat-
ed variety in regional economic development research. Facets of (technological) proximity 
are at the core of theorizing on the sectoral knowledge spillovers of related industries and on 
the portfolio effect of unrelated variety in the robustness of the regional economy. The 
utrecht school, a stronghold of such research agendas, has thematized the debate by formu-
lating related variety research questions and by developing the entropy-based methodology. 
Connections to the evolutionary economic geography discussion have also been established 
by the utrecht line of inquiry. This paper highlights key aspects of the research on related 
variety. It is argued that a more explicit attention to policy issues would be beneficial moving 
forward. Also evolutionary economics can further contribute to the theoretical foundation of 
the related variety concept. 
 
Keywords: related variety, unrelated variety, regional economic development, economic 
geography 
1. Introduction 
The notions of related and unrelated variety have gained an ever so increasing atten-
tion from economic geographers in the international scene. This attention mainly 
followed the seminal paper of Frenken et al. (2007), examining the relationship be-
tween related and unrelated variety of sectors in the regional economy and the eco-
nomic and employment growth of said regions. According to Google Scholar, this 
paper accumulated 599 individual citations in the course of the last six years, includ-
ing approximately 150 last year. The several peer-rviewed articles published re-
cently and the amount of working papers building on variety show that it is a rele-
vant topic of vivid regional scientific discourse. The theoretical point of departure in 
                                                   
 
1 Present working paper is supported by the European Union and co-funded by the European Social 
Fund. Project title: “Preparation of the concerned s ctors for educational and R&D activities related to 
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Frenken et al. (2007) is that of agglomeration externalities and the key contribution 
of their work is in the methodology, introducing entropy measures to account for re-
lated and unrelated variety. Research on variety conducted by others mainly follows 
this methodological focus. 
In spite of the recent influx of variety-based research in the international eco-
nomic geography scene, appearance of this topic in Hu garian regional scientific 
discussion is still scarce, perhaps with the exception of Lengyel and Szakálné 
(2013). Present paper sets out to review the relevant literature on related and unre-
lated variety and to see whether the contribution of these notions to economic geog-
raphy resulted in “knowledge accumulation” as phrased by Henning et al. (2013). 
After the discussion of the next few pages, some points f interest will be identified, 
that may be the focus of future variety related research agendas. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section h ghlights key character-
istics of the concept of variety, including agglomeration economies, relatedness and 
technological proximity. In the third section reoccurring themes in related variety 
research and research questions are discussed, like competitiveness focus and re-
gional branching. The paper concludes by a summary and a set of possible exten-
sions to related variety research for future research gendas.  
2. The concept of (related) variety 
The spatial concentration of economic activities is a key feature in regional microe-
conomics. Firms clustered in the same locality receive benefits of different sources 
called agglomeration economies or agglomeration externalities. Following the rea-
soning of Frenken et al. (2007), present discussion of related variety departs from 
agglomeration economies as well. Different forms of agglomeration economies have 
been identified in economic geography. (1) Internal i creasing returns to scale, un-
derstood as production cost efficiency stemming from a large market size. It is inter-
nal for the firm and so not in the focus of present paper. (2) Localization economies 
(Marshallian externalities), understood as external economies available to all firms 
of the same sector of a locality. (3) Urbanization economies, understood as external 
economies available to all firms, stemming from urban size and density. (4) Jacobs 
externalities, understood as external economies available for all firms, stemming 
from the variety of sectors in a region. 
The different sorts of agglomeration economies yield different benefits for 
firms and their region. Based on the likelihood and nature of knowledge spill overs 
occurring, localization economies contribute to incremental and process innovation 
through knowledge spillovers within sectors (Lengyel–Rechnitzer 2004). Jacobs ex-
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ternalities yield knowledge spillovers between related sectors, resulting more likely 
in radical and product innovation. Urbanization economies facilitate interactive 
learning between firms and other institutions of the local society, including universi-
ties, local governance and NGOs. According to Frenken et al. (2007), related variety 
is understood as the source of Jacobs externalities, while unrelated variety sums up 
to a portfolio effect for the regional economy, making it more resistant against 
asymmetrical sectoral shocks (Table 1). 
Table 1. Sectoral relatedness and external economies 
Degree of variety Similarity Related variety Unrelated variety 






Relational proximity High Moderate Low 








Effect on the robustness of the  
regional economy 
Exposure to  
asymmetric  
shocks 
Exposure to  
asymmetric  
shocks 
Resistance to  
asymmetric  
shocks 
Source: Own construction 
 
Hence the central issue of theorizing on related and unrelated variety – and in 
turn on the occurrence and intensity of knowledge spillovers – is the understanding 
of relatedness. That is, when and to what degree can it be stated that two firms or 
sectors are in fact related or unrelated. While a formal approach to this problem has 
been devised in the entropy measure, it is important to highlight the roots of related-
ness in appreciative theory as well. Breschi et al. (2003) argued that technological 
relatedness is the result of the firms learning process – intentional, based on search 
processes and unintentional, based on knowledge spillovers – and the nature of 
knowledge as a resource. Studies from the management literature on business port-
folio relatedness are interested in firm diversification of economic activities (e.g. 
Tang–Rowe 2012, Shin–Shin 2013). Cassiman et al. (2005) conducted research 
from an industrial organization theory point of view on merger and acquisition and 
built upon technological relatedness as a form of synergy stemming from existing 
production processes and knowledge recombination possibilities. Piscitello (2000) 
argued that industrial and market relatedness aside, the firms role in selecting what 
is related and what is not in terms of activity is a strong selection process and a 
formative element of industries.  
The degree of relatedness between industries and thus the significance of ag-
glomeration economies arising is a translation of the geographical, cognitive or oth-
erwise proximity of said industries. On the one hand, proximity and embeddedness 
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facilitates knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, distance between firms can yield 
flexibility, creative solutions and emergence of variety (Boschma 2005, Frenken 
2009, Boschma–Frenken 2010). In this sense, strong proximity may also result in 
lock-ins, while weak proximity makes coordination difficult and renders the firms 
creative processes more isolated. In terms of agglomeration externalities, the first 
case is localization externalities in extreme proximity situations (i.e. firms of the 
same industry in the same locality). The second case is related variety with a fertile 
soil for radical innovation and the emergence of new industries. Technological prox-
imity is central notion in the conceptualization of relatedness. According to Knoben 
and Oerlemans (2006, p. 77.): 
 
“[Technological proximity] refers […] to the knowledge actors pos-
sess about these technologies. Similarities in technological knowledge 
[…] facilitate technological learning as well as the anticipation of 
technological developments…” 
 
Again, the central issue is the difference in knowledge between firms regard-
less of this knowledge being codified, appearing as m chinery or other artefact or 
being tacit represented in organizational routines, as suggested by Nelson and Win-
ter (1982).  
Finally, some authors from the field of international trade theory have shown 
interest in related variety of industries as well. There, a connection between export 
basket diversification and economic development (e.g. growth) is established. The 
role of export basket diversification in development is identified as a source of 
knowledge spillovers and a platform of interactive l arning (Kadochnikov–
Fedyunina 2013). 
3. Themes in related variety studies 
The lively discourse in the literature on related variety indicates that the concept 
sheds light on the important effect of similarity and difference in the regional econ-
omy. First it helps understanding how the difference of industries can contribute to 
employment, economic growth and overall competitiveness, the common goals of 
regional economic development theory. Second it holds key insights to the evolution 
of the regional economy. The specialization and diversification of said economy 
through the emergence of new industries and the disappearance of old ones (i.e. 
Schumpeterian creative destruction) is a path-dependent branching process best un-
derstood in its own historic context. 
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3.1. Competitiveness-based approach  
Regional competitiveness has been identified as the central tool for welfare in main-
stream regional development literature. It is understood as a composition of the re-
gions capabilities to maintain relatively high employment rate and relatively high 
income (Lengyel 2010). The concept of competitiveness is the bases for evaluating 
the effect of related variety on regional economic performance. Since related indus-
tries are identified as the sources of knowledge spillovers more likely to result in 
radical innovation, they are also beneficial for economic growth. Likewise the 
emergence of new industries provides additional opportunities for traded sectors to 
attract additional income. 
In the mainstream literature it is widely agreed upon, that in the case of re-
gions in developed economies, related variety is beneficial for employment. New 
industries provide additional demand for labour andthe presence of related indus-
tries makes it less likely for firms to exit their industry. Frenken et al. (2007) added 
that unrelated variety serves as safety net against u employment in case of an 
asymmetric sectoral shock (Table 2). In the case of a transitional economy setting, 
Lengyel and Szakálné (2013) showed that in lagging regions related variety aggra-
vated the employment conditions of a region, most likely because it reinforces nega-
tive-lock in patterns. 
Table 2. Effect of related variety on aspects of competitiveness 
Study Employment Growth 
Boschma et al. 2010 0 + 
Boschma–Iammarino 2009  + + 
Frenken et al. 2007 + 0 
Note: “+” indicates positive, significant impact, “0” indicates insignificant impact, “-“  
indicates negative, significant impact 
Source: Adapted from Kadochnikov–Fedyunina (2013, p. 7.) 
3.2. Regional specialization, diversification and regional branching 
The related variety concept can serve as bases for understanding the diversification 
of the regional economy over time. As firms diversify into technologically related 
economic activities or new firms appear through entry or spin-off process, the com-
position of the regional economy changes. This is a path-dependent branching pro-
cess in the sense that the growth of new industries is anchored by the existing port-
folio of economic activities. Also the exit of existing firms is affected by their relat-
edness to dominant economic activities. The description of this branching process 
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has been begun in increasing detail (see for e.g. Boschma–Frenken 2009, Boschma–
Iammarino 2009, Neffke et al. 2011, Boschma et al. 2012). 
In these attempts of accounting for the underlying processes of regional eco-
nomic branching, it is commonly agreed upon that the technological relatedness of 
firms and their respective industries is based on knowledge. This knowledge is rep-
resented in organizational routines on the firm leve  (Nelson–Winter 1982), in the 
products of the firm and in the employee know-how. As research into regional 
branching indicates, new industries emerging from radical innovation build upon 
these existing firm competences. This may help explaining why industries growing 
out of a radical innovation tend to cluster in previously successful regions (e.g. bio- 
or nanotechnology in informatics hubs or the YouTube content producing communi-
ty in Los Angeles). The concept of knowledge bases can be interpreted as an attempt 
to organize the knowledge particularities underlying relatedness (Asheim et al. 
2011). In this sense, the related variety concept is deeply embedded in theorizing on 
knowledge, interactive learning and innovation systems. 
A recent development of the smart specialization concept in the economic ge-
ography literature builds heavily on the concept of relatedness and its relevant re-
search. Smart specialization is a notion adapted for ec nomic geography by McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés (2011) with an explicit regional development policy focus. Re-
latedness is one of the building blocks of their approach: diversifying into related 
industries serves the robustness of the regional economy as well as enhances the 
possibility of knowledge spillovers. The growth of the regional economy can be fos-
tered by the technological diversification of its embedded industries. As McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés (2011, p. 16.) put it: 
 
“[…] the most promising pathways forward for a region to promote 
its growth by enhancing its technological capacity are by diversifying 
into technologies which are closely related to the existing dominant 
technologies.” 
4. Conclusions and ideas for further research 
The analysis of relatedness and variety is a promising framework for understanding 
regional economic change. The emergence of new industries and the innovativeness 
of existing ones, the specialization or diversification of the regional economy and 
the path-dependent branching process of the industry portfolio are explananda ap-
proachable with the concept of relatedness. The effct of related industries on the 
economy so far seems to be positive on employment, growth and overall competi-
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tiveness. This makes the notions of related and unrelated variety attractive for re-
gional economic development theory. 
4.1. Interpretation for regional economic development policy 
For the most part, empirical evidence based on related variety is rarely accompanied 
by regional economic development policy implications. The policy distance of on-
going research projects reflects in part the relative novelty of the variety concept. In 
this sense caution exercised by researchers about policy messages is warranted. On 
the other hand policy distance – in part – comes from a distance from normative 
goals in regional economic development research. As phrased by Markusen (1999, 
p. 873.): 
 
“…regional research should be policy-relevant and con erned not on-
ly with efficiency but also with normative goals loosely considered 
'progressive': equity; democracy; human rights; environmentally be-
nign development.” 
 
Frenken et al. (2007) briefly mention that regional po icy supporting related 
variety may decrease the risk of selecting wrong sectors for the bases of regional 
economic development, since it is focusing on existing competences. On the other 
hand, the reinforcement of the existing economic base of a region may in turn ag-
gravate an existing negative lock-in situation. As Lengyel and Szakálné (2013) sug-
gest, this may exactly be the case with lagging behind regions of transition econo-
mies. Also the emergence of new industries may not follow the policy interventions 
based on existing competences and related variety. Or new related industries may 
appear on their own relying on said competences, as uggested by the window of lo-
cational opportunity concept of Boschma (1997), without using policy resources at 
all. Thus the clarification of the role of related and unrelated variety in regional eco-
nomic development policy seems to be an important focal point in future research on 
variety. 
While competitiveness is a widely used baseline for evaluating economic per-
formance, other approaches can be taken up by the policymaker. The detrimental ef-
fect of related variety in a region in negative lock-in situation shows, that even with-
in in the competitiveness framework, further research on different regions is wel-
come. Likewise the evaluation of interactive learning and regional economic branch-
ing on the bases of related variety could be analysed from a different standpoint. For 
example evaluation of related variety based on enviro mental sustainability could 
investigate the self-reinforcing impact of economic activity and regional branching 
on the local environment or society. 
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4.2. Insights on variety from Generalized Darwinism 
The appearance of the evolutionary approach in economic geography contributed to 
several fields of discussion, including cluster dynamics, evolution of regional 
knowledge networks and regional development through economic branching (Fedy-
unina et al. 2014). It can be argued that the related variety approach itself is a contri-
bution rooted in the evolutionary economic geography discourse. The existence and 
source of variety is a central issue in evolutionary economics and a process to be ex-
plained. Variation is considered one of few principles essential in evolutionary rea-
soning (Hodgson–Knudsen 2006, Stoelhorst 2010). These principles work in tan-
dem, as Metcalfe and Miles (1994, p. 253.) put it: 
 
“Progress depends not on chaotic generation of variety, but on focus-
ing devices which constrain the development of technology into chan-
nels which have already been found to be productive.” 
 
Although it is widely agreed upon that variety is a key contributor to the suc-
cess of a population – a region in the case of economic geography –, the scope of its 
significance and its meaning is still unclear. Essletzbichler and Rigby (2010) col-
lected a couple of meanings associated with variety including the variety of organi-
zational routines, product and process variety and heterogeneity generated by inno-
vation. Based on the related variety research explored above, variety of knowledge 
generated through interactive learning and employee movement, or variety of indus-
tries in a region are also applicable approaches when analysing the success of a pop-
ulation (e.g. regional growth, regional development). Whether these sorts of variety 
have a common element (e.g. knowledge bases) or they are different, and cannot be 
regressed into a single notion of variety seems undecided at the moment. 
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12. Financial reporting in the new economy 
Zsuzsanna Kovács 
 
The fundamental objective of preparing financial reports is providing financial information 
for the users of reports, primarily to investors and creditors who use that information when 
making their decisions about allocating their resources. Living in the so-called new econo-
my, it seems obvious to expect that information regarding knowledge assets will be found in 
these reports. However, actual financial reporting standards do not support the recognition 
of internally generated intangible items on the balance sheet. Voluntary disclosures are a 
possible alternative for firms who are willing to give information on their intangible re-
sources to the stakeholders. The inflexibility of the regulations lead companies to developing 
intangible reporting practices that sometimes exceed th  scope of financial reporting. Never-
theless, financial reporting is the only form of providing information that is based on the 
same standards and conceptual basis, making users able to compare data of different pre-
parers. 
The underlying research questions are: how the existing intangible accounting rules 
are applied in business reporting practice and which are the related features of the financial 
reporting culture in Hungary. As financial reporting regulations and literature associated 
with the topic has been investigated, the planned empirical research includes the collection 
of both quantitative and qualitative data. Based on the empirical findings of several interna-
tional surveys, a similar research on a Hungarian smple will be executed using the data in 
the financial reports of entities. The objective is to measure the amount and quality of the 
information preparers disclose on intangible resources and to find association with some 
corporate-specific features (e.g. size, sector, book t  market ratio, capital structure etc.). Ex-
amining the intangible reporting practices of large companies also can serve as an input in 
the other line of the planned research, which involves collecting quantitative data regarding 
the intangible reporting culture of Hungarian firms. The expected outcome is the drawing of 
some proposals for the improvement of the intangible reporting culture of the smaller firms 
of the region. 
 
Key words: financial reporting, intangible resources, knowledge assets, voluntary disclosure 
1. Introduction 
In theory, financial reports are designed to cover all information that users of reports 
need to make their financial decisions. According to the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) which is the leading international standard setting body, the 
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objective of financial reporting is to provide financial information that is useful to 
investors and creditors in making their decisions about allocating their resources. 
That information includes data on the financial positi n, performance and cash flows 
of the entities, among which assets or resources of the companies are fundamental. 
The new economy – as we often call it – has brought intangible resources to the cen-
ter of attention as they appear to be key factors of competition. However, the most 
widely used international financial reporting system, the IFRS defines recognition 
criteria that lead to a very limited set of intangible assets presented on the balance 
sheet. The reason for this is that intangible resources have some specific features 
that are very difficult to harmonize with the present framework of financial reporting 
regulations. This situation is apparent in different regulation environments, in inter-
national standards as well as in most country-specific regulations. 
Companies’ reactions to the difficulties related to intangible reporting are di-
verse depending on features like size, sector, profile, capital structure, etc. Large in-
ternational firms often have significant intangible resources and are able to cover the 
cost of reporting such information, even in the form of voluntary disclosures. New 
reporting systems have evolved in the last decades to amend traditional financial in-
formation regarding topics of social responsibility, environmental issues, sustaina-
bility, value creation, etc. These voluntary discloures or reports show an expedient, 
yet expensive example of putting intangibles in the spotlight. Yet, the ratio of these 
powerful companies among all participants of the markets is relatively low in many 
countries. Smaller or even say micro-size companies have fewer resources to allo-
cate to creating annual reports. That does not imply that they do not have any intan-
gibles to show. Is reporting intangibles only the game of big firms? 
2.  Intangible resources and financial reporting 
The obvious way of reporting information on intangible assets is integrating them 
into financial reports. However, present financial accounting regulations seem to 
provide narrow space for intangibles on balance sheet . International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS) issued by the IASB are applied in over one hundred coun-
tries including the member states of the EU. IFRS standards define recognition crite-
ria that lead to a very limited set of intangible assets presented in financial reports. 
The definition of an asset derives from The Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting, which defines the basic concepts of reporting (IFRS Foundation 2010, 
par. 4.4.): ‘An asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events 
and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’.  
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The definition of intangible assets is included in International Accounting 
Standard 38 Intangible Assets (IFRS Foundation 2012, par. 8.): ‘An intangible asset 
is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance’. 
The recognition criteria set by the Framework are the rules that specify which 
items are incorporated into financial reports, which nvolves the depiction of the 
item in words and by monetary amounts. Items that satisfy the recognition criteria 
are presented on the balance sheet or the income stat ment. According to the 
Framework the recognition criteria are the following (IFRS Foundation 2010, par. 
4.38.): ‘An item that meets the definition of an element should be recognised if: 
(a) it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item 
will flow to or from the entity; and 
(b) the item has a cost or value that can be measured with reliability’. 
 
Very few internally generated intangible items meet the recognition criteria 
because the economic benefits they incorporate are associated with high risk (i.e. the 
case of research costs) and measuring their value is a great challenge. Furthermore, 
they hardly correspond to the existing definitions, because intangible resources like 
competence experience and ideas of the workforce or t chnological expertise are not 
assets controlled by the companies. Basically, the only type of inter ally-generated 
intangible resources that appear on the balance shet ar  development costs and 
know-how (protected by contract). Intangible assets that are of external origin (pur-
chased, acquired as part of a business combination or by way of government grant) 
are much easier to place in financial reports as they are traded on the market, which 
makes them easy to identify, control and measure (i.e. brands, patents, trademarks, 
customer lists). However, the Framework for IFRS requires entities to enclose in-
formation on all items that are essentially assets bu  fail to meet the recognition cri-
teria in case knowledge of the item is relevant to the evaluation of the financial posi-
tion. Upton seizes the heart of the problem stating (Upton 2001, p. 70.): ‘Is there any 
rationale based on the definition of an asset, why those items are assets when ac-
quired in a business combination or other purchase nd not assets when created in-
ternally? No. Genealogy is not an essential characteris ic of an asset’  
 
As a consequence of the above described regulations, IFRS financial reports 
basically exclude internally generated intangible items or knowledge assets from the 
balance sheet. The structure and approach of Hungarian accounting regulations i  
different from that of the IFRS standards but the final results are very similar. Our 
Accounting Act gives a list of the items that shall be presented on the balance sheet 
in a specific format. The definitions given in the intangible section of the balance 
sheet are also tailored for acquired items. However, b sides development cost, by 
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Hungarian rules, the cost of incorporation (start-up costs) and reorganization are also 
allowed to be capitalized in case the expected economic benefits exceed their cost. 
Hungarian regulations require entities to describe esearch and development activi-
ties in the company report, which supplements the data given in the financial report. 
Similarly to IFRS, the Accounting act also prescribes preparers to enclose infor-
mation on off-balance sheet items that incorporate significant benefits or risk that 
influences the financial position of the entities. 
Taking small and medium size companies into consideration, the international 
reporting standard setters have published a separat standard called IFRS for SMEs 
in 2009.1 IFRS for SMEs includes similar definition and recognition criteria for in-
tangible assets but expressly prohibits the recogniti n of internally generated intan-
gible items. Hungarian accounting rules identify a separate types of financial reports 
for SMEs and micro-size entities. Small and medium size enterprises may opt to 
prepare reports under some simplifying rules and as a consequence have to include 
in the balance sheet only the overall amount of intangible assets and no compulsory 
disclosure on off-balance sheet items or research and development is required. How-
ever, they are allowed to supplement the financial information given is the balance 
sheet. Micro-size companies are allowed to prepare reports with even more reduc  
data, but any notes to the balance sheet are excluded in this type of report.  
Basically we have a reporting framework (both on country and international 
level) that cuts off most internally generated intangible assets from the balance sheet 
and we do have a business environment that is considered to be built on knowledge. 
This seems to be a great contradiction. Lev (2003) summarizes the consequences of 
the mismeasurement or deficient reporting of intangibles:  
1. significant deterioration in the information content of key financial state-
ment items; 
2. managers looking for alternate measures of corporate performance for in-
ternal purposes; 
3. systematic undervaluation of companies that are intnsive in intangibles 
(excessive cost of capital); 
4. gains are missallocated to insiders because of the great information asym-
metry.  
 
The standard setting bodies, the International Accounting Standards Board or 
the Hungarian legislative bodies face a great challenge if they intend to react on the 
critique that has been drawn lately. Studies about a possible paradigm-shift in finan-
                                                   
 
1 International Accounting Standards Board (2009): IFRS for SMEs is applied on a voluntary basis by 
entities, it is not mandatory for any conpanies in the EU. 
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cial accounting have been published ever since the 1970’s (i.e. Wells 1976, Elliot 
1992). Opinions given by accounting professionals show great differences, but the 
fact is financial reporting paradigm is presently undergoing some changes. 
Shortridge–Smith (2009) predict the specific characteristics of the new accounting 
paradigm which are: relevance, globalization, fair v lues, faithful representation and 
principles-based regulation (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Financial reporting paradigm shift 
 
 
Source: Shortridge–Smith (2009, p. 12.) 
 
Upton gives an extensive review on intangible reporting regarding the back-
ground, the basic definitions and the topics of the evolving new reporting paradigm, 
new metrics and intangible asset accounting. The author also highlights the focus to 
concentrate on (Upton 2001, p. 9.):‘We may have a new economy, or our new tools 
may have given us an appreciation of factors that were always important. It doesn’t 
much matter which. The more important question is how to improve business and 
financial reporting’. 
In the following section some research studies willbe introduced which all 
aim to find association between the level of discloure of intangible items in finan-
cial reports of the sample companies and some country-specific or firm-related fac-
tors. These studies are all based on samples containing large firms, from different 
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countries and industry sectors. The data is collected by analyzing the intangible-
related information disclosed by firms, usually in the narrative sections of the finan-
cial reports. In all cases some kind of self-constructed disclosure index is applied.  
3.  Preparers’ point of view – international studies 
Considering preparers and users financial reports, they have to align with existing 
regulations. As we have mentioned, the reporting framework includes some alterna-
tive choices for the entities therefore the application of the rules and the methodolo-
gy of reporting might show some differences between companies. Those companies 
that have significant internally generated intangible property make their decisions 
about consigning such information to the stakeholders. As we have seen, financial 
reporting regulations do not support including these types of assets on the balance 
sheet. However, preparers have an alternative opportunity to supplement the data 
given in the financial reports: they can prepare any ki d of business reports on vol-
untary basis. Totally new frameworks of business repo ting have evolved over the 
last decade and some companies devote significant resou ces to disclose information 
on sustainable growth, corporate responsibility, human capital etc.  
Annual reports created by firms that operate in different countries show the 
diversity of the reporting culture related to intangible property. Several international 
studies have been organized to find relationship betwe n the amount of intangible 
items reported in mandatory or voluntary disclosure and other features of compa-
nies.  
Ragini (2012) examines and compares various disclosure practices of the top 
one hundred Indian, US and Japanese firms over the period 2000-2005. The sample 
includes the first 100 most valuable companies of India in the Compedium of Top 
500 Companies in India, 100 US, and 60 Japanese companies listed in the Fortune 
Global 500 World’s Largest Corporations. The author creates a disclosure index of 
180 intangible items classified into the following groups: research and development, 
strategy and competition, market and consumer, human resource, intellectual proper-
ty rights & goodwill, corporate and shareholder information, environment and oth-
ers. The study reveals that all countries show a significant improvement in their 
overall disclosure scores over the five year period. The author also analyzes group-
wise disclosure and finds that Indian companies disclosed more information on ‘re-
search & development’ and ‘human resource’ while US companies disclosed more 
information on ‘strategy and competition’, ‘market and consumer’, and ‘IPRs and 
goodwill’. Japanese companies disclosed more on ‘corporate and shareholder’ and 
‘environment and others’ (Ragini 2012, p. 57.). The study also discusses the associa-
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tion between selected company attributes and overall disclosure scores. The results 
show that the disclosure score of the Indian entitis are more associated with organi-
zational size and profitability, while those of the US companies are more associated 
with industry type. In case of the Japanese companies, disclosure scores are associ-
ated with organizational size (Ragini 2012, p. 61.). 
Kang and Gray (2009) examine the extent of intangible asset disclosure of 
emerging market companies. The source of their sample is the list of the top 200 
emerging market companies in 2002 from the July 14, 2003 issue of Business Week. 
The authors analyze the narrative sections within the annual reports of the final sam-
ple of 144 firms. The dependent variable in the calcul tion is the level of intangible 
asset disclosure based on an index measured using the Value Chain Scoreboard 
elaborated by Professor Lev Baruch. The independent variables are different corpo-
rate and country specific features. The results of the study show that corporate-
specific factors, such as the adoption of global (international) reporting systems 
(IFRS or USGAAP2), industry type, price-to-book ratio are the key factors signifi-
cantly associated with intangible assets disclosure. Country-specific factors includ-
ing risks associated with economic policies and the legal systems are also found to 
be of key importance (Kang–Gray 2009, p. 420.).  
Kumar (2013) performs similar calculations on a sample of all U.S.-listed 
Asian companies in the year of 2007, totaling 74 firms from nine countries in the fi-
nal sample. The results indicate that larger firms, firms with greater ownership dis-
persion, and firms with lower leverage provide more voluntary disclosure of intan-
gibles information. Kumar also examines the effect of domestic culture on the level 
of disclosure incorporating two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions into the model. 
Results show that sample companies from countries that are more individualistic are 
providing higher voluntary intangible information (results failed to support the hy-
pothesis related to power distance).  
4. Planned research 
The reason why international studies of intangible reporting focus on large firms is 
obvious: they are the ones that have the resources and are capable of preparing such 
reports. Part of the planned research is accomplishing similar analysis to those de-
scribed in the previous section. An analysis on a Hungarian sample is planned using 
the same intangible disclosure index as Ragini (2012). Additional data on corporate-
                                                   
 
2 United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
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specific features (applied standards, size, sector, apital structure, market to book 
ratio etc.) of the firms will also be obtained from the financial reports disclosed by 
companies. The purpose of the work is discovering the tendencies of the largest 
Hungarian firms: identifying the groups of intangible items they are reporting. The 
data gained from the research could also help identifying some areas to improve and 
showing the best practice of intangible reporting among large firms.  
The most numerous group of companies, the small and medium size entities 
are also possible subjects of research. Counting the in angible items is their financial 
reports would probably lead to less impressive results than the previously mentioned 
researches, but there lie some answers to be found considering SMEs too. A firm be-
ing small does not mean that it possesses no significa t intangible property to report 
to stakeholders. In today’s knowledge based economy start up activities are based on 
new technologies, ideas, implemented by qualified workforce, all of which are in-
tangible resources. Many companies start small and perform phenomenal growth 
paces, which is impossible without investors or creditors who buy into the ideas they 
are selling. Investors and creditors are the primary users of financial reports, there-
fore these reports should serve as a tool of disclosing all the information they need. 
Does it really work that way? 
The aim of the future research is to discover the financial reporting culture of 
the SMEs of the region. In order to gain some information besides the data of the fi-
nancial reports, some qualitative research is planned. Questionnaires and interviews 
are appropriate research methods to answer the questions related to the following re-
search topics: 
- firms’ opinion on the purpose of financial reporting; 
- the usefulness of the narrative sections of financial reports; 
- voluntary disclosures in annual reports; 
- the relevance of the deficiencies of intangible repo ting standards/regulations; 
- identifying, registering and measuring intangible property. 
 
The expected outcome of the planned research is creating a database on the 
intangible items reported by large Hungarian firms. The database could be used to 
execute some statistic calculations based on which comparisons are possible with the 
results of the mentioned international surveys. Examining the intangible reporting 
practice of larger companies also can serve as an input n the process of creating the 
questionnaire and interview questions for the survey elated to smaller entities of the 
region. Those practices applied by domestic enterprises are easier to understand and 
embrace for smaller preparers, therefore these examples may facilitate the drawing 
of some proposals for the improvement of the intangible reporting culture of the 
smaller firms of the region. 
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13. The triple nature of the crisis – Are growth-oriented 
economies able to handle it? 
An alternative: The theory of de-growth 
Judit Dombi 
 
The world has been facing an economic crisis from 2008 and is still trying to overcome it. 
The current crisis has two forgotten dimensions – social and environmental – which started 
decades ago. 
Territorial and income inequalities are widening at all levels – global, national and 
regional – despite of the economic growth of the last decades. In addition, after meeting the 
basic needs – e.g. food, drinking water and healthcre – happiness does not correlate 
strongly with material well-being but rather with other qualitative factors influencing our 
lives. 
Moreover, nature’s carrying capacity is finite and we already caused several global 
problems like damaged ozone layer, climate change, and the overuse of other global com-
mon pool resources (rainforests, oceans). More than 20 years after the beginning of the dis-
cussions about sustainable development we are still unable to find an overall solution for the 
unsustainable environmental and social processes. 
Current economies are growth-oriented based on the institutions of capitalism and 
most of us are waiting for the solution of today’s problems from economic growth. But if 
growth is the problem itself, then it cannot handle th se problems. Present capitalist econo-
mies are not capable of not growing because without economic growth they collapse and 
new problems emerge beside the aforementioned ones. 
As an alternative, the theory of de-growth suggests that we should reconsider our 
goals and means. The actual growth-based economic system and its institutions should be 
restructured and new means should be used. The democratic and peaceful transition should 
help to move towards real sustainability. 
 
Keywords: environmental crisis, social crisis, sustainability, capitalism, de-growth 
1. Introduction 
In the recent years the world has been facing an eco omic crisis. Still these days we 
can hear from many sources about the caused economic problems which are still un-
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solved. Mainstream economists and politicians are waiting for the answer from eco-
nomic growth. 
We usually tend to forget that the current crisis ha other two dimensions also 
– social and environmental – which started decades go. What if growth is the prob-
lem itself of all the three dimensions of the crisis? Then we cannot wait for the an-
swer from it. 
The question is whether the present capitalist economies are capable of not 
growing or not. Currently it seems that they cannot. As an alternative, the theory of 
de-growth suggests that we should reconsider our means and ends. The actual 
growth-based economic system and its institutions should be restructured and new 
means should be used. The democratic and peaceful transition should help to move 
towards real sustainability. 
In this paper first I introduce briefly the ecological and social dimensions of 
the crisis and point out that economic growth might be the problem itself. Then as 
another way, I introduce the alternative of de-growth and make an attempt to present 
its connection with capitalism. 
2. The ecological crisis 
Kenneth Boulding declares that ‘anyone who believes exponential growth can go on 
forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist’. We have been living 
on credit: according to the index of ecological footprint if everybody on Earth lived 
an American lifestyle we would need six planets (Latouche 2011). 
Nature’s carrying capacity is finite and we already caused several global prob-
lems like damaged ozone layer, climate change, and the overuse of other global 
common pool resources. Global common pool resources – Antarctica, oceans, rain-
forests, Earth’s atmosphere and biological diversity – are in danger (Sachs 2005). 
The problem is that the price of natural resources is low and depositing the garbage 
is almost free. Specialization and commerce cause a decrease in agricultural diversi-
ty in traditional agro-societies. It seems that the environment mainly suffers from 
over-growth thus from over-use of the resources or from the over increment of hu-
man race, and not from the inefficient use of the resources. It is not enough to be 
more efficient as it causes just more use of the giv n resource – which we call as 
Jevons paradox – and then the situation is even worse. E.g. the number of cars is 
growing four times faster than the population of the Earth. Losing of ecological re-
sistance potentially causes serious problems as the yst m will be less capable to 
hold up human existence and uncertainties are growing regarding the environmental 
effects of economic activity. 
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Many people are pushed to the periphery because of the expanding growth 
which causes drought, disappeared animals, fenced and ruined fields (Sachs 2007). 
Moreover these people have to show up in the urban m rkets where they have no 
purchase power, so poverty is all that remains. Hence, poverty is started to be corre-
lated with the ruin of environment but we should not mix up cause and effect (Sachs 
2005). 
Latouche (2011) declares that growth is already not sus ainable. Our economy 
has over-grown; people make waste from resources faster than nature produces re-
sources again from trash. The worldwide ecological dept has increased from 70% to 
120% from 1960 to 1999, and it is just rising as the lifetime of products is getting 
shorter and shorter (Arrow et al. 2005, Latouche 2011). Developed world continue 
to consume wastefully. 80% of the products on the market go to the dustbin after on-
ly one use which creates an annual 760 kg of household waste per person in the 
USA, while 40 kg paper based advertisement goes into the post-boxes. Currently 
developed countries produce all together 4 billion t s rubbish per year. The huge 
amount of freely or incorrectly deposed trash is poisonous and exceeds the ecologi-
cal systems’ natural anabolic capacity. It takes deca s, centuries or more that these 
radioactive, PCB, CFC etc. materials state their effects causing diseases and global 
climate change. The losses are significant, irreversible and show asymmetric distri-
bution in time. While revenues come in immediately, costs come up in the future 
(Spash 2005). 
Goergescu-Roegen draws our attention that the law of entropy can be used in 
the analysis of economic processes. According to him it s important to take into ac-
count the biological, physical limitations of all economic activity, system or tech-
nology, and it is necessary to redefine what we call scarcity. In addition, we should 
take into account that the most of the processes of the economy is one-way, irre-
versible and indefinable from the aspect of society and environment, and the pro-
cesses for the entire economy, – with today's word alive – the sustainability from so-
cial and environmental aspects. So economy should be treated as an opened system 
which interacts with its environment, and which uses low-entropy, valuable inputs, 
while the outputs are high-entropy and worthless. Hence, one of the targets should 
be the reduction of throughput (Pataki 2002a, 2002b). 
3. The social crisis 
Territorial and income inequalities are widening at all levels – global, national and 
regional – despite of the economic growth of the last decades. The poverty in the 
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world is huge; many people are not able to meet their basic needs – e.g. food, drink-
ing water and healthcare. 
When we are talking about social crisis we should mention not only the prob-
lems of the poorest people but the problems of the rich ones also. At this point it is 
important to take difference between material welfar  and real well-being. While the 
previous concentrates on the material dimension, on affluence, the latter means an 
overall sense of comfort where income and consumption are just one of the compo-
nents (Fitoussi et al. 2009). Living conditions, health, education, living environment, 
infrastructure, working hours, leisure time, social c pital, personal relationships, 
democratic and citizens’ possibilities, economic, political and environmental uncer-
tainties, and subjective well-being should be taken into account also.  
The growth in GDP of developed world and the multiplication of consump-
tion per person do not cause necessarily an increasing proportion of well-being. In 
many cases the rising incomes do not involve decreasing working hours and increas-
ing leisure time (Pataki–Takács-Sánta 2007). It would be necessarily to spend more 
time on other values, such as family and social reltions. Thus, in addition that we 
excessively pollute our environment, it is not even c rtain that majority of the socie-
ty feels itself good (Latouche 2011). 
This is proved for example by the paradox of appropriation of consumption 
(Lindenberg 2005). Most of the ordinary commodities can be more or less expropri-
ated. E.g. a family can use a bathroom in common but every member of it can have 
his/her own one. We can see the trend that the higher is one’s income the more 
he/she appropriates his/her consumption. But what is so paradoxial in this phenome-
non is that with the increasing expropriation peopl destroy certain forms of social 
appreciation which they cannot substitute own their own. If everything is totally ex-
propriated e.g. in a family there is no need to share anything, and follow the norms 
of sharing, after a time the members of it will admit that they miss the ‘good old 
times’ when they were less rich but they were more important to each other. So as 
income is increasing sharing groups are shrinking. At the same time social norms, 
local traditions, ethnic specialties cannot be held up without them. Thus the personal 
ownership of a product or a service might cause pleasure in shorter term, but in 
longer term we pays heavily for it. So after meeting the basic needs, happiness de-
pends on other qualitative factors influencing our lives, which are not necessarily 
correlated with wealth (Kallis et al. 2012). 
Another proof is that the continuous redefinitions of social status holding up 
permanent tension in the society in global, national, regional and communal level 
too (Corrigan 2010, Csigó 2007). Usually the aim of our consumptions is not to 
break from the crowd but to reach a socially accepted honourable limit in quantity 
and quality as well (Veblen 1975). Do we really need these kind of situations, if yes, 
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in what extent, and how the enormous amount of promotion strengthen these pro-
cesses, so they become unperceived a part of our lives.
Layard (2007) declares also that the determining factors of our happiness are 
rather our relationships with family and friends than our income. Our satisfaction of 
our income depends on how much the others earn, and what we are used to earn. 
4. An alternative: the theory of de-growth 
In section 2 and 3, I introduced the problem of continuous growth. As an alternative 
direction, the theory of de-growth appeared, introducing that the continuous growth 
is not desirable; moreover, in many cases it is specifically harmful. 
4.1. The interpretations of de-growth 
The meaning of the expression of de-growth can be defined from three different, 
mutually not exclusive aspects. From the first aspect it means a provocative slogan 
which message is that economic growth as the main social mean and end should be 
questioned, and we should get rid of the related usual mode of thinking (Latouche 
2011). 
From the second aspect de-growth is a social movement; as the program of 
de-growth has become a scientific research field from a French civil movement 
which started in the early 2000s. In France a politica  party (Parti pour la Décrois-
sance) is related to it, but it is not really decidd whether it is closer to the right or 
the left side. Years later, this social and political ambition has become stronger; 
there are more and more countries where groups are organized along this principle, 
there are more and more related concrete alternative, and the scientific world organ-
izes more and more conferences in this topic. 
From the third aspect de-growth is a complex scientif c theory which ap-
peared as an alternative counterpoint of the challenges and tasks caused by continu-
ous economic growth. The aim is a peaceful and democratic transition to a more eq-
uitable society and a more livable environment (Latouche 2011, Martínez-Alier et al. 
2010). Today's mainstream economics accepts that perman nt growth is desirable, 
whereas de-growth might provide a completely new paradigm. Today, everything 
and everyone – individuals, companies and institutions – operate along the same 
principle that growth is desirable. If growth rate reduces or stops – for example dur-
ing recessions – it causes serious problems. The growth-oriented capitalist econo-
mies are unprepared for how to de-grow, during these times, as Kallis et al. (2012) 
write they collapse. That is, the GDP reduces, the unemployment rate increases, the 
currency weakens, the investments are uncertain, the public debt rises, the propor-
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tion of emigrants increases, etc. Therefore the theory suggests the overall restructur-
ing of the current growth-oriented economic system, but not de-growth in the pre-
sent system (Latouche 2011). We should move on the dominant discourse, and we 
should get rid of the pressure of growth. The main objective of the transformation is 
a social and economic system where bigger well-being could be reached without the 
continuous growth in production and consumption, and where the environmental 
pressure would be significantly reduced. 
Latouche (2011) hopes that the possible outcomes of the whole de-growth 
program would include the following: protection of the environment, greater well-
being, less unemployment, less stress, more transparent production chains, reduction 
of dependency from multinational companies, increasing security in all aspects, 
strengthening democratic attitudes and participation in decision-making, opportuni-
ties for the Third World. The implementation could be started first in the field of 
food supply, and later it could be extended to a broader economic and financial self-
sustainability also (Latouche 2011). 
Figure 1. Mapping of views on sustainable development 
 
Source: Own construction based on Hopwood et al. (2005) 
 
Hopwood et al. (2005) figure summarizes a set of theories about sustainable 
development. On the vertical axis we see how important a theory considers well-
De-growth 
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being and social equity, while on the horizontal axis how much a theory focuses on 
environment. The figure shows a third dimension that what kind of changes a theory 
considers necessary: status quo, reformist or transformative. If we place the theory 
of de-growth in this figure, it would be in the upper right-range, in the transforma-
tive category. De-growth is probably more sensitive towards the environmental 
problems than towards social problems. 
The three approaches of de-growth cannot be sharply separated, since they 
continuously interact with each other, thereby they repeatedly fertilizes the thoughts 
related to the topic. This process is illustrated by Figure 2. 










Source: Own construction 
 
Although the three interpretations cannot be clearly distinguished, the rest of 
the paper primarily deals with the approach of scientific theory, but of course the 
theory is closely related to movements which can also be considered means. After 
introducing shortly some means on different levels the paper focuses on the connec-
tion of de-growth with capitalism. 
4.2. The levels and means of de-growth 
The changes following the principles of de-growth has already been started. Several 
attempts, means can be experienced which are certainly waiting to be improved, but 
a process has begun. For example, in Spain several initi tives have been started 
(Amate et al. 2013, Cattaneo–Gavalda 2010). The steps for the implementation of 
the ideas of the movements can be grouped into four main categories, depending on 
which level of the society is affected. This is thepoint where scientific theories and 
movements continuously interact with each other, so there is no strict boundary be-
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On the individual level the program can be described as a lifestyle, a form of 
life where the participant voluntarily take on simplicity and a sustainable mode of 
life which can be as a form of symbolic consumption and which does not mean as-
ceticism, nor that from now he/she cannot has beautiful dresses, low-energy tools, 
cannot go for calm and relaxing holidays and cannot eat delicious foods (Málovics–
Prónay 2008, Kallis et al. 2012). As Veblen (1975) stated also the aim of a signifi-
cant portion of our consumption is ostentation and status-gaining which might be 
one of the keys to the global ecological crisis (Flipo 2008). Thus citizens of the 
Western civilization have to sober urgency, starting with the richest ones’ responsi-
bility. The program does not mean retrogression or setting back an earlier era of his-
tory but the realization of the principle “better from less” (Matthey 2010). 
Thinkers of de-growth strongly believe in bottom-up initiatives, so in the 
community level. It is important to rethink the redistribution and the recycling of 
goods organized from the bottom (Schneider 2008). It is worth to look back, learn 
from former societies – natural tribes, hunter-gatherer societies – in order to be able 
to respect more each other and the nature (Gowdy 2007). Innovative models of local 
life are needed (Kallis et al. 2012). New means can be: the model of cohousing, lo-
cal currencies, localized production and supply system , self-sufficient organiza-
tions, small-scale sustainable agricultural production, new forms of coexistence, 
community gardens, etc. (Liegey et al. 2013, Lietaert 2010, Longhurst–Seyfang 
2013). Every kind of attempt for new models of production and consumption which 
would serve the aims of de-growth should be supported. 
Means are needed on national level as bottom up strategies cannot be efficient 
without top-down actions (van den Bergh 2011). Despit  many scientists have criti-
cized the indicator of GDP, governments on the natio l level intend to increase it – 
this is called as the paradox of GDP. So beside a fundamental change in the atti-
tudes, adequate information-transfer is required from science to society, education 
and the media, and opened public discussions are necessary for the acceptance of the 
conceptions. At these higher levels of governance, it would be important to recog-
nize and admit the financial, physical, natural, infrastructural and time limitations, 
and national and international strategies should be developed in accordance with 
them (Schneider 2008). According to the scientific l terature basic income is consid-
ered a very important mean which can be connected mostly to the national level, but 
it can be connected even to the communal level also. Launching basic income could 
help on poverty, unemployment, uncertainty and even on those who always work 
over (Mylondo 2008). 
On the international level multilateral agreements and relevant Community 
policies are needed to be successful (van den Bergh 2011). Many pollutants – such 
as greenhouse gases – cause global problems which cannot be handled by only one 
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country. On international level we should take differences which countries have to 
de-grow. Of course, in a certain scale and type, so called selective growth is needed 
in the southern countries (Foster 2011, Kallis et al. 2012, van den Bergh 2011). In 
many societies the basic needs – drinking water, food, healthcare – are not met. 
Therefore the de-growth expectations (reduction in co sumption and production) 
towards the western countries cannot be applied to them, but instead a new sustaina-
ble development path should be worked out which does not lead to the same impasse 
as the path of western societies. 
5. De-growth and capitalism 
The common vision of de-growth researchers that economy should get in a kind of 
state which can be considered sustainable socially and environmentally too. So the 
program is not an aim, but primarily a process which appoint the way for it. In order 
to really start this process it is necessary to ident fy the institutional and technologi-
cal limitations that are currently inhibit this way (Griethuysen 2010). 
First, one of the pillars of the capitalist model of development, the institution 
of property should be examined. Two main potentials of the property can be defined. 
One is the potential of possession which provides th  right to have a say in a matter, 
and a variety of other rights. The other is the potential of the propriety itself, which 
gives the possibility of getting and giving credit. The latter allows the actors of the 
economy to extend his/her economic activity or invest in new ones which is a cumu-
lative process as more property and status can be acquired (Griethuysen 2010). 
However, this process does not only allow growth, but also forces it since the credits 
with their interests have to be paid back on time. At this point the problems are con-
nected to monetary system’s problems. Those debtors who are unable to pay their 
credit back on time are selected out of the property-based economy. Creditors give 
the impulse for further expansion of the capitalist economic system by choosing the 
activities to be financed, so innovations are profit-driven. In this process the ecolog-
ical and social aspects are effaced thus it is difficult to imagine “win-win” strategies, 
so social differences are widening, social hierarchy is strengthening. This process is 
path-dependent which implies this development path where there is no internal limi-
tation and which seems to lock in because it cannot handle the caused problems. The 
limitation should arrive from outside, we should intervene in this process and rede-
fine the legal limits of the economic system (Griethuysen 2010). During the transi-
tion very low or zero interest rates should be considered (Kallis et al. 2012). 
According to the previous thoughts an eco-compatible capitalist system in 
practice does not seem realistic (Foster 2011). But the main cause of environmental 
198 Judit Dombi 
 
degradation is economic growth, and the capacity of the environment cannot be in-
creased, and the environment cannot be substituted perfectly, which is called as 
strong sustainability theory. A de-accumulation process should be started stopping 
the concentration of capital without limitations whic  strengthens a kind of modern 
caste system. However in such a process the questions of succession should be han-
dled with special care. 
According to Lawn (2011) the capitalist system mainly depends on its institu-
tional framework which supports and forms it, thus many kind of the system can be 
imagined. By re-planning it a green, dematerialized capitalism can be developed 
which can support the steady-state level. 
6. Discussion 
The present crisis which is a triple crisis – so not only economic but social and envi-
ronmental also – might help us to take ourselves some basic questions like ‘Where 
we are?’, ‘How did we get here?’ and ‘Where are we going?’ (Kallis et al. 2010). 
Everyone should have the right to live a good, enjoyable, qualitative life on intra-
generational and inter-generational level also. The current growth-oriented world ra-
ther threatens it that give appropriate conditions a d framework for it. Although so-
cial classes, differences have always been, and probably there always will be, the ex-
tent of the difference should not be ignored. 
It is a question that where and in which direction the theory of de-growth will 
change. There is many coercive forces that changes have to be made on the current 
system. However, to be able to start the process, politics, social attitudes, institutions 
and actually everything should work for the new aims, so that the theory would be 
widely accepted and would put in practice. We need to find the democracy of de-
growth. Johanisova–Wolf (2012) economic democracy might be good for describing 
it: ‘a system of checks and balances on economic power and support for the right of 
citizens to actively participate in the economy regardless of social status, race, gen-
der, etc.’ 
If we cannot change the current economic and social system, everyone – indi-
viduals and companies – has an interest in growth which is a treadmill where there is 
no exit. This process – the coercion of growth – can be described by theory of 
‘treadmill of production’ (Gould et al. 2003). Another big question is that if the aims 
of de-growth can be achieved within the framework of capitalism, as capitalism is 
about agglomeration from its definition, a social system where private property and 
market transactions dominates (Kallis et al. 2012, Trainer 2012). 
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De-growth does not have only one, perfectly defendable definition, currently 
it is not a specific, single alternative but a matrix of various alternatives which opens 
a space for creativity raising the heavy blanket of the present economic system 
(Latouche 2010). De-growth is a complex method of treatment which aims to take 
into account economic, financial, social, environmetal, cultural and civilizational 
aspects. 
The different notions of de-growth agrees that in order to achieve a better fu-
ture – from the aspect of society and environment also – this program or a similar 
must play the key role, and many people thinks this process seems inevitable. It is 
important to note that as our problems are serious and difficult to solve, the main-
stream economics should also consider it. The solution is probably the result of the 
variation of many ideas which tolerate and understand each other. As Martínez-Alier 
et al. (2010) wrote we must ask the question that would we like to follow the busi-
ness as usual which promise less and less good for future, or would we like to work 
on a currently utopian but livable system? After all, the current growth seems unre-
alistic in the long run (Kallis et al. 2012). 
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